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Summary 
Property taxes tend to be under-used globally, especially in developing countries. This is 
particularly true in Pakistan. To explore the reasons, I studied policymaking and administration 
in relation to the recurrent (annual) property tax in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous and 
urbanised province. I used a mix of research methods, including extensive field observations of 
how the lower level tax staff of the Excise and Taxation Department go about their work.  
I found three major probable explanations for the very low levels of property tax collections: 
• Especially after a major decentralisation reform in 2001, responsibilities for collecting 
the property tax and the revenues it produces are both divided in complex ways between three 
levels of subnational government. Each level has low incentives to perform its tax collection 
functions.  
• Each level of subnational government obtains most of its income either from transfers 
from higher levels of government or from loans. It generally seems easier for them to increase 
their incomes by putting more effort into tapping these sources, rather than trying to improve 
their own tax collection performance. The lack of strong political pressures to increase spending 
has a reinforcing effect. 
• It has become administratively difficult for senior policymakers to increase property tax 
revenue collections through mobilising the organisational resources of the Excise and Taxation 
Department. Property tax collection has become locked into a system that combines (a) a high 
degree of informality in routine practices, (b) exclusive control of detailed information about tax 
collection potential and performance by lower level staff and (c) modest rent-taking and 
responsiveness to local pressures for leniency in tax collection at these lower levels. When 
higher-level officials in the Department attempt periodically to enforce the achievement of 
higher tax collection targets, they are mostly frustrated by these informal working practices and 
relationships. 
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1 Why is property tax in Punjab so low? 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with finding reasons for exceptionally low property tax 
collection in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous and urbanised province. I first got 
interested in the issue of low property tax as a senior civil servant while heading a 
provincial public sector reform programme supported by the Asian Development Bank, 
in 2008. The Punjab Government Efficiency Improvement Programme was initiated in 
2002. It partly focused on increasing sub-national1 tax collection in Punjab. Property tax 
was high on the reform agenda because it is a local government tax; and Pakistan had a 
major decentralisation reform in 2001 that substantially increased local government 
responsibilities for service delivery. Since most property tax functions are performed by 
the provincial government, extensive policy advice and technical assistance was 
provided at the provincial level, over the decade of the 2000s. The provincial 
government repeatedly committed to its aid donors that it will increase property tax 
collection. Despite this, and all the efforts supported by the aid donors, in real terms, 
property tax collection declined substantially over the last ten years (see figure 1.1).  
When I started investigating the case of property tax in Punjab for my doctoral research, 
I realized that property tax collection is universally low, compared to its potential. There 
are a number of reasons cited for low property tax collection all over the world: 
property tax is unpopular, which can lead to political resistance; since it is a local 
government tax, higher level governments may oppose increases in the tax; property tax 
functions are usually divided between different levels of government, the higher level 
governments may not have incentives to perform these energetically; property 
revaluations are not conducted as often as they should be, which erodes the basis on 
which the tax liability is calculated; there can be a number of problems with tax 
assessment, collection and enforcement; and finally chances of collusion between 
taxpayers and tax collectors can be relatively high.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘sub-­‐national’	  to	  denote	  the	  provincial	  government	  and	  all	  the	  levels	  of	  local	  government	  below	  it.	  ‘Local	  governments’	  denote	  three	  levels	  –	  the	  district,	  town	  and	  union	  –under	  the	  Punjab	  Local	  Government	  Ordinance	  (2001).	  In	  Punjab	  province	  there	  are	  36	  district	  jurisdictions	  that	  comprise	  144	  town	  jurisdictions,	  which	  in	  turn	  comprise	  about	  4,000	  union	  jurisdictions.	  The	  union	  level	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  property	  taxation.	  Out	  of	  the	  36	  districts,	  the	  five	  (most	  populous	  and	  urbanised)	  are	  declared	  as	  City	  Districts.	  	  
 
 
2 
Given these reasons, Punjab’s exceptionally low property tax collection should not be 
surprising. In the case of property tax in Punjab, experts (mostly aid donor consultants) 
point out that low collection is due to a number of reasons, including a high level of 
exemptions; a non-expanding tax base despite rapid urbanisation; failure to revalue 
properties; remissions for owner-occupied properties; weak administrative and 
accounting systems; low-skilled tax collectors etc. But these reasons only touch the 
surface. Low tax collection, as I show through my research has deeper underlying 
causes, which have largely not captured the attention of scholars of taxation so far.   
Thus, in this thesis I ask the question: what are the deeper structural reasons that explain 
low property taxation in Punjab? Are the factors suggested by the literature simply 
overwhelmingly present in the Punjab? Or are there other, hitherto unexplored 
dynamics at play?  
To answer my main question, I carried out an in depth study of property taxation in 
Punjab. In Punjab, there are various kinds of taxes levied on property, including those 
on its ownership and transfer. This thesis is only concerned with recurrent (annual) 
property tax in urban areas.2 I use the term ‘property tax’ in its most common sense to 
mean recurrent (annual) tax on immoveable property (land and/ or improvements) in 
urban areas (Norregaard, 2013).3 I used mixed research methods, that included 
investigating the question at various levels of government and observation of tax 
collectors in field offices of the provincial Excise and Tax Department (that collects 
property tax) over a period of six months out of a full year’s fieldwork.    
What I found was eye-opening. While the factors mentioned in the literature were no 
doubt present, on the ground there was a whole set of additional factors that led to 
perverse performance. Three dynamics stand out. First, especially after a major 
decentralisation reform in 2001, responsibilities for collecting the property tax and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Five	  separate	  charges	  are	  levied	  on	  the	  formal	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  of	  real	  estate.	  They	  are	  significant	  to	  this	  thesis	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  (the	  first	  four	  named	  below)	  collectively	  provide	  more	  revenue	  for	  sub-­‐national	  governments	  than	  does	  the	  property	  tax.	  The	  levies	  are:	  (i)	  Stamp	  Duty	  on	  transactions;	  (ii)	  Registration	  Fee	  for	  recording	  changes	  in	  property	  ownership;	  (iii)	  Capital	  Value	  Tax	  on	  transfers;	  (iv)	  Transfer	  Tax	  on	  Immoveable	  Property;	  and	  (v)	  Withholding	  income	  tax	  on	  real	  estate	  transactions,	  recently	  introduced	  by	  the	  Federal	  Government.	  The	  first	  three	  levies	  belong	  to	  the	  provincial	  government	  while	  the	  fourth	  belongs	  to	  the	  local	  (town)	  governments.	  3	  In	  Pakistan,	  recurrent	  (annual)	  property	  tax	  is	  formally	  known	  as	  the	  Urban	  Immoveable	  Property	  Tax	  (UIPT)	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revenues it produces are both divided in complex ways between three levels of sub-
national government. Each level has low incentives to perform its tax collection 
functions. Second, each level of sub-national government obtains most of its income 
either from transfers from higher levels of government or from loans. It generally seems 
easier for them to increase their incomes by putting more effort into tapping these 
sources, rather than trying to improve their own tax collection performance. The lack of 
strong political pressures to increase spending has a reinforcing effect. Third, property 
tax collection has become locked into a system that combines (a) a high degree of 
informality in routine practices, (b) exclusive control of detailed information about tax 
collection potential and performance by lower level staff and (c) modest rent-taking and 
responsiveness to local pressures for leniency in tax collection at these lower levels. 
When higher-level officials in the Excise and Taxation Department attempt periodically 
to enforce the achievement of higher tax collection targets, they are mostly frustrated by 
these informal working practices and relationships. These suggest that one needs to 
understand institutional incentives within local level tax bureaucracies and their 
relationship with provincial government, higher levels of the tax system as well as 
elected politicians. 
In the next section (1.2) of this introductory chapter, I elaborate my research question. 
In section 1.3 I present the broader context of taxation in Pakistan and highlight what 
we already know about property taxation in Punjab. In section 1.4 I review the general 
literature on property taxation to find some of the common explanations for low 
property tax collection and discuss the extent to which these are expected to be relevant 
to my case. I also elaborate on the importance of this study. In section 1.5 I build my 
research framework and discuss my research approach, and also explain how I 
investigated my main question including data collection. Lastly, I present my main 
findings and the chapter outlines, as well as research contribution in section 1.6.  
1.2 The research question 
This thesis deals with the question, why is property tax collection in Punjab 
exceptionally low? In Punjab the ratio of property tax to GDP is 0.03%.4 This is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  property	  tax	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  for	  Punjab	  varies	  in	  different	  studies.	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  the	  Government	  of	  Pakistan	  does	  not	  officially	  publish	  GDP	  figures	  disaggregated	  by	  provinces.	  Bahl	  and	  Bird	  (2008)	  report	  the	  property	  tax	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  to	  be	  0.09%	  for	  Punjab;	  according	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  (2009c;	  p.131)	  it	  is	  about	  0.03%.	  My	  calculation	  of	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exceptionally low compared to the average of 0.6% in developing countries (Bahl et al., 
2008b, World Bank, 2009c). And despite being the most rapidly urbanising country in 
South Asia with an annual urbanisation rate of 3.1%, Punjab’s ratio is also significantly 
lower than neighbouring India (0.2%), which has many similarities with Pakistan, 
including a largely common history of taxation and administrative systems (Mathur et 
al., 2009, Rao, 2013).5    
Figure 1.1: Punjab property tax to GDP ratio (%) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation, based on data from the Finance Department, Punjab and 
the World Bank (2013). 
In many respects, low property tax collection in Punjab is unsurprising. As pointed out 
in the introduction, tax collection in Pakistan is generally low. In 2010 the ratio of tax to 
gross domestic product (GDP) was about 10%6 while the average of countries with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  ratio	  for	  Punjab	  is	  based	  on	  a	  recent	  World	  Bank	  (2013)	  estimation	  of	  provincial	  GDP	  (see	  figure	  1.1).	  5	  Pakistan	  is	  the	  sixth	  most	  populous	  country	  in	  the	  world	  with	  an	  estimated	  population	  of	  about	  185	  million	  in	  2012.	  Six	  of	  the	  most	  populous	  cities	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Punjab	  (Mustafa	  and	  Sawas	  2013).	  About	  40%	  of	  the	  90	  million	  people	  in	  Punjab	  live	  in	  urban	  areas,	  according	  to	  the	  Pakistan	  Demographic	  Survey,	  2001	  and	  2007.	  Source:	  http://www.statpak.gov.pk/fbs/population_publications.	  	  All	  population	  figures	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  based	  either	  on	  estimates	  or	  surveys	  because	  the	  10-­‐yearly	  population	  census	  has	  not	  been	  conducted	  since	  1998.	  6	  Source:	  International	  Centre	  for	  Tax	  and	  Development	  (ICTD)	  dataset	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comparable income was almost 18%. Pakistan is poor at collecting various types of 
taxes compared to other low middle-income countries7 (LMICs, see table 1.1).  
Table 1.1: Comparing tax to GDP ratios (in 2010) 
Country/ 
Group 
Government 
Revenue 
excluding grants 
Government 
Tax revenue 
Direct 
Taxes 
Value added Tax 
(VAT) Revenue  
Trade Taxes 
Pakistan 14 10.1 3.58 3.59 1 
LMIC 
(average) 
25.6 17.7 5 5 4.9 
Source: ICTD dataset and IMF (2011; p.54) 
Compared to the generally positive trend in other countries in the region, with the 
exception of Sri Lanka, overall tax collection in Pakistan remained fairly static in recent 
years. It has been around 10% of its GDP, from 2000 to 2010 (figure 1.2), having 
regressed from almost 12% in 1996-97.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  categorises	  Pakistan	  as	  a	  lower-­‐middle	  income	  country	  (IMF,	  2011;	  p.55)	  8	  Includes	  only	  income	  taxes	  9	  Pakistan	  has	  a	  General	  Sales	  Tax	  (GST)	  on	  goods	  and	  services	  in	  place,	  which	  is	  in	  essence	  a	  destination	  VAT.	  Ahmad	  (2010)	  provides	  details	  of	  the	  existing	  VAT	  system	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  its	  shortcomings.	  He	  traces	  the	  long	  history	  of	  repeatedly	  failed	  reforms	  to	  institute	  a	  broad-­‐based	  VAT.	  10	  Source:	  ICTD	  dataset	  	  
 
 
6 
Figure 1.2: Regional comparison of tax to GDP ratios (for general government) 
 
Source: ICTD dataset11 
Despite this general environment of low tax collection, the case of property taxation in 
Punjab is puzzling mainly for three reasons. One is that, contrary to expectations that 
greater decentralisation will lead to increased property tax revenues (Norregaard, 2013) 
– a major decentralisation reform in 2001, granting local governments unprecedented 
fiscal and administrative autonomy, has failed to stem the downward slide of property 
tax to GDP ratio in the Punjab (figure 1.1). The second is that, in order to exploit its 
potential in Punjab, property taxation has been high on the agenda of various donors 
supporting fiscal reforms in the province.12 The downward trend of the property tax to 
GDP ratio in Punjab continued despite numerous donor-supported initiatives to reform 
the tax, since 2001.13 The third is that, while the overall tax to GDP ratio for Pakistan 
remained stable (about 10%) over the decade of 2000s, Punjab’s property tax to GDP 
ratio has declined rapidly. 
The last point indicates that property taxes in Punjab are probably affected by factors 
additional to those that impact taxation in Pakistan generally. These are possibly the 
ones that are specific to property taxation. In the following two sections I explore first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Available	  at,	  http://www.ictd.ac/en/about-­‐ictd-­‐government-­‐revenue-­‐dataset	  12	  Nabi	  and	  Shaikh	  (2011)	  estimate	  the	  potential	  of	  property	  tax	  revenue	  in	  Punjab	  at	  Rs.	  25	  billion;	  about	  five	  times	  the	  collection	  in	  financial	  year	  2011-­‐12.	  13	  Major	  donors	  working	  with	  the	  Punjab	  government	  that	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  property	  tax	  reform,	  include	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  and	  more	  recently	  the	  Department	  for	  International	  Development,	  UK.	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the context of taxation in Pakistan, and then review the property tax literature to find 
some common causes of low property taxes. 
1.3 The low tax context of Pakistan 
In the preceding section I showed that tax collection in Pakistan is low compared to 
similar countries, and its tax to GDP ratio has been fairly static over the last decade. 
Most of the donor supported studies attribute low tax collection in Pakistan to some 
relatively obvious factors, for example, a regime of wide-ranging concessions and 
exemptions, rampant tax evasion, and inefficient and corrupt tax administration (World 
Bank, 2009d, 2012a).  
Below I outline and discuss the evidence for low tax collection in Pakistan organising 
the points, starting from more proximate causes to deeper structural ones. 
• First, an immediate cause of low tax collection in Pakistan is weak tax 
administration. It is also prima facie evidence that the government gives little priority to 
taxation. For example, for the year 2004-5, estimated tax gap – difference between 
estimated potential and actual tax collection – for federal taxes was 69% of actual 
collections (Ahmed and Rider, 2008). As in most comparable countries, there are large 
chunks of the economy that are not documented, for example, the small-scale industry.14 
Estimated average tax evasion was about 4% of GDP annually over a forty-year time 
period (Aslam, 1998).15 Estimates of the informal economy put it at about 50% of the 
GDP (Gulzar et al., 2010). The economic and political elite of the country blatantly 
flouts tax laws. For example, 60% of elected public representatives in national and 
provincial parliaments do not file any tax returns (Pasha and Pasha, 2013). The Federal 
Government has taken a number of steps to improve its central tax agency, the Federal 
Board of Revenue (which includes customs) including converting it into a semi-
autonomous tax agency with substantial increase in salaries of its employees. From 
2004 to 2011, a major tax administration reform, the Tax Administration Reform 
Project, was implemented with assistance from aid donors. While some progress was 
made, for example, reorganisation of the tax agency and introduction of information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Small	  scale	  industry	  is	  about	  7%	  of	  the	  GDP,	  according	  to	  the	  State	  Bank	  of	  Pakistan	  (SBP,	  2012).	  15	  Pakistan	  ranks	  high	  on	  international	  corruption	  indices.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  corruption	  and	  governance	  issues	  in	  Pakistan,	  see	  Javaid	  (2010).	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technology, which improved databases and some taxpayer services, generally the 
administrative reforms did not help in improving tax collection. Reforms were not 
successful for a number of reasons including, tax policy, frequent changes in political 
and tax agency leadership, implementation capacity, tax staff resistance to change, and 
generally the government’s weak commitment to reform (World Bank, 2012a; p.33). 
Tax administration remains conspicuously weak in Pakistan: for example, from 2008 to 
2012, the average time spent by taxpayers on preparation and filing tax returns and 
refunds is 560 hours per year. This is the highest in South Asia, where the average time 
is 331 hours per year (World Bank, 2012a; p.31). 
• The second one is another proximate cause: while the Federal Government itself 
is not a good taxer, it has also undermined own source tax revenue generation by sub-
national governments. Some experts attribute this to the tendency of the Federal 
Government to centralize power (Shah, 1996). Sub-national taxation in Pakistan is 0.8% 
of its GDP. Pakistan’s tax system is over-centralized; sub-national government taxes 
contribute about 5% to the total tax revenue in Pakistan while the comparable figure for 
India is 35% (Pasha and Pasha, 2013; p.200). In the case of Pakistan, this is partly 
because the Federal Government abolished some of the sub-national government taxes 
such as land revenue and octroi without replacing them with any substantive, viable 
alternatives. Abolition of these taxes was justified by the Federal Government on 
various pretexts, for example, Islamisation of the economy (e.g. land revenue) and 
pursuing market liberal policies (e.g. octroi).  
 
Land Revenue was a historical and substantial provincial government tax on agricultural 
produce. In 1980s it was replaced by Islamic taxes of ‘Zakat and Ushr’ – levies on 
savings and a nominal part of agricultural produce. Ushr was augmented by the 
agriculture income tax (AIT) in 1990s, but low rates and non-enforcement of AIT 
substantially diluted tax revenue from the agriculture sector which constitutes about 
25% of the GDP. Currently Punjab government collects about Rs. 1 billion agriculture 
income tax; its potential is estimated between Rs. 50-70 billion (Nasim, 2013). Octroi – 
a tax on movement of goods between districts and their import into municipal 
jurisdictions – was a substantial revenue source for local governments. It was abolished 
and replaced by an equivalent grant from the Federal Government in 1990s, because it 
hampered free flow of goods within the country (Ghaus and Pasha, 1988, World Bank, 
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1999). Several of these taxes were significant sources of sub-national government 
revenue. 
 
The rest of the reasons are more structural in nature. 
 
• The third one is foreign aid. Some experts are of the view that Pakistan’s 
continued geo-strategic importance for United States’ interests in the area and its role as 
a front-line state in the Afghan War (1980s) and in the War on Terror (2000s), resulted 
in large amounts of foreign aid over the last forty years. In particular, experts claim that 
the intermittent nature of the aid flows to Pakistan helped the government put off the 
required tax reforms and avoid the political costs of taxation (Ahmad and Mohammed, 
2012).16 However, there is little evidence from cross country statistical analysis that aid 
– including loans and grants – suppresses tax generation in recipient countries (IMF, 
2011, Clist, 2014, Morrissey et al., 2014). In the case of Pakistan specifically, the 
evidence on this issue is mixed and varies for different time periods. Ahmad (2002) 
finds that from 1980 to 2000, while loans have had a positive effect on taxation in 
Pakistan, grants have had a negative effect. Similar work for an earlier period, 1976-95, 
shows that on the whole foreign assistance enhances taxation efforts (Iqbal, 1997).  
 
• The fourth is political (un)willingness to tax. In theory, the possibility of a 
premature end to their rule has been cited as one of the reasons why rulers might not be 
willing to tax the people (Levi, 1988).17 Pakistan has oscillated between civil and 
military rule over the seven decades of its existence. When in 1990s the first time four 
civilian regimes replaced each other in succession, each of them was dismissed 
suddenly by the President (Ahsan and Desai, 2006).18 Similarly, there have been 
numerous disruptions to elected local governments in Pakistan, which might have 
contributed to unwillingness of local level politicians to raise local taxes. Set up during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Also	  see	  proceedings	  of	  a	  seminar,	  ‘Civilian	  Assistance	  to	  Pakistan’,	  held	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  (LSE,	  2012).	  17	  Uncertainty	  about	  continuity	  of	  rule	  is	  expected	  to	  affect	  the	  ‘discount	  rate’	  of	  tax	  revenues	  for	  the	  ruler	  (Levi,	  1988).	  Rulers	  will	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  risk	  losing	  political	  capital	  and	  public	  goodwill	  by	  taxing	  people	  if	  they	  think	  they	  will	  not	  be	  in	  power	  for	  long	  enough	  to	  use	  the	  money	  for	  provision	  of	  public	  services,	  for	  example.	  Olson	  (1993)	  develops	  this	  concept	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘roving’	  and	  ‘settled’	  bandits.	  18	  However,	  since	  2002	  the	  country	  is	  experiencing	  its	  longest	  uninterrupted	  democratic	  spell	  and	  national	  elections	  are	  being	  held	  regularly.	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military regimes – in 1960s by General Ayub Khan; 1980s by General Zia; and by 
General Musharraf in 2000s – elected local governments were disbanded by provincial 
governments each time. For long periods of time provincial governments have 
controlled local governments directly by appointing provincial officials, which is also 
currently the case, since 2010. 
 
No academic study looks specifically at the connection between political uncertainty 
and taxation in the case of Pakistan. One might argue that, on the one hand military 
regimes were not interested in increasing tax collection, while on the other, elected 
governments were unwilling to tax due to uncertainty about continuity of their rule. 
Fear of upsetting powerful interests in absence of a wider political support base might 
have led military regimes to avoid aggressive taxation. In fact, there is some evidence 
that supports the possibility that, in order to make up for their lack of political 
legitimacy military regimes wanted to gain support of powerful groups. For example, 
influential interest groups were the main beneficiaries of tax concessions during General 
Musharraf’s rule from 1999 to 2008 (Pasha and Pasha, 2013).19 
There is a possibility that due to fears of a premature end to their rule, elected civilian 
governments in Pakistan did not pursue taxation aggressively. Military rulers may have 
been equally unwilling because of lack of legitimacy of their rule, the higher risk of 
igniting popular resistance to taxation and their need to appease powerful groups. 
• The fifth is people’s willingness to pay taxes. There is a large literature on tax 
compliance, examining people’s willingness to pay. Some of the factors that may 
determine willingness to pay are: attitudes towards authority and the state, expectations 
of reciprocity by the state, perceptions of other taxpayers’ behaviour, experiences with 
taxpaying and a sense of justice and fairness (Song and Yarbrough, 1978, Fjeldstad, 
2004, Oberholzer, 2005). Due to a paucity of evidence, we simply do not know which 
of these factors shape in willingness to pay taxes in Pakistan. We know though, that tax 
enforcement is selective and often politically motivated; and the politically well-
connected avoid paying taxes. This unequal enforcement may foster a feeling of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Evidence	  of	  military	  regimes	  trying	  to	  gain	  support	  of	  business	  interests	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  General	  Musharraf’s	  regime.	  Previous	  military	  regimes	  also	  followed	  economic	  policies	  which	  favoured	  the	  rich.	  For	  example,	  industrial	  policies	  that	  led	  to	  concentration	  of	  wealth	  in	  the	  ‘22	  families’	  in	  Pakistan	  in	  the	  1960s	  during	  General	  Ayub’s	  regime;	  and	  reversal	  of	  Bhutto’s	  populist	  policies,	  including	  de-­‐nationalisation	  of	  industries	  by	  General	  Zia	  in	  1980s	  (Husain,	  1999).	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injustice on the part of those who are forced to pay.  Further, tax collection mechanisms 
are not transparent or efficient and public service delivery is poor. All these can be 
reasons for people’s resistance towards paying taxes. 
• The sixth reason for low tax collection is resistance by powerful groups. 
Resistance by the elites/ interest groups can take a number of forms, including, 
influencing tax policy and ensuring that tax collection is not enforced (Eisenstein, 
2010). Influence on tax policies in Pakistan is reflected in the arbitrary system of 
awarding exemptions and concessions in various taxes at both federal and sub-national 
levels of government. Tax expenditures – “revenue losses attributed to tax laws which 
provide for a special exclusion, exemption, deduction, tax credit, preferential rate of tax 
or a deferral of tax liability” – have been estimated at about a fourth of total taxes 
collected by the Federal Government (Pasha and Pasha, 2013; p.207).  
 
Selective enforcement of tax collection by the government and tax evasion by the 
political and economic elite is a major factor for low tax collection in Pakistan (Husain, 
1999). Government’s inability to effectively implement agricultural income tax is a case 
in point. A majority of politicians represent rural constituencies themselves have 
substantial agricultural landholdings, and have avoided the tax net (World Bank, 1999). 
Another example of groups successfully resisting taxation is the country-wide bazaar 
unrest when traders refused to cooperate in VAT registration drive led by the military in 
1999 (Ahmad, 2010).  
There is little doubt that some of the structural reasons for generally low tax collection 
in Pakistan discussed above, impact property taxes in Punjab. But, as mentioned earlier, 
the consistent decline in Punjab’s property tax collection in real terms suggests that 
some additional factors specific to property taxation are at play. In the following section 
I discuss some of the general reasons for low property tax collection, and specifically on 
how they might be impacting property taxes in Punjab. I also enumerate the importance 
of this study. 
1.4 Property taxes in the context of taxation 
In the theoretical taxation literature, (annual) property tax is considered a ‘good’ tax for 
a number of reasons. Since it taxes an immobile base – land alone, and/or improvements 
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– it is the least distorting of all taxes in terms of impact on economic incentives and 
does not stimulate much asset flight. It tends to be progressive since it taxes owners of 
land and capital. It is relatively easy for ‘simple’ tax organisations to collect, if it is 
being collected locally. Compared to some other taxes it provides relatively stable 
income through the vagaries of the economic cycle, mostly because property values 
change slowly. Property tax revenues usually fund municipal services that directly 
affect the wellbeing of residents and impact house prices positively. It is considered a 
good way of funding local public services – that cannot be charged to consumers 
individually. Property taxation is also expected to play an important role in 
strengthening local level public accountability.  
Moreover, property taxation is considered most suitable for collection by sub-national 
governments (Bird, 2011). In practice as well, in most of the countries around the 
world, property tax is a local government tax. Although property tax on average 
accounts for just above 1% of GDP in OECD countries and 0.6% in developing 
countries, it is considered an important source of funding for local governments. As 
pointed out earlier there is an expectation that property tax greater decentralisation will 
lead to increased property tax revenues (Bird and Slack, 2004, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Timofeev, 2005, Bahl and Bird, 2008, Bahl et al., 2008a, Bird, 2010, Lutz et al., 2011, 
UN-HABITAT, 2011, Alm, 2013, Cornia, 2013, Kitchen, 2013, Norregaard, 2013).  
Importance of this study 
Findings from my research about extremely low – about twenty times less than 
developing country average – urban immoveable property tax collection in Punjab paint 
a bleak picture and could lead one to question the practicality of continuing with the tax. 
No matter how low it is currently, there are at least three reasons to believe that property 
tax has a future in Punjab and in similar contexts, and that this research is hence 
important. 
First, the annual tax on urban properties is a relatively progressive tax because it is a 
levy on the owners of properties; land and capital being indicative of the wealth of a 
person. Globally inequality is on the rise and there are calls for redistribution of wealth 
through progressive direct taxation. Public protests like ‘occupy Wall Street’, as well as 
academic debates, like the one triggered by Piketty (2014) call for a wealth tax to fight 
inequality. Increased annual property taxes might be a small way of doing this. Since 
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annual property tax paid by the owners of properties is used to fund public services in 
the same local jurisdiction, theoretically and practically it does have a redistributive 
effect, especially if the tax rates are progressive and revenues are expended in the 
jurisdictions that they are collected from. 
To add to the point made above, Pakistan has an exceptionally narrow base of 
individual income taxpayers, in the sense that less than 1 million people out of a 
population of about 180 million file income tax returns. ‘Direct taxes’ (see table 1.1 on 
p.5) comprise income tax collection that is largely based on a ‘withholding’ regime and 
corporate income tax. Income from agriculture – a fourth of the national GDP – is 
barely taxed. The government abolished Wealth Tax in early 2000s during the regime of 
General Musharraf. Experts estimate that the informal economy in Pakistan is almost as 
large as the formal. In this context, it makes sense for the government to improve 
property tax policy and administration so that it is able to tax the rich on at least part of 
their assets that are difficult to hide. 
Second, Pakistan is the most rapidly urbanizing country in South Asia; its urban 
population is growing at a rate of 3% annually. Currently about a third of Pakistan’s 
population resides in urban areas; this is expected to rise to 50% by 2025. By that year 
11 cities in Pakistan will have more than 1 million people living in them. Most of these 
cities are in Punjab province, which currently has a population of about 90 million. 
Punjab’s capital city Lahore, currently at 7 million, is expected to be 10 million strong 
by 2025 (Kugelman, 2014, p.2). These rapidly growing urban concentrations require 
medium to large-scale public infrastructure, like roads, water supply, sanitation and 
other municipal services. Most of these are public services that cannot be charged 
individually. The annual urban property tax is a good way for paying at least the cost of 
running these services, or even partially funding the capital costs. 
 Whenever municipal financing mechanism in Pakistan matures – like issuance of 
municipal bonds, as in some other parts of the world, then local governments with 
reasonable property tax collections would be considered bankable and will be able to 
raise their own finances from the market rather than rely on transfers from higher level 
governments. Presently, the Punjab provincial government is facing immense public 
and political criticism for spending almost a fourth of its annual development 
expenditure on just one mass transit project in the city of Lahore. Lahore, the provincial 
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capital with about 7 million people gets a disproportionate amount of provincial 
government investment. In some of the years in the recent past this has been in excess 
of 50% of the annual provincial development expenditure. As mentioned earlier annual 
property taxes might be low as part of the national tax to GDP ratio, but they are a 
substantial source of income for local governments globally. If property tax collection 
in Punjab is closer to international averages, it would enable the fast growing urban 
centres to at least partly pay for their infrastructure development and maintenance.  
Third, ever since the 7th National Finance Commission Award – that distributes tax 
revenues between the federal and provincial governments – in 2009 and subsequently 
the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, expenditure responsibilities for the 
provincial governments have increased substantially. These have not been 
complemented fully by an increase in the taxes assigned to the provincial governments. 
The provincial governments are under increased pressure to meet more of their 
expenditures with their own taxes. Given this scenario the Punjab provincial 
government can ill-afford to lose out on any subnational government tax base, that 
funds services in the provincial jurisdiction. Income from annual property tax is almost 
Rs. 8 billion in financial year 2015-16; there are a number of considerably smaller taxes 
and levies that the government is still continuing with. The potential for property tax 
revenues in Punjab has been estimated at about Rs. 25 billion (Nabi and Shaikh, 2011). 
The potential for improvement in tax policy and administration can also be gauged from 
the fact that currently property tax collection in Punjab is about 0.03% of its GDP; this 
ratio for developing countries is about 0.6%, which indicates ample room for 
improvement.  
Given the high revenue potential and relative importance of property tax for sub-
national governments, a strong case is made by academics as well as tax practitioners 
for improvements in property tax policy and administration (Bahl et al., 2008b, Bird, 
2010). 
Some common explanations for low property tax collection 
In order to begin to investigate my question of ‘why is property tax so low in Punjab’, it 
is useful to review broadly six common explanations for low recurrent (annual) property 
tax that arise from its specific characteristics.  I then discuss the extent to which these 
explanations are relevant in the case of the Punjab.  
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i. The relative salience of property tax 
In the case of recurrent (annual) property tax, its relative salience – visibility compared 
to some other taxes – makes it unpopular and is considered to be an important external 
factor that might affect taxpayers’ willingness to pay the tax. Although taxpayers bear 
the burden of other taxes as well, the way property tax is charged and paid makes it 
relatively unpopular. It is billed annually and paid directly by the taxpayers in periodic 
lump-sum payments. This is unlike some other taxes, for example, income tax – which 
is at times withheld at source, and sales tax – usually paid in small amounts with 
purchases.  
There is always a chance that the property taxpayer will feel that his/her property is 
relatively overvalued for tax purposes, and resist paying it. Individual property tax 
liability is usually determined on capital or rental value of the property. In absence of 
actual sale or rent these are usually estimated using various techniques. Property 
valuation is ‘inherently an arguable matter’ and may be perceived by taxpayers to be 
unfair and/ or arbitrary. Additionally if the property is not sold or rented then the tax is 
actually being charged on an ‘unrealized’ value. Although an appeals system is 
expected to rectify over-assessment, appeal processes can be expensive and time 
consuming (Bird and Slack, 2004; pp.12-13, Cabral and Hoxby, 2012, Slack, 2013). 
In the case of the United States where individual property tax liabilities are significantly 
higher than many other countries, property tax has been identified as the “worst” tax, 
and is more unpopular than the federal income tax. This is amply demonstrated by caps 
on property tax rates and property valuation freezes imposed by state legislatures in 
numerous states (Bahl et al., 2010, p.10). It has been pointed out that, “there is a well-
documented gap between academic studies that support property taxation and the 
lukewarm or hostile reactions of voters to the property tax” (Pagano and Jacob, 2010; 
p.269).  
Partly because of its relative salience and the ways in which its liability is estimated, 
property taxation is unpopular compared to some other taxes. This makes raising 
revenue from the tax relatively difficult politically. 
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ii. Institutional arrangements to collect property tax and relatively low political 
influence of local governments 
Most national taxes are collected by one tax agency which is responsible to the 
beneficiary, mostly the central government. However, in case of property tax, revenue 
collection and sharing arrangements usually involve different levels of government. 
Some institutional arrangements to collect property tax among different levels of 
government involved in collection and sharing of property tax revenue can affect 
collection. There is a strong theoretical argument for fully decentralizing most policy 
and administrative functions pertaining to property tax to local governments. However, 
practice varies widely in how these functions as well as tax revenue is shared between 
national/ regional and local governments. Experts point out that low property tax 
revenue due to institutional arrangements, on the one hand, may be due to ‘indifference’ 
if the higher level of government retains most of these roles, since they usually do not 
benefit from tax revenues; and on the other hand, from ‘incompetence’ due to capacity 
issues, as well as low ability to enforce, if local governments are largely responsible for 
tax collection (Dillinger, 1988, Bird and Slack, 2004, Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2010, 
Mikesell, 2013, Norregaard, 2013). 
Local governments may be constrained by policies regarding property tax set by the 
higher level of government including capping of tax rates, granting exemptions and not 
revaluing properties. For example, even in the case of United States, with its long 
history of local governance, some state legislatures place limits on increases by local 
governments in property tax rates and/or property revaluations, and have sometimes 
also granted exemptions and tax reliefs. Similar actions have also been reported in the 
case of India where state governments grant exemptions from property tax without 
consulting or compensating the local governments. There can be various reasons for 
actions by the higher level of government, including unpopularity of the tax and 
influence of interest groups. Higher level governments may also be driven by political 
motives and use centralized tax functions to exercise greater fiscal control over local 
governments. Motivated by multiple factors, such actions can impact property taxes 
significantly (Bird and Slack, 2004, Shah, 2005, Bahl et al., 2010, Pagano and Jacob, 
2010, Boex and Kelly, 2013, Ihlanfeldt, 2013, Rao, 2013, Slack, 2013). 
Although considered fit for local governments, for a number of reasons, property tax 
functions may be divided between various levels of sub-national government. Some of 
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the reasons for this division are historical and political factors which influence the 
extent of decentralisation in a country, and the relative autonomy and capacity of local 
governments. Division of functions between various levels of government to collect 
property tax can have an impact on actual tax collection. 
iii. Once too low, property taxes may be hard to increase substantially  
Generally, if revenue from a tax falls too low as a ratio of the government’s total 
income, then for a number of reasons, including political considerations, it might 
become difficult to raise it substantially (Bird and Smart, 2002). Property tax is likely to 
fall in this kind of a trap since it is a local government tax and local governments are 
often reliant (sometimes ‘over-reliant’) on transfers from higher levels of government. 
When such transfers are forthcoming local governments may avoid local taxation for a 
number of reasons, including political expediency. They might also develop 
expectations to be bailed out by higher level government in times of financial 
difficulties. Literature on fiscal federalism refers to this as a typical ‘common resource’ 
over-exploitation problem. It is expected that sub-national governments may 
persistently ‘raid the fiscal commons’ rather than raise revenues from their own taxes 
(Rodden, 2000, 2002, Oates, 2005, Boadway and Shah, 2009). 
In presence of large transfers from higher level of government, property tax revenue 
may be a relatively insignificant source of sub-national government income. If this is 
the case, then, the sub-national governments may have low incentives to increase 
revenue from property taxes substantially. 
iv. Property revaluation and political expediency 
Property valuations – the current market value of properties or their rental value, the 
basis on whichever property tax is usually assessed – need to be updated at reasonable 
intervals. In practice the time gap in revaluations varies widely, from 5 to 10 years or 
more. Long gaps between revaluations, especially where property values appreciate 
rapidly or in high inflation countries, may lead to declining property tax assessment in 
real terms. A large increase in property tax bills that would result from a delayed 
revaluation is often considered politically unpalatable and risky due to the salience of 
the tax. Such increases affect property owners who are relatively wealthy and also 
politically more influential, and hence can effectively oppose revaluations (Slack, 
2013).  
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When properties have not been re-valued for a relatively long time period, it may erode 
the basis on which property tax is charged. In such cases, given the relative salience of 
property tax, there might be political resistance to revaluing properties. This could lead 
property tax revenues to stay low. 
v. Property tax administration and collusion 
Some property tax systems could raise significant revenues at low costs. However, it is 
relatively easy for the government to get into a situation of low tax collection, and 
reluctance to invest in improving tax administration. As in all taxes, effective tax 
administration is crucial to property tax collection. Property tax administration includes: 
identification of properties; tax assessment and billing; a mechanism for taxpayers to 
appeal against assessments; tax collection and enforcement. Property tax in most 
countries around the world is assessed by tax agencies or professional assessors.20 
Property tax collection requires maintaining and updating a cadastre that includes a 
unique property identification number and its relevant attributes, including dimensions, 
usage etc. For correct assessments it is important to keep the cadastre constantly 
updated, which is costly and difficult. Similarly large capital costs may deter the 
government from investing in improvements, for example, geographic information 
system (GIS) mapping, digitalising cadastral records and automated billing systems. 
Reluctance of the government to invest in improving tax administration due to 
expectations of low returns or benefits that are not immediate may result in continued 
reliance on manually maintained cadastres. Manual record keeping is not only 
considered inefficient but may also increase possibility of manipulation and corruption 
(Dillinger, 1988, Bird and Slack, 2004, Mikesell, 2007).  
Property tax collection is especially susceptible to collusion between tax collectors and 
taxpayers because of their face-to-face interaction. Where properties are not re-valued 
regularly and tax policy provides for allowances – for example, for use of the property 
(commercial or residential) and its occupational status (rented or owner-occupied) – the 
tax collectors also become assessors of individual property tax liability, raising the 
possibility of collusion (Moore, 2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Property	  tax	  is	  self-­‐assessed	  in	  relatively	  fewer	  countries;	  although	  it	  can	  be	  cost	  effective	  but	  in	  the	  long	  run	  the	  system	  is	  expected	  to	  lead	  to	  under	  assessment	  in	  absence	  of	  effective	  cross-­‐checks	  (Bird	  and	  Slack,	  2004;	  pp.	  31-­‐33).	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Various elements of property tax administration – for example, manual record-keeping, 
where tax collectors also assess tax liability, and where tax policy allows use of 
discretion in assessment – are susceptible to collusion and rent-sharing, which can lead 
to low tax collection. 
vi. Enforcement 
Enforcement against non-compliance is immensely important to tax collection, as it 
helps maintain the credibility of the tax collection system. Property tax enforcement 
usually involves incentives, sanctions and penalties against taxpayers. Incentives may 
involve rebates for early payment or instalments. Penalties may be imposed for late 
payment or interest may be charged on outstanding liabilities. Sanctions may be 
imposed for recovery of outstanding tax dues, for example, withholding of certain 
government services (usually registering change of property ownership), and ultimately 
property seizure and auction to recover tax liabilities. Given the harshness of some of 
the measures, for example, auction of properties to recover tax liabilities – which might 
be significantly small compared to the value of the house – the more coercive methods 
of enforcement are unpopular and politically risky. In countries where the tax 
administration is generally weak, absence of strict enforcement can lead to significant 
loss of authority to collect taxes. If taxpayers know that tax collection will not be 
enforced, they are more likely not to pay taxes. In most developing countries weak 
enforcement often results in accumulation of large arrears. Experts emphasize the 
importance of tax collection and enforcement, especially in developing countries, since 
improvements in assessment alone are not expected to impact tax revenue (Bird and 
Slack, 2004, Kelly, 2013). 
Most of the reasons for low property tax collection are complex and interconnected. 
Additionally, they are expected to be reinforced by some of the underlying reasons for 
low tax collection in Pakistan, which I discussed in the previous section. Below, I 
briefly discuss the extent to which some common reasons identified in the literature are 
expected to explain exceptionally low property tax collection in Punjab. 
I do not expect tax salience to be an immediate significant factor in the case of Punjab. 
Tax rates and property valuations have remained unchanged since 1999 (Nabi and 
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Shaikh, 2011).21 Individual property tax assessments are grossly low. For example, in 
2012, a self-occupied residential property owner in the highest valued neighbourhood 
typically paid (equivalent of) about 70 USD in annual property tax, an amount 
comparable to what s/he most probably paid for the monthly electricity bill. 22 If the 
house is rented then the tax bill is ten times more, but still considerably lower compared 
to tax liability of rented properties prior to changes in property tax policy in 1999. 
Because of exceptionally low property tax bills the salience factor in Punjab is probably 
not as significant as the literature points out in the case of some other countries. 
However, given the relative salience of property tax pointed out in the literature, it 
cannot be ruled out as a contributing factor when policy decisions on the tax, for 
example, revaluation of properties, are considered by the government.23  
Institutional arrangements to collect property tax and relatively low political influence 
of local governments in the case of Punjab are viable explanations for low property tax. 
After a major decentralisation reform in 2001, property tax revenues and responsibilities 
were divided between three levels of sub-national government – provincial and local 
(district and town) levels. In Pakistan, local governments have traditionally been 
politically quite weak relative to the provincial governments. Thus, an analysis of the 
complex tax collection mechanism shows how low incentives to collect for each level of 
government involved, and intergovernmental politics affect property tax collection. 
Political expediency and reluctance to increase revenues from relatively small taxes are 
highly relevant to Punjab. Own source revenues,24 especially from property tax, is 
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  For	  example,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  2011-­‐12,	  property	  tax	  liability	  for	  rented	  properties	  was	  usually	  less	  than	  a	  month’s	  rent.	  Prior	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  1999	  the	  property	  tax	  liability	  of	  rented	  properties	  was	  more	  than	  two	  months’	  rent.	  Till	  1999,	  property	  tax	  was	  assessed	  on	  annual	  rental	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  as	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  and	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  of	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  of	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  tax	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  on	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  rent	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  self-­‐occupied	  were	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  on	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  of	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  of	  rental	  value,	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  the	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  of	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  rental	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  In	  1999	  standardized	  banded	  annual	  rental	  valuation	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  were	  introduced	  throughout	  the	  province.	  	  22	  This	  estimate	  is	  based	  on	  an	  average-­‐sized	  house	  built	  on	  500	  square	  yards	  of	  land.	  The	  estimate	  can	  vary	  from	  50–100	  USD	  depending	  on	  various	  factors	  that	  determine	  tax	  liability,	  including	  built-­‐up	  area	  of	  the	  property	  and	  remission	  for	  older	  construction.	  23	  In	  2014	  property	  valuation	  tables	  were	  updated	  but	  the	  tax	  rate	  has	  been	  reduced	  substantially,	  from	  20-­‐25%	  to	  about	  10%.	  The	  government	  has	  placed	  a	  cap	  on	  increase	  of	  individual	  liabilities	  at	  150%	  of	  the	  liability	  under	  the	  earlier	  property	  valuation.	  24	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘own	  source	  revenues’	  in	  its	  conventional	  sense,	  to	  mean	  ‘own	  source	  tax	  revenues’.	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considerably small compared to transfers from the higher level of government and other 
sources of revenue available to the sub-national governments. 
Issues of tax administration, possibilities of collusion and weak enforcement in the case 
of property tax collection pointed out in the literature are highly relevant to the Punjab 
case. However, there is lack of detailed analysis in property tax literature (as well as in 
the Punjab specific studies, which I refer to below) regarding underlying causes for 
weak tax administration. 
Analysing some of the common reasons for low property tax collection is a good 
starting point but insufficient to investigate the Punjab case. In the following section I 
explain the process I followed to research my question. 
1.5 Investigating the puzzle: why is annual property tax collection in 
the Punjab so low? 
1.5.1 The research framework 
The existing literature offers a number of explanations for low property tax collection 
that are to an extent relevant to Pakistan. In reviewing this literature on annual urban 
property taxation in Section 1.4, I noted the relevance of each explanation in the case of 
Pakistan (Punjab). While this literature on low property tax collection is useful, it is not 
sufficient to explain the extraordinarily low property tax collection in Punjab. To 
explain this, it is necessary to cast the net more widely. I offer three additional 
explanations in this thesis: effects of a dysfunctional decentralization with a history of 
political rivalry between the provincial and local governments; a low level fiscal 
equilibrium where the government is locked into a cycle of low tax collection and low 
political demands for expenditures on public services; and the pervasive and complex 
informality of local administration that impacts tax collection negatively and creates 
barriers to reform. 
Each of the above three areas of politics in developing countries has not been well 
addressed in relation to property taxes, but each has been addressed in other domains, 
and it is thus useful to consider these literatures. Below I discuss these literatures under 
three broad themes: (1) problems of intergovernmental relations undermining 
decentralization generally; (2) problems of weak demand for universal public services 
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in developing countries owing to patronage politics, privatization of services for the 
relatively well-off, and peculiar issues of budgeting (low operations and maintenance 
expenditures), that cumulatively lead to low pressures for raising taxes; and (3) 
corruption and actual working of the state at the local government levels.  
1) Intergovernmental politics and decentralization 
While empirical evidence is mixed and dependent on the political context, there is a 
long-standing theoretical argument for decentralization. It is based on the expectation 
that improved local government accountability to its citizens will lead to improved 
service delivery, mainly as a result of an increased two-way flow of information 
between the government and the citizens regarding needs and decision-making. One of 
the potential problems that can hinder effective decentralization is that, typically 
subnational governments are weak compared to higher levels of government, which 
prefer to keep local governments disempowered. It is widely agreed in the literature that 
control over finances of subnational governments is one way for higher-level 
governments to do that (Rodden, 2000, Tanzi, 2001, Heller, 2001, Bardhan, 2002, 
Keefer et al., 2003, Shah, 2004, Smoke et al., 2006, Bahl and Bird, 2008, Bird, 2010, 
Smoke, 2013, Ghuman and Singh, 2013, Weingast, 2014, Faguet, 2014). 
In this thesis I pick on two sub-themes on how the politics of decentralization can 
impact subnational tax revenues. The first is the literature on the politics of the 
relationships between different levels of government that impacts tax revenues when tax 
functions and revenues are divided between two levels of government. I review this 
literature in Chapter 2 in order to inform my case where actually three levels of 
government are involved, which is a rarity and not alluded to in the literature. In 
Chapter 2, based on evidence from Pakistan, I also show the role that bureaucrats play 
within intergovernmental rivalries, a topic less elaborated in the literature on 
decentralization and intergovernmental politics.  
 
The second sub-theme within the decentralization literature that I discuss is how 
transfers from higher levels of government can impact efforts of the recipient 
government to mobilize tax revenues. In Chapter 3 I review the literature on the 
intergovernmental transfers and conclude that institutional mechanisms relating to the 
transfers largely determine the impact of transfers on tax revenues of recipient 
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governments. I then show that evidence from Pakistan is consistent with the 
international experience. 
 
2) Weak political demands for public services and low taxation 
The second theme that I trace in the literature has to do with political pressures on the 
government to provide expanded public services that will require it to raise taxes. At the 
risk of oversimplification, the suggested/alleged causality runs as follows: In a poor 
country most people who vote are poor, so the poor can effectively demand more 
universal public services. Pressures for expanded public service therefore force the 
government to collect more taxes from the rich and spend on the poor. However, in the 
literature there are a number of explanations for why this might not happen. Here I am 
concerned with just three explanations: patronage politics, privatization of services for 
the relatively well off and the way government budgets are made and executed. I use 
literature on these three topics to understand how the political executive can avoid the 
potential political costs of taxation, for example losing support of the rich who are 
politically powerful, while simultaneously aiming to meet its political objective of being 
re-elected. From a brief review of the literature below I conclude that there is a 
possibility that in contexts where political patronage is rife and demands for universal 
services from politically strong (the rich) are weak, peculiar budgeting practices enable 
the political executive to make do with the available resources and avoid raising more 
revenues from taxation. In Chapter 4, I show that in the case of Pakistan similar political 
mechanisms are at work.  
Patronage politics 
Patronage is defined as an exchange relationship between voters and politicians, where 
the politicians try to get political support on the basis of exchanging support for clubbed 
or private goods (individuals or small groups), or for public goods (with large 
classes/categories of people). Evidence from many poor countries shows that 
governments prefer to spend more on targeted programs (such as government jobs and 
infrastructure investment) that reward a selected few rather than improving universal 
public services. This often results in citizens generally receiving lower levels of or poor 
quality of public services than would be the case otherwise (Blunt et al. 2012). Often at 
the cost of universal service provision, politicians service selected groups for a number 
of reasons: Politicians want to reward their election financiers; politicians want to come 
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through on campaign promises by providing public projects or programmes/ jobs for 
which they can claim personal credit rather than focusing on improving provision of 
public health or education, where credit is difficult to attribute; absence of a strong 
media and restricted flow of information between citizens and the government can 
weaken government responsiveness; political fragmentation of voters, amongst other 
factors (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004, Keefer and 
Khemani, 2004, Hasnain, 2008b, Blunt et al., 2012, McCartney and Roy, 2015).  
The point that I take from the literature on patronage is that the political elite may not 
want to invest in expanded public services to get re-elected but can manage it by buying 
off a smaller section of the electorate by providing targeted services. Hence, despite 
widespread poverty, elected governments are not inevitably under strong pressures to 
provide universal services. 
Privatization of services for elites 
Tax revenues allow states to provide public services to citizens for a better quality of 
life. However, one of the major constraints to raising taxes is the resistance by the 
economic and political elites to pay taxes. One of the reasons why the wealthy avoid 
paying taxes is that they might not rely on public provision of most social services. 
Especially in most developing countries, the elite live highly privatized lives and 
therefore have little incentive to pay taxes for something they do not use. Resistance to 
pay taxes by the elites/ interest groups can take a number of forms, including, 
influencing tax policy and ensuring that tax collection is not enforced (Eisenstein, 
2010). Although not large in numbers, the economic elite are politically powerful and 
can influence political outcomes in a number of ways, including funding for elections 
and lobbying for their economic interests. They can also threaten to move their capital 
out of the country if they find the tax rates too high or other government policies not 
conducive to capital accumulation. There is some evidence for even the middle classes 
opting out of public services in developing countries (Singh, 2005, Profeta and 
Scabrosetti, 2007, Fairfield, 2010, Pasha and Pasha, 2013, Dreze and Sen, 2014, Hassan 
and Prichard, 2016). The relevant point here is that the relatively rich do not demand 
expanded public services, which weakens political pressure on the government to 
provide these. 
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Budgeting 
I link the two sub-themes above with literature on government budgeting practices to 
demonstrate the possibility of the political executive using available public money to 
meet their political objectives at the cost of public services and simultaneously avoiding 
raising taxes. I do so by reviewing the literature on budgeting, especially how operating 
costs (for maintenance and operations) of public services are a low priority, which 
practically means that they are estimated on the lower side and then cut further 
whenever there is a shortage of public funds. In absence of scholarly literature on 
budgeting in developing country subnational governments, I use literature about central 
government budgeting as a starting point. 
Three shortcomings that usually characterize budgeting in developing25 countries that 
affect operating cost allocations are: (i) ‘dual’ budgeting - the practice of recurrent 
(salaries and operating costs) and capital (development) budgets being prepared and 
executed by two different departments, finance and planning respectively; (ii) 
‘incremental’ (historic) budgeting – that partly emanates from inability to correctly 
estimate departmental service delivery costs due to lack of criteria for judging their 
adequacy, thus resulting in use of previous year’s costs as a benchmark; and, (iii) annual 
budgeting, the practice of making annual budgets that have no reference to medium-
term fiscal or expenditure framework, and are hence short sighted. In an ideal public 
financial management world government should be able to predict with reasonable 
accuracy the incomes and expenditures typically over a three-year time period 
(Peterson, 1996, Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980)  
Various features of budgeting pointed out above create two broad hurdles that may 
prevent adequate funding of service delivery in some developing countries. Firstly, the 
fact that traditional budgeting is not performance oriented but input-based makes it 
difficult for decision-makers to allocate resources or hold spending units (departments) 
accountable for service delivery targets. Since financial inputs are not related to any 
outputs it is difficult to measure performance of various departments or functions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  As	  mentioned	  by	  some	  experts	  the	  attributes	  of	  budgeting	  and	  some	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  discussed	  are	  common	  to	  most	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  In	  poor	  countries	  some	  of	  these	  issues	  recur	  more	  frequently	  and	  are	  more	  pronounced,	  compared	  to	  richer	  countries,	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  including	  greater	  uncertainties,	  relatively	  fewer	  public	  resources	  and	  weaker	  budgetary	  institutions	  (Caiden	  and	  Wildavsky,	  1980).	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government. To put it in another way, service delivery has no unit cost attached to it, 
there is no reasonable way of knowing how it will be affected when expenditure cuts are 
made, which are usually made across the board. Secondly, because of its inability to 
undertake output oriented ‘programme budgeting’ (that looks at sector-wide recurrent 
and capital budgets holistically) rather than stand-alone inputs, the government 
effectively cannot plan over the medium term due to a lack of measureable objectives. 
Dual budgeting often restricts the ability of spending units to reallocate resources from 
capital to recurrent expenditures due to technical rigidities, as well as political interests 
that prefer availability of funds for development projects (Caiden, 1980; p.164, 
Peterson, 1996). 
Uncertainty of resource availability can impact budgetary outcomes by placing more 
control over actual resource allocation in the hands of the political executive. For a 
variety of reasons, developing country governments work under conditions of greater 
uncertainty where expected resources do not often materialise. For example, some 
developing countries rely more on sources of government revenue that are less reliable 
than others, like foreign aid or raw material exports that are vulnerable to international 
price volatility. Moreover, both revenue and expenditure estimates might be inflated to 
satisfy multiple interests in the budget planning and approval process, placing the 
political executive and civil servants in positions of power with unaccountable control 
over the actual distribution of resources – during the execution of the budget. In 
countries where patronage politics is rife, unaccountable authority over the public purse 
is sometimes arrogated by design – by inflating budget estimates to cause a ‘shortfall’ 
later - allowing the political executive more space to manoeuvre during budget 
execution. Alston et al. (2009) find that in the case of presidential system in Brazil there 
are incentives to overestimate revenues enhancing presidential discretion to cut 
individual budget items during execution as revenues fall below expectations. Other 
studies have found wide variation between budget estimates and actual expenditures, for 
example in Malawi and Mozambique (Rakner et al., 2004, Hodges and Tibana, 2004). 
Since the inflow of government resources is unpredictable over the course of the year, 
the actual budget document approved by the legislature being only an estimation of the 
annual sum, budgeting in reality is a continuous process - referred to as ‘repetitive’ 
budgeting. This implies that just because an allocation has been approved at the 
beginning of the year it does not necessarily become available to a line department 
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automatically. The amount will only be ‘released’ by finance department on a piecemeal 
basis and that too after scrutiny keeping government's overall resource picture in view. 
This holds especially for subnational governments that do not have the luxury of deficit 
financing, like in the case of Pakistan. Even for central governments that can finance 
deficits, spending priorities are set politically and any additional funding is not shared 
equally across various expenditure heads. In extreme cases of uncertainty government 
might resort to cash flow budgeting where scrutiny may take place on a daily basis 
(Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; p.72). The ability of government to exercise this level of 
discretion in allocation of public funds, where, it can pay lip service to certain budget 
priorities, even reflect them in budget documents but actually spend the money 
somewhere else makes government policy implementation hard to follow, monitor and 
influence, especially when comprehensive and timely information on budget execution 
is not available to legislatures (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; p.113). 
For a number of reasons including weak legislative oversight, the political executive 
exercises increased control over decisions regarding use of public resources. Under 
cabinet style government where executive rules by virtue of its majority in the 
legislature making approval of budget essential to its continuation, there is very little 
room available to the legislature to provide any meaningful input into budget planning. 
Allocation and later availability of constituency development funds budgeted for 
legislators often become prime focus of their attention (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980). 
Generally in developing countries the role of the legislature in the budget process has 
been found to be marginal (Dabla-Norris et al., 2010; p.26). In their study on 
institutions and budgetary outcomes Alesina and Perotti (1999) find that democratic 
accountability of the budgetary process can be diluted in contexts where the political 
executive is strong in relation to cabinet ministers and legislators.  
More recent literature on budgeting in developing countries builds on the work of 
Caiden and Wildavsky but includes new players, like donors and the civil society. In 
order to improve service delivery in developing countries, donors push for public 
financial management reforms, amongst other initiatives, to help improve transparency 
and accountability of budgeting. For a variety of reasons, including rise of donor 
financial support, developing country governments are, to some extent, accountable to 
donors as well (de Renzio, 2007). Simplifying the budget for public scrutiny adds to its 
legibility for legislators as well (Robinson, 2008; p.11). However, though partly a result 
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of inertia and capacity issues in developing countries, reform of budgeting systems has 
proved difficult because of broader institutional and ‘rent-seeking influences’ in these 
countries (Allen, 2009). 
Given various political and bureaucratic interests working formally and informally 
within the institutional mechanisms – some of which I have described above – most 
empirical literature finds the fiscal outcomes of the budgeting process prioritise actual 
expenditures in the following way: civil service salaries are most protected – they are 
almost a fixed cost for the government, followed by capital (development) budget – due 
to political patronage, ‘pork-barrel’ politics and visibility of new projects. Operating 
costs that fund service delivery are estimated on the lower side to begin with, and are at 
a higher risk of being further slashed during budget execution in periods of fiscal stress 
(Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980, Peterson, 1996, Alesina and Perotti, 1999). In Chapter 4 
I show that fiscal practices in Pakistan are quite similar to those reported in the literature 
on budgeting. Low political pressure on the government to deliver expanded public 
services is possibly one of the reasons why tax collection is low.  
3) Corruption and actual working of the state 
One of the ways of categorizing corruption is: one is ‘grand’ or ‘wholesale’ corruption – 
cases where mostly senior government officials and politicians are involved in mega 
corruption, for example, large kick-backs in public procurement or influencing 
government policy to benefit a few. If found out this kind of corruption is often the 
subject of public scandals. It is also a large source of funds flowing out of developing 
countries, into offshore accounts held by political leaders from poor countries or their 
family members (Siddiqui, 2005). Grand corruption is not the subject of my study.  
The second kind of corruption is referred to as ‘petty’ or ‘everyday’ corruption that 
people in developing countries often come across in their interaction with the state 
(Witsoe, 2012). This type of corruption often takes the form of ‘speed money’ – to get 
things done quicker, or pay relatively small amounts of money for government officials 
to overlook some irregularities in processing a case. Such payments usually become 
routine and are sometimes referred to as ‘fees’, as in the case of Pakistan. The public 
generally cannot differentiate (and perhaps does not care to, as long as its work gets 
done) whether this ‘fee’ is going to the government or into the pockets of the public 
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functionary. Although petty corruption exists as part of the greater informality in the 
way the government works, informality does not necessarily imply corruption. 
The working of the state, more so in poor countries, is a mixture of formal structures, 
laws and rules, as well as informal practices often influenced by individual or group 
networks and at times monetary considerations. As a number of studies on the state in 
poor countries show, often the boundaries between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ are ‘blurred’ 
(Gupta, 1995). Harriss-White (2003) ascribes two meanings to ‘informal economy’: one 
is the economic activity that is not registered by the state for the purposes of taxation or 
regulation. The second meaning of ‘informal economy’ is a type of behaviour within the 
formal economy, which still escapes, partially or fully, taxation or certain kinds of 
regulation. This kind of practiced informality, within the formal, usually has its own 
rules and norms that govern it that may find legitimacy within a certain context. This 
usually gives rise to rents and corruption at the cost of the state. As Harriss-White 
(2003; p.6) points out that, “the social legitimacy of corrupt and fraudulent activity is 
less secure than informal economic activity, and it is increasingly contested” – and thus 
more interesting to study. My study of informality in the collection of property taxes in 
Punjab lies within this second meaning of the informal economy. 
In the case of property taxes, when the taxpayer and the tax collector collude, they both 
stand to gain and they also know the exact amount of loss to the state. Presumably, how 
they divide the rent that arises from their collusion is a matter of their respective 
bargaining positions. As I show later in this thesis (Chapters 5 and 6), the working of 
the tax department is routinized with deeply ingrained informal practices. In Chapter 5 I 
review the literature on property tax administration that concerns itself wholly with 
formal tax collection and its problems. My work does not limit itself to the interaction 
of the state and the society within the realm of the informal, as the literature reviewed 
above is concerned with, it also focuses on the internal working of the tax department. 
There are few studies of the informal working of the state in similar contexts, that I have 
come across, for example, Wade (1982) and Blundo (2006).  
1.5.2 Research strategy and approach 
Based on my review of various literatures, when I entered the field to investigate 
reasons for exceptionally low property tax collection in Punjab, I had some broad ideas 
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about the explanations that I wanted to investigate. Later in this sub-section, I explain 
some of the assumptions I started out with and how these developed over the course of 
my study.  
Several donor supported studies provided starting points: a static tax base due to tax 
exemptions and large newly urbanised areas around cities and towns which are not 
taxed; the large remissions allowed for owner-occupied residential and commercial 
properties; and absence of indexation of valuation tables or revaluation of properties in 
a high inflation economy; use of manual systems to assess and collect property tax; 
weak enforcement; insufficient and untrained staff, as well as non-availability of 
resources for effective tax assessment and collection (World Bank, 2000, 2001, 2006, 
Asian Development Bank, 2009, Bahl and Cyan, 2009, Nabi and Shaikh, 2011, World 
Bank, 2012b).26    
My strategy was to place myself in the provincial Excise and Taxation Department 
(ETD)27 to get some sense of how property tax is actually collected and what policy 
issues affect tax collection. Many of the issues that I identified concerned the Punjab 
Provincial Government. This led me to investigate and gather data initially at the 
provincial level, primarily the departments of Finance, Excise and Taxation, and Local 
Government & Community Development, which mostly comprised interviews and 
financial data. After numerous rounds of interviews and long conversations with 
provincial level officers of the ETD, I gradually began to observe how the tax collectors 
actually work, at a local tax office in Lahore. This was logistically convenient since 
Lahore is the provincial capital where all provincial departments are headquartered. I 
discuss my fieldwork and data gathering methods in detail in section 1.5.3. But before 
that, I elaborate my approach that helped me develop some of my ideas about my 
research. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Since	  late	  1990s,	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  have	  provided	  technical	  assistance	  to	  the	  Punjab	  Provincial	  Government	  to	  assess	  its	  property	  tax	  policy	  and	  administrative	  setup.	  They	  also	  helped	  develop	  recommendations	  for	  reform	  of	  policies,	  the	  organisational	  structures	  and	  business	  processes	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  property	  tax.	  Some	  additional	  reports	  are	  available	  at:	  http://prmp.punjab.gov.pk/Public_financial_management	  	  27	  Property	  tax	  collection	  is	  responsibility	  of	  the	  provincial	  ETD	  which	  has	  field	  offices	  in	  all	  the	  districts.	  I	  explain	  the	  administrative	  hierarchy	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  ETD	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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In order to gain a deeper understanding of property taxation in Punjab I explored the 
broader political and bureaucratic institutional setting – both formal and informal – in 
which property tax policies are made and the tax is collected. Political and bureaucratic 
structures, their functioning and incentive mechanisms, which are unique to a country 
and vary with its level of political and economic development, are important to 
comprehend tax outcomes (Steinmo, 1989). In Punjab, property tax revenues mostly 
belong to the local (town) governments while the provincial government controls most 
of the tax functions. Incentive issues around such arrangements are expected; these are 
complex due to a history of political competition between the provincial and local 
governments in Pakistan. As Bird and Vaillancourt (1998; p.2) remark: “the essence of 
decentralisation is that it does not occur in general but rather in a particular country – 
in a country with its own history and traditions and its own specific institutional, 
political, and economic context.” Smoke (2013) underscores the importance of taking 
an ‘inductive approach’ to understand decentralisation in specific contexts, since unique 
political and bureaucratic state institutions, multiple players and considerations impact 
property tax policy-making. Similarly, tax administration is better understood if local 
political, economic and social factors and relationships are considered (Steinmo, 2008). 
Wade (1982) uses a similar approach to study the irrigation department in India and 
maps the informal ways of working, channels and relationships that shape 
organisational outcomes in addition to formal rules and regulations. I was especially 
motivated by Wade’s work when setting out to understand property tax administration 
in the Punjab. 
To investigate my central question I undertook an empirical, in-depth study using mixed 
research methods to check for applicability of some of the available explanations 
provided in the property tax literature. As mentioned earlier, based on the property tax 
literature, initially I developed some tentative hypotheses that I considered helpful to 
explore my puzzle. During my research, based on my initial findings, I revisited these 
hypotheses and refined some of them. This was a gradual process and at times difficult. 
Throughout my work I was partly guided by my long experience in the civil service, 
especially of working in the Punjab provincial Finance Department and a donor 
supported public sector reform programme, as well as a field administrative officer 
earlier in my career. In the remainder of this sub-section, I briefly outline how my 
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thinking about the various factors that influence property tax collection in Punjab 
evolved over the course of this project. 
Most property tax policy-making and administrative roles are in practice performed by 
the provincial government. I started with the assumption that the provincial government 
is not interested in increasing property tax revenues primarily because these are enjoyed 
mostly by the local (town) governments. Moreover, it is well known to Pakistan experts, 
and I have also experienced while working for the government, that provincial level 
politicians and bureaucracy resent local governments.28 I suspected that 
intergovernmental political rivalry might be a reason why the provincial government 
neglected its property tax functions, and that it was not simply a case of ‘indifference’, 
as asserted by the property tax literature. Taking into account the historic provincial 
government antagonism towards local governments helped me understand some of the 
actions of the provincial government, especially after decentralisation reforms in 2001, 
which impacted property tax collection negatively.  
It would be simplistic to attribute the neglect of property tax functions by the provincial 
government solely to its antagonism towards local governments. The Punjab Provincial 
Government has historically neglected raising own source revenues. Punjab is highly 
reliant on transfers from the Federal Government and most of the taxes that the province 
collects are considerably small compared to its total income. The relative importance of 
property tax as a source of income for the Punjab Provincial Government was relatively 
easy to investigate because of the readily available data. A similar exercise for the town 
governments was not possible because the town government data is not collated at the 
provincial level. According to the literature property tax revenue is an important source 
of local government income, so I expected the local (town) governments to be generally 
more interested in increasing property tax revenues compared to the provincial 
government.  
The non-inclusion of newly urbanized areas to the property tax base, since the 
decentralisation reforms in 2001, has been pointed out in numerous aid donor reports as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  I	  came	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  constricting	  flow	  of	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a major reason for low property tax collection in the Punjab. Levy of property tax in 
newly urbanized areas is the sole responsibility of the town governments in return for a 
majority share of property tax revenues. It is puzzling then, that the majority of town 
governments did not. There could be a number of possible reasons for the inaction of 
the town governments: for example, the town governments might be only partially 
reliant on property tax revenues or they avoid the political cost of taxing newly 
urbanised because they do not control any of the tax collection mechanisms.  
In the course of investigating these possible explanations some additional questions 
arose, which I thought were important to investigate. These questions were mostly 
concerned with the apparent absence of any political pressure on the sub-national 
governments in the Punjab to raise additional revenues from the taxes assigned to them. 
Sub-national governments in Pakistan generally do not seem too concerned about 
changing tax policies or investing in their capacity to increase their own source 
revenues. Since most property tax functions are provincial government responsibility, I 
focused on the provincial level mostly to investigate this issue. Since making efforts to 
increase the government’s income and increasing public expenditures are two sides of 
the same coin, I also investigated the question: what level of political pressures does the 
provincial government face for increasing its public service delivery expenditures? 
The main hypothesis regarding property tax administration that I developed initially was 
quite general: it was reflective of the literature, as well as widespread perceptions, of tax 
administration being inefficient and rampantly corrupt. However, during the course of 
my fieldwork I found that general notions of inefficiency and corruption did not 
accurately reflect the state of affairs in the Excise and Taxation Department. Annual 
increases in property tax revenue (in nominal terms), which were mostly incremental 
but significant in some years did not bear out my initial hypothesis. In absence of 
property revaluations, non-changing tax rates and non-expanding tax base – to newly 
urbanised areas, the only two possible ways to increase property tax revenues are by 
reassessing liabilities of individual properties and collection of arrears. This requires 
significant administrative work, not typical of a system that is grossly inefficient and 
rampantly corrupt. While at a systemic level there are a lot of gaps in tax administration, 
I soon realized that a system where tax collectors do not get any resources from the 
government (apart from salaries) for their routine work, the notion of efficiency – at 
least in its basic economic sense – was largely irrelevant. From my initial interaction 
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with tax staff I got the impression that they use considerable discretion when collecting 
property tax and that rent-taking in the department was not unbridled, as commonly 
perceived.  
A related hypothesis regarding tax administration pertains to enforcement. According to 
the property tax literature enforcing tax collection, especially through coercive means, is 
partly dependent on the government’s will to collect taxes. Luckily for me, tax 
enforcement was unusually aggressive during my fieldwork. This gave me an 
opportunity to identify various factors that impact enforcement.  
Initially I wanted to conduct a survey about taxpayers’ willingness to pay property tax; 
however, I did not undertake this mainly because I got considerable traction in my 
research on tax administration. My supervisors and I thought I should continue studying 
the relatively unchartered territory of property tax administration, rather than undertake 
a perception survey that was expected to give relatively generic results.  
1.5.3 Fieldwork and data collection 
This doctoral project has been quite challenging. Coming back to academia after two 
decades, during most of which I worked as a civil servant, was not easy in many ways. 
My relative strength was my inside knowledge of (parts of) government functioning 
gained from working in various positions in Pakistan, both at the local and provincial 
levels of government. More importantly I was fairly confident of accessing relevant 
civil servants and official data, for example, office files which are not publicly 
available. I used this advantage fully in investigating my case.  
During my fieldwork I effectively played two roles simultaneously. One was that of a 
senior civil servant who could access government files and data in various departments 
with relative ease (though not necessarily very expeditious).29 I could rely on colleagues 
to get officially verified up-to-date financial data from field offices and other sources, 
which are normally not collated at the provincial level, and which would have been 
quite challenging for an outsider; collection of the local government financial data and 
the provincial government cash-balance data from the State Bank of Pakistan, being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  My	  request	  to	  access	  and	  use	  official	  files	  and	  data	  for	  my	  doctorate,	  which	  is	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Punjab,	  was	  granted	  by	  the	  Chief	  Secretary	  –the	  head	  of	  the	  provincial	  Civil	  Service	  –	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  provincial	  Secretaries	  of	  the	  Finance,	  ETD	  and	  Local	  Government	  &	  Community	  Development	  Departments.	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cases in point. More importantly my position in the civil service gave me ready access 
to many of the senior civil service informants, some of whom I knew professionally. 
Most were very forthcoming and I had frank discussions with them about tax policy and 
how some of the decisions regarding property tax, as well as other provincial taxes, are 
taken. To my pleasant surprise I found the politicians that I interviewed to be equally 
open. 
My second role was more challenging, and about which I was quite apprehensive; that 
of a ‘harmless’ researcher mingling with relatively junior tax officials on a daily basis. I 
had to observe them, discuss sensitive issues like corruption with them, and most of all 
convince them about my research project so that they opened up to me. For this role, to 
an extent, I was guided by methodology courses and readings on qualitative data 
collection,30 and also by reading works on the state mentioned earlier, especially Fuller 
and Harriss (2001) and Wade (1982), but more importantly by my previous experience 
as a field officer. I discuss my data collection through observation of tax collectors in 
more detail later in this section. 
I moved back and forth between various departments and levels of government for my 
data collection. Actual data collection required a lot of persistence and numerous trips 
and follow-up telephone calls for each piece of information, file and quantitative data. I 
gathered data using the following:   
• Study of official documents and office files concerning property tax policy, 
annual taxation proposals, specifically exemption-related and legal cases 
concerning property taxation at the provincial secretariat of the ETD, and the 
Resource Wing of the Finance Department. 
• Participation as an observer in meetings of the ‘Resource Generation Sub-
committee of the Punjab Cabinet’, during the 2012-13 budget-making process. 
• Semi-structured formal and informal interviews with: 
o  High ranking officers of the provincial government including serving 
and former provincial Chief Secretaries, Ministers and Secretaries of the 
Finance Department and the ETD.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  For	  example,	  	  (Van	  Maanen,	  1979,	  Holy,	  1984,	  Barter	  and	  Renold,	  1999,	  Emerson	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  Bryman,	  2012)	  
 
 
36 
o Technical officers of the provincial Finance Department who are 
concerned with provincial taxation and budgeting. I had multiple rounds 
of in-depth, issue specific discussions with the relevant officers. 
o Former/ retired and serving officers and officials of the ETD including 
those who headed tax operations and relatively junior officers who have 
experience in matters regarding property taxation. 
o Foreign and local property tax experts and academics with experience of 
working with the Punjab ETD. 
This was augmented by extensive quantitative data gathering in various departments of 
the provincial government including Finance and ETD, and selected town governments. 
This included: 
• Time series data on: 
o Provincial budget estimates and the actual revenues of all taxes and 
levies, as well as other sources of income including, transfers from the 
Federal Government, foreign loans etc. 
o Provincial government transfers to local (town) governments and own-
source revenue for selected town governments.31 
o Human and financial resources available to the provincial ETD.  
• Data on disciplinary cases against tax collectors. 
 
Revenue data for provincial taxes were taken from the province-wide online accounting 
system maintained by the Accountant General of Punjab. The town level financial data 
are neither recorded by the Accountant General nor collated at the provincial level. I 
procured these data through the Provincial Directorate for Local Governments & 
Community Development, which oversees some broader aspects of local government 
functioning. Finance officers of the towns that I selected provided authenticated town 
revenue data. The criterion for my selection of towns for the budget revenue data was 
guided by the fact that since I was studying a tax applicable to urban areas only. I 
collected data from all the towns in the seven most populous and urbanized district 
jurisdictions in the province; these included 49 out of 144 town jurisdictions in Punjab. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  See	  Annexure	  ‘A’	  for	  my	  selection	  criteria	  for	  the	  town	  governments	  and	  the	  map	  of	  the	  Punjab	  province.	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To understand the intricacies of property tax administration I undertook a multi-tiered 
study of the provincial ETD. This included the offices of: the provincial Secretary, who 
is the administrative head and advises the government on tax matters, and is ultimately 
responsible for the tax collection target given to the ETD; the Director General, who 
heads all taxation operations and field units throughout the province; Regional 
Directors, who supervise multiple districts; and the Excise and Taxation Officers 
(ETOs), who are assessing authority for property tax for a whole district (or a Zone in 
case of larger districts) and directly responsible for property tax collection in their 
jurisdiction; and the property tax staff below the ETOs.32  
Punjab is divided into nine property tax Regions. I observed the office working of the 
tax property tax collectors in three Regions. Lahore, the provincial capital, was my 
primary site where I spent about four months and then a month each in Multan and 
Rawalpindi.33 I also conducted interviews with Directors, ETOs and lower level tax 
staff at four additional sites: Sahiwal – a relatively small Regional headquarter; 
Khanewal and Sialkot – both relatively small non-regional headquarter districts; and 
Murree – a small sub-district tax jurisdiction. These four sites were chosen primarily for 
their size and remoteness from provincial and regional offices – and hence less direct 
supervision – to account for any variation in behaviour of tax officers and their working 
when not directly supervised by the Regional Director. Sialkot district was included for 
the additional reason that an intensive exercise to digitalise the property tax cadastral 
data was being piloted in Sialkot by the ETD. 
Over the six months during which I observed the tax collectors, I limited my 
observation to the tax office-level and did not accompany lower level tax staff 
(Inspectors and Constables) on their field visits.34 Since most collusive activities take 
place while the staff are in the field, my presence would have disrupted their natural 
environment and not served any purpose. At the office level I observed three levels of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  I	  explain	  in	  detail	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  ETD	  and	  functions	  of	  each	  level.	  33	  The	  Secretary	  and	  Director	  General	  of	  the	  ETD	  are	  based	  in	  Lahore.	  Because	  of	  its	  size	  it	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  property	  tax	  Regions,	  A	  and	  B.	  I	  chose	  region	  B	  because	  it	  collects	  more	  property	  tax.	  Multan	  and	  Rawalpindi	  districts	  are	  City	  Districts	  as	  well	  but	  rarely	  visited	  by	  senior	  departmental	  officers	  (also	  see	  Annexure	  ‘B’	  for	  details	  of	  criteria	  for	  site	  selection	  for	  observation	  of	  tax	  collectors	  and	  a	  map	  of	  Punjab	  to	  see	  where	  the	  sites	  are	  located).	  34	  In	  Multan	  the	  Regional	  Director	  took	  me	  along	  on	  some	  field	  visits	  during	  enforcement,	  and	  rounds	  of	  inspections	  to	  check	  if	  properties	  in	  some	  areas	  were	  assessed	  at	  all.	  These	  visits	  were	  very	  insightful.	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the ETD: the Director General who heads the province-wide tax operation, three 
Regional Directors and one associated ETO in each region. The information I gathered 
through my observations was augmented, explained and enriched through discussions 
with the officers almost after each interaction with a property taxpayer and other 
visitors, at an opportune time since I did not disrupt the normal flow of office work. 
These were complemented with semi-structured interviews and mostly informal 
discussions with those not being observed directly, including some tax staff and 
taxpayers that I met in the tax offices and also outside the offices.  
I entered the ETD through the bureaucratic hierarchy with the formal permission of the 
provincial Chief Secretary, which was conveyed to the Secretary and Director General 
of the ETD. The Director General spoke to the concerned Regional Directors to allow 
me to sit in their offices and those of their subordinates (the ETOs), and to help me 
‘understand’ the working of the department. Officially that was about it. Informally I 
requested the Additional Director General, a senior official of the ETD cadre, to 
personally speak to the Regional Directors in order to reassure them that my work was 
academic in nature and that I was not being sent by the Secretary or the Director 
General for ‘some kind of an investigation or inspection’. I strategized to have him 
make these phone calls since, coming from someone from their own cadre,35 his word 
was expected to be more credible and personal, and not seen as just another routine 
order from the top. This worked quite well.  
Since I am a senior civil servant, working in the same province I was concerned about 
not being accepted within the lower tiers of the department I was trying to study as a 
‘researcher’ or a ‘neutral’ observer. This would have risked my project, by not only 
being denied correct information but also actively misguided. Once within the lower 
tiers of the ETD I set about to establish a personal rapport with the tax staff, mostly by 
using my own experience of working in the lower bureaucracy. Sharing experiences and 
stories from the remote province I had previously worked in; the difficulties, 
compromises and practicalities of ‘getting the job done’ not only helped me immerse 
into the lower tax bureaucracy but also in understanding the complex nature of their 
socio-political milieu. The tax staff sometimes quipped about me taking time off from 
my civil service career to do a four-year PhD when I could be a provincial Secretary, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  As	  I	  explain	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  the	  Secretary	  and	  DG	  are	  usually	  from	  general	  civil	  service	  cadres	  with	  few	  personal	  contacts	  in	  the	  ETD.	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heading a department. But that perhaps also convinced them of the sincerity of my task. 
They would add that I might end up being their boss someday, and that this was a good 
opportunity to find out how the Department actually worked and the issues that they 
faced. I usually avoided direct questions on corruption but officers were not shy of 
talking about their informal practices in generalities. Within the Department, apart from 
observation and interviews, I took every opportunity to discuss departmental working 
with all levels of tax staff including the Tax Inspectors, Constables, Clerks and office 
peons. Earlier discussions about property tax administration with retired officers of the 
ETD were helpful in gaining initial knowledge of the informal setting.  
I have pieced together findings from my continued observation and discussions with 
various informants at different levels in the government, and in various departments and 
jurisdictions. I cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that tax staff might have 
misguided me regarding some issues concerning corruption and the ways in which they 
operate. I tried to minimize this risk by speaking to a large number of tax staff in 
different jurisdictions (see Annexure B). Generally, their accounts of the way they 
worked matched. However, more reassuring of the veracity of what they told me is the 
fact that their information is largely self-incriminating. None of the staff that I spoke to 
were defensive about their informal ways of working; they were quite matter of fact 
about it. At various stages of my fieldwork I discussed my findings with some senior 
officers with long careers in the ETD; they broadly agreed with the picture that 
emerged. 
1.5.4 Background assumptions 
I make two important background assumptions in this thesis.  
The first is the poor quality of domestic services in Pakistan. Pakistan has low human 
development indicators; it ranks 146 out of 187 countries on the HDI scale.36 The fact 
that Pakistan is nine places lower on the human development index than on its per 
capita national income ranking reflects the gap in service delivery (UNDP, 2013). Some 
of the reasons for the failure of successive governments to provide quality public 
services are:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  The	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI)	  is	  a	  composite	  statistic	  of	  life	  expectancy,	  education,	  and	  per	  capita	  income	  indicators,	  which	  is	  used	  to	  rank	  countries	  into	  four	  tiers	  of	  human	  development.	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(a) The government of Pakistan does not invest adequately in the provision of social 
services. For example, its combined expenditure on health, education and social 
protection was 1.5% of its GDP, compared to an average of 4.71% for South Asian 
countries (World Bank, 2012). This is partly because of lack of public resources, but 
also political expenditure priorities.  
(b) Patronage politics and the lack of accountability and transparency in allocation and 
use of available public funds restrict provision of expanded public services. Experts 
argue that greater decentralization and accountability puts pressure on the government 
to allocate resources that are more in line with public needs. However, in the case of 
Pakistan, successive changes in local government laws and the Constitution devolving 
expenditure responsibilities to lower levels of government failed to improve service 
delivery (Ahmad et al., 2005, Hasnain, 2008b, Keefer and Khemani, 2004, Keefer et al., 
2003, Mohmand and Cheema, 2007).  
(c) The elite do not use most public services; hence they do not exert political pressure 
for provision of these services. Since they are relatively more influential politically, 
absence of any political pressure from the elites dilutes the overall political demand for 
expanded public services (Zaidi, 2011, Andrabi et al., 2002, Asadullah, 2009, Shaikh 
and Hatcher, 2005). While I discuss some of these factors in various parts of my thesis, 
in order to remain focused on my research question, I simply assume low levels of 
quality public service provision in Pakistan and do not go deeply into its reasons. 
My second assumption – the extreme reluctance of the Pakistani elites to pay taxes – is 
clearly an important explanation for low tax collection but it is not the core focus of this 
thesis. The rich all over the world are reluctant to pay taxes. Governments face a 
constant risk of the economic elites transferring their wealth abroad. The rich employ all 
sorts of ways to avoid taxation, including, influencing tax policy and ensuring that tax 
collection is not enforced (Eisenstein, 2010). Relatively complex and less transparent 
taxation systems in poor countries make it easier for the elites to manipulate these in 
their favour. There are also a number of reasons why governments do not make all out 
efforts to tax the rich; some of these factors are more relevant to developing countries 
(Profeta and Scabrosetti, 2007, Fairfield, 2010, Pasha and Pasha, 2013, Hassan and 
Prichard, 2016):  
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(a) Governments allow the rich various concessions and reductions in the tax rates, in an 
attempt to gain the political support of these powerful interest groups or as a result of 
lobbying. The ruling elite bias is found both in tax policy (formal provisions of the tax 
code) and in tax administration – failure to make much effort to pay what they should 
be paying in taxes. For example, in the recent past, during the military regime of 
General Musharraf, tax concessions were granted in an attempt to gain the support of 
powerful interest groups. These concessions included: Abolition of the wealth tax; 
exemption granted on capital gains from stock market trading; zero-rating of the 
domestic sales of major export sectors, such as textiles; exemption from sales tax granted 
to agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and pesticides; exemption from sales tax granted 
to plant and machinery and promulgation of a large number of statutory regulatory 
orders (SROs) for exemption from or concession in import duties. During Musharraf’s 
regime tax expenditures – revenue losses attributed to tax laws which provide for a 
special exclusion, exemption, deduction, tax credit, preferential rate of tax or a deferral 
of tax liability – have been estimated at about a fourth of total taxes collected by the 
federal government (Pasha and Pasha, 2013).  
(b) A large section of the political elite itself has substantial economic interests in 
retaining a weak tax system. For example, 60% of Pakistan’s federal cabinet and two 
thirds of its federal lawmakers paid no tax in 2010. Thirty-four out of fifty five cabinet 
members did not file their tax return, and of those who did, most paid negligible taxes 
(Cheema, 2012). A glaring example of direct economic interests of the political elite in 
Pakistan is the case of agriculture income tax. Despite contributing about a quarter of 
Pakistan’s GDP, and employing almost a third of the total work force, the agriculture 
sector accounts for a negligible amount of government income tax revenue (Javid, 
2011). Historically, the landed elite in Pakistan has enjoyed political power and has 
always blocked reform or strict enforcement of the agriculture income tax (Khalilzadeh-
Shirazi and Shah, 1991, World Bank, 1999, Manning et al., 2003).  
For various reasons, I do not study in detail the impact of elite resistance to property 
taxes as part of my doctoral research. However, based on their generally successful 
resistance to taxation in Pakistan, I assume that elites play a significant role that results 
in low property tax collection. 
 
 
42 
1.6 Findings, chapter outlines and research contribution 
I found a number of reasons for unusually low property tax collection in Punjab that can 
be categorised under three broad headings. The first is the failure of the sub-national 
governments to cooperate to collect property tax. The second is the low fiscal 
equilibrium that results from political disincentives to raise tax revenue as well as low 
political pressures on government to deliver services. The third is the weak tax 
administration, mostly due to the predominance of the informal ways in which property 
tax is assessed, collected and enforced.  
These three broad findings are spread over five chapters, as I explain below. 
1. Failure of sub-national governments to cooperate 
Complex arrangements of collection and division of revenues are frequent in the case of 
property tax. There are both potential benefits of sharing functions among different 
levels of government and risk of the potential dysfunctions: ambiguities about 
responsibilities; muted or perverse incentives to perform well; and the scope for 
political manoeuvring. I found that after the decentralisation reforms in 2001, these 
dysfunctions dominate in Punjab, because responsibilities for raising property tax 
revenue and rights to enjoy those revenues are divided among different levels of 
government – the province, district and town – in exceptionally complex ways. Revenue 
raising responsibilities are divided among three levels of government, while revenues 
are divided only between two levels of government. Town level governments enjoy 
most of the revenues, the district level governments above them receive none and the 
remaining revenues accrue to provincial government. 
This complex arrangement resulted in disincentives for each level of government 
involved to cooperate, in order to raise property tax. More specifically three factors 
impacted property tax revenues: the first deals with organisational disincentives. There 
is a major mismatch between the efforts that different levels of sub-national government 
are required to put into property tax collection, and their potential gains. While district 
governments have no share in revenues they are expected to supervise tax staff, fund 
their operation costs and review public appeals against assessment. Provincial 
government exercises most tax collection functions but has a small share of revenues. 
Town governments receive most of the property tax revenues but have only one 
significant revenue raising responsibility: declaring newly urbanised areas eligible for 
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property tax collection. Both provincial and town governments that share tax revenue 
find that the political cost of raising them is too high compared to their expected returns. 
Although enjoying majority of revenues from urban property taxes with minimal effort, 
town governments are reluctant to fulfil their rating responsibilities for electoral 
reasons. There are a number of possible reasons why elected town government officials 
failed to rate newly urbanised areas. These include, practically absence of town 
governments’ control over most of the property tax rate-setting and collection functions, 
as well as tax revenues.  
The second is that the current system for property tax collection requires relatively 
senior public servants who are employed by the provincial government to be 
accountable for their performance to the lower, district, level of government. This is 
unpopular and generated resistance, which found ready sympathy within the provincial 
government, which, for various reasons, was keen to regain control over devolved 
departments. Resultantly the provincial ETD informally resumed control of its district 
staff. Thus, in the absence of any share of property tax revenues, the district 
governments lost administrative control over tax collection as well. Thus there is no 
incentive for district governments to cooperate over property tax collection that partly 
explains their failure to provide supervision and funding to local ETD offices – which is 
their formal role. 
The third reason is related, and may indeed in some sense be a major underlying cause 
for the two factors listed above. There is a long history of rivalry between the provincial 
level of government, which has the main responsibility for property tax collection, and 
the levels of sub-national government below it. This rivalry stems in particular from the 
ways in which military governments have tried to empower local governments and 
undermine power of provincial governments. The latest (2001) round of local 
government reform was quite ambitious, devolving provincial authority substantially. 
Historically, the political and official staff of provincial government seem to have 
preferred that there should be no elected levels of local government below them, as this 
reduces their power. If forced to accept the existence of elected local government, they 
tend to find ways of undermining their authority.  
I discuss the above probable causes for low property tax collection in Chapter 2. I 
explain the formal mechanism of property tax collection and also how it actually works. 
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I show that revenues and responsibilities of the three levels of sub-national government 
are mismatched leading to disincentives for each level to cooperate in collecting 
property tax. Incentive issues existed in the previous system, but I focus on the period 
since 2001, because the decentralisation reform multiplied these obstacles. I provide 
evidence that indicates bureaucratic resistance to be accountable to local level of 
government and how that affected property tax administration. I then trace the history of 
political rivalry between the provincial and the local governments, which was perhaps 
an important background reason for provincial government actions that impacted 
property tax collection negatively. 
2. Low fiscal equilibrium: Lack of incentives to raise taxes and expenditures 
When own tax revenues are low and political demands for public spending are 
politically manageable, fiscal politics enters into something of a low level equilibrium – 
a situation in which sub-national governments neither make the kinds of efforts one 
might expect to obtain more revenues from own sources, nor appear to be under strong 
pressure to spend more money. Various factors are at work keeping both sides of the 
equation – own taxes and expenditures – at low levels, and thus contribute to 
maintaining this equilibrium; I discuss some probable reasons for low taxes and 
expenditures in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Most of the arguments in these two 
chapters are largely speculative and based on deduction. The speculation is in turn 
informed by my field research, extensive work experience in the government as well as 
my analysis of the relevant academic literature. The evidence I provide for the 
mechanisms at work that help maintain the low fiscal equilibrium are not cast-iron; at 
best they are consistent with the arguments that I make. 
Low incentives to raise tax revenue 
The provincial and town governments share most property tax raising responsibilities. I 
argue that the provincial and town governments are not strongly motivated to increase 
tax revenues generally due to their relatively easy access to other sources of revenue, 
especially transfers from higher levels of government and loans, in the case of 
provincial governments. More specifically, I found that the fiscal transfer mechanisms – 
expectations of additional transfers, absence of any attached conditions and 
unpredictability of the transfer of property tax revenues (in the case of town 
governments) – did not incentivise sub-national governments to raise property taxes. 
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The relative insignificance of property tax revenues to the total provincial income led 
the provincial government to put little effort into maintaining or enhancing its 
organisational capacity to collect property tax. In the end I begin to link the revenue side 
of the low fiscal equilibrium with the expenditure side; I found that the sub-national 
governments rarely run into the kinds of liquidity crises that could force them to 
increase tax collection. 
In Chapter 3 I show that both the provincial and town governments are highly reliant on 
sources of income other than their own source revenues, especially transfers from 
higher levels of government and loans. Property taxes are a small proportion of their 
total incomes, particularly in the case of the provincial government. I show that there is 
ample evidence from elsewhere that easy access to other sources of income, like loans 
and transfers, affect the incentives of sub-national governments to raise their own taxes. 
I provide some evidence that indicates such disincentives to be at work in the case of 
Punjab. Specifically I discuss: expectations for additional transfers; unconditional 
transfers; easy access to borrowing by the provincial government; lack of investment by 
the provincial government in its capacity to collect property tax; and the fact that town 
governments do not receive their full share of property tax revenues. In the end, I show 
that generally both the provincial and town governments have enjoyed a relatively 
comfortable liquidity position reflected by positive cash balances, which indicates 
absence of sustained fiscal stress.  
Low political pressure to spend on public service delivery 
For a number of reasons, including the scope of this research, the expenditure side of 
my ‘low fiscal equilibrium’ argument concerns the provincial government only, which I 
discuss in Chapter 4. My arguments in this chapter are generally speculative in nature. 
The provincial budgets need formally to be balanced at the beginning of the fiscal year 
and the provincial government is required to maintain a positive liquidity position. But 
very little effort is put into determining expenditure needs in relation to service delivery 
projections. Inadequate provision is made for the operations and maintenance costs 
(non-salary recurrent costs) – including repairs, maintenance, utilities, consumables and 
other operational necessities critical to effective public service delivery. Because it is 
able to remain liquid in cash terms normally and to retain unspent balances at the end of 
the year, the provincial government broadly satisfies the fiscal objectives imposed by 
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the higher level of government. Additionally, during times of fiscal stress, instead of 
raising additional taxes, the government resorts to cutting expenditures on operations 
and maintenance even further, eventually putting the burden of adjustment mainly on 
service delivery. 
I make deductive arguments and provide some evidence that is consistent with them. I 
argue that there are no pressing internal political pressures to raise additional revenues 
because the government does not face very strong political pressures to spend on public 
services, for a number of reasons: the first is that political demands for expanded service 
delivery are relatively weak, despite appallingly low levels of provision, because of the 
prevalence of patronage politics, and political dominance of the wealthy who are largely 
not reliant on publicly provided services. There is weak public and social accountability 
of the provincial government about the ways in which it spends public resources. The 
second is that the provincial government is rarely at serious risk of upsetting a powerful 
interest group – its own employees – because it always prioritizes paying their salaries, 
by slashing other expenditures if required. The third is that the provincial government 
can effectively ignore pressures from aid donors to raise expenditures on service 
delivery without risking its long-term relationship with them. 
In Chapter 4, most of the evidence that I provide in support of my arguments above, is 
based on secondary data and my prior experience of working in the government. I show 
that despite large gaps in service delivery requirements, government’s expenditure 
priorities are driven by narrow political objectives. I provide some evidence that 
indicates that mechanisms of political and social accountability of public expenditures 
are weak. Relatively meagre financial resources are allocated for expenditure on 
operations and maintenance, which is critical to public service delivery. I also show that 
during times of fiscal stress the government prioritizes paying salaries to its employees 
and resorts to cutting its operations and maintenance costs rather than raise more taxes. 
In order to demonstrate that the government ignores its numerous commitments – about 
raising certain expenditures – with various aid donors that fund it, I provide an example 
from a donor-supported programme. 
3. Weak tax administration  
Although Weberian in form with a clear hierarchy, formal rules, a system of 
recruitment, postings, promotions and a certain level of answerability, the actual 
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working of the ETD in Punjab is largely informal that impacts property tax assessment, 
collection and enforcement. Property tax collection has become locked into a system 
that combines (a) a high degree of informality, (b) control of detailed information at 
lower levels that makes it hard for departmental higher level management to change the 
system or increase collections, (c) modest rent-taking by the local staff who have 
become very responsive to local pressures for leniency in tax collection. In Chapters 5 
and 6, which are based on my field observations, I explore the ways in which property 
tax is actually administered in Punjab. While in Chapter 5 I discuss normal working of 
the department, Chapter 6 is concerned with departmental working during a period of 
unusual pressures to increase tax collection. 
Normal working of the ETD 
Informality and exercise of discretion by frontline workers is normal occurrence in most 
organisations. I found that in the case of Punjab property tax policies including large tax 
rate differentials, for example, those between residential and commercial, owner-
occupied and rented properties provide ample opportunities for tax collectors to exercise 
discretion. Since property tax in Punjab is not self-assessed by the taxpayers – tax 
collectors assess property tax liability – possibility of collusion is high. This is 
facilitated by lack of supervision of lower level staff and absence of effective 
crosschecks on their assessments. I found that for a number of reasons – including 
manual record keeping, which at times does not represent ground realities truthfully, 
and weak supervision/ internal audit – higher-level management of the department is 
not in a position to ensure tax collection effectively. Lower level tax staff monopolise 
information about properties and often manipulate information they pass on to their 
seniors in order to avoid demands for higher tax collection. Amongst other information, 
this is often the case in reporting arrears that are manipulated by lower staff to create a 
‘buffer’ for periods when they may face pressures to increase tax collection. I also 
found that apart from personal gain tax collectors seek and share ‘rents’ from collusive 
arrangements to fund operational costs of tax collection that are not adequately funded 
by the government. Although the amount of rent-taking in the department is difficult to 
estimate, its nature, and the fact that it is embedded and routinized, form a major 
obstacle to increasing tax collection substantially. 
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In Chapter 5, I present findings regarding normal departmental working summarised in 
the preceding paragraph. I explore some of the following questions: what motivates tax 
collectors, how do they operate in a given environment, why and how administrative 
discretion exercised, and how it impacts property tax revenue? I explore the incentives 
that motivate different levels of the ETD in Punjab. I explain formal and informal intra-
organizational relationships, and the hoarding and manipulation of information 
regarding properties and tax arrears by the lower level tax staff. I also show how the 
higher management of the department uses the middle level management to overcome 
its lack of detailed information on property tax and pressure them for increased tax 
collection. 
The working of the ETD under unusual pressure to increase property tax collection 
I found that even during episodes of strict enforcement, like the one I witnessed, though 
there are signs of some formal roles and procedures being actualized, these have very 
little impact on the informal working of the department, especially exercise of discretion 
by tax staff. Resultantly there is no long-term impact on departmental working or tax 
collection. Tax staff manage to increase tax collection by leaning into the buffer of tax 
arrears that they accumulate overtime, but without upsetting too much their local 
political and social relationships or their collusive arrangements.  
In Chapter 6 I analyse tax collectors’ behaviour when they are under extraordinary 
pressures to collect taxes. In this chapter I highlight the tactics used by the supervisory 
staff during strict enforcement, and those used by the field staff to cope with the 
situation. I make the point that despite this unusual episode of enforcement there is no 
long-term change in tax collection or the ways in which local level relationships are 
configured. 
In Chapter 7 I conclude with a recap of the main findings and make comments on an 
experiment incentivizing tax collectors conducted recently in the Excise and Taxation 
Department. I then discuss some implications of my study for long-term tax revenue 
raising in Pakistan, as well as some wider issues of development in the country.  
Research Contribution 
Based on the review of the various literatures, in this thesis I have made the following 
original contributions: 
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1. I have constructed a new framework to answer the question that I set for myself: 
‘Why is property tax so low in Punjab’? After analysing the explanations for low 
property tax offered by the literature, I cast the net more broadly. I explored probable 
explanations for low tax collection based on the literatures on public finance, budgeting 
and the informal working of the state. Since property tax is a subnational tax, I also 
examined aspects of intergovernmental politics and fiscal transfers to find possible 
answers to my puzzle. In this process, I developed a useful framework for studying 
subnational taxation. This framework enabled me to examine the policies and 
administration relating to a subnational tax in a wider political context. It encompassed 
politics between different levels of government as well as the relationships between the 
various levels of the bureaucracy within the tax department. My thesis takes into 
account various channels of political pressure that may or may not push subnational 
governments to raise more taxes. It also examines other political aspects such as the 
respective costs and benefits of the tax revenues and responsibilities when these are 
divided between various levels of government. Researchers may find this framework 
helpful when studying subnational taxes. 
 
2. In this thesis I show the practical consequences of rivalries between different 
levels of government, in this case, neglect of property tax policy and administration that 
led to exceptionally low levels of property tax collection. The literature predicts the 
possibility of this sort of an outcome if the incentives to collect taxes are not aligned to 
the responsibilities assigned to the two levels of government involved. I have added to 
this literature by presenting a case where three levels of government are involved in 
property tax collection. This is perhaps an extreme case of a dysfunctional 
decentralization, where intergovernmental rivalries accentuate the lack of incentives for 
various levels of government involved to collect the tax effectively.  
 
I also highlight the role that the higher-level officers of the tax department play during 
the process of decentralization reforms. As expected, they guard and further their own 
interests, with little regard for overall state functioning, in this case, property tax 
collection. I show that these higher-level bureaucrats resent reporting to elected officials 
of the local government and take advantage of political rivalry between the provincial 
and local governments to restore their provincial status informally, undermining 
decentralization reforms in the process. 
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3. Perhaps the most important contribution of this thesis is unpacking the way 
property tax assessment and collection actually takes place in the context of a poor 
country. The existing literature on property tax administration is largely theoretical and 
barring a few exceptions makes largely normative suggestions on how to improve 
property tax collection. In this thesis, the fine-grained analysis of the informal working 
of the Excise and Taxation Department in Punjab brings out the political and 
bureaucratic complexities of tax collection, which has important policy implications.  
 
Although there have been a number of studies about how the state actually functions in 
poor countries, for example, India, very few of these studies relate to tax collection. 
Moreover, most of these studies are concerned mainly with analysing the informal 
interaction between the state and the citizens. This thesis is a significant addition to 
studies of informal state functioning because of its focus on the internal dynamics the 
departmental working. Because of issues of access to researchers, this provides a rare 
opportunity to look into the actual internal working of a tax department in a poor 
country. Given that for any considerations of reform it is vital to understand the way a 
tax collection system actually works and to identify all the players involved and their 
interests, this thesis contributes significantly. 
In sum, my overall effort has been to provide probable explanations for unusually low 
property tax revenues in the Punjab. Given the increased level of interest shown by the 
international development community, including academics and practitioners, in 
taxation in poor countries, this research hopes to contribute to the vast and growing 
body of literature on property taxation through a careful, in depth examination of an 
extreme case. Taxes are considered important not merely for raising revenue but also as 
a means to state-building.37 This study is expected to have important policy implications 
for Pakistan specifically but also more generally for countries with similar context.38 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  For	  example,	  see	  Brautigam	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  38	  For	  example,	  Rao	  (2013)	  highlights	  similar	  issues	  to	  those	  pointed	  out	  by	  donor	  reports	  on	  Pakistan,	  that	  he	  claims	  result	  in	  low	  property	  tax	  collection	  in	  India.	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2 A cooperation problem: Property tax and inter-governmental 
politics  
2.1 Introduction 
Globally, most taxes are collected and spent by national governments. More complex 
arrangements are however relatively widespread. Different levels of territorial 
government – national, provincial, regional, district, municipal, etc. – share 
responsibility for setting tax levels, assessing individual taxpayers and collecting the 
money owed. They might also share the revenues collected. These more complex 
arrangements are especially frequent in the case of property taxation. In particular, it is 
the norm that two adjacent levels of territorial government divide responsibility for the 
‘earning’ activities in relation to property taxation: level-setting, assessment and 
collection. Within the literature on property taxation there are extensive discussions of 
both the potential benefits of sharing functions among different levels of government in 
this way and of the potential dysfunctions: ambiguities about responsibilities; muted or 
perverse incentives to perform well; and the scope for political manoeuvring.   
These dysfunctions dominate in Pakistan, because responsibilities for raising property 
tax revenue and rights to enjoy those revenues are divided among different levels of 
sub-national government in exceptionally complex ways. Revenue raising 
responsibilities are divided among three levels of government, while revenues are 
divided only between two levels of government. Those two levels are not adjacent to 
one another in the hierarchy: town level governments enjoy most of the revenues, the 
district level governments above them receive none and the remaining revenues accrue 
to provincial governments.  
I argue in this chapter that one of the reasons for low property tax collection in Punjab is 
the ways in which the responsibilities and benefits of the property tax system have been 
interwoven with the structure of sub-national government. Especially since the local 
government reform of 2001, complex property tax arrangements result in significant 
obstacles and disincentives to the use of property tax to raise significant revenues. Prior 
to 2001, while the revenue sharing arrangements were the same as they are currently, all 
functions – property tax level-setting, assessment and collection – were performed 
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solely by the provincial government. There were some problems about perverse 
incentives, but these increased markedly following the reforms in 2001.  
The three main components to the argument in this chapter are: 
• There is a significant mismatch between the efforts that different levels of sub-
national government are required to put into property tax collection, and their potential 
gains. While district governments have no share in revenues, they are expected to 
supervise tax staff, fund their operational costs, and adjudicate on public appeals against 
assessments. The provincial government is responsible for most tax collection functions 
but enjoys only a small share (about 14%) of total property tax revenues.39 Town 
governments receive most (about 81%) property tax revenues but have only one 
significant revenue raising responsibility: to bring newly-urbanised areas into the 
property tax net by rating them. Practically this involves town governments declaring an 
area eligible for property tax collection. They are however reluctant to fulfil their rating 
responsibilities for a number of reasons, including lack of control over property tax 
collection and revenues. Thus, all three levels of government that have revenue raising 
responsibilities – the provincial, district and town levels – have incentives not to fulfil 
these responsibilities energetically.  
• The current system for property tax collection requires relatively senior public 
servants who are employed by the provincial government to be accountable for their 
performance to a lower level of government, the district. This is unpopular and 
generated resistance from the officers involved, which found sympathy within the 
provincial government. For various reasons, the provincial government was keen to 
regain control over its departments that were devolved under the local government 
reforms in 2001. Once the provincial government regained control of its field offices 
(this change was informal and not reflected in local government law), district 
governments became less cooperative over property tax collection.  
• There is a long history of rivalry between the provincial level of government, 
which has the main responsibility for property tax collection, and the levels of sub-
national government below it. This rivalry stems, in particular, from the ways in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  After	  deducting	  5%	  of	  property	  tax	  revenues	  to	  cover	  administrative	  costs,	  the	  provincial	  government	  retains	  15%	  (of	  the	  remaining	  95%)	  and	  is	  legally	  required	  to	  transfer	  85%	  to	  the	  respective	  town	  governments	  from	  where	  the	  tax	  is	  collected.	  I	  use	  approximate	  percentage	  shares	  in	  this	  thesis.	  For	  exact	  shares,	  see	  table	  2.1.	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military governments have tried to empower local governments and undermine the 
power of provincial governments. The local government reforms in 2001 were quite 
ambitious, devolving provincial authority substantially. Historically, the political and 
official staff of provincial government seem to have preferred that there should be no 
elected levels of local government below them, as this reduces their power. If forced to 
accept the existence of elected local governments, they tend to find ways of 
undermining their authority. I argue that a lack of cooperation in the collection of 
property tax by the provincial government was part of a strategy to curtail the financial 
resources available to the town governments. 
In section 2.2, I review the general literature on the assignment of property tax 
responsibilities and revenues among different levels of government. Most of the 
literature I review concerns low-income countries. Among other things, I explore what 
the literature has to say about the potential advantages and disadvantages of sharing of 
tax functions among different levels of government. In section 2.3, I begin by 
explaining in more detail the current arrangement of the property tax functions among 
the three different levels of sub-national government in the Punjab. I then show that 
there are disincentives to cooperate over property tax collection for the two levels of 
sub-national government – the provincial and town – that share revenues from property 
tax. I show that the provincial government has few incentives to invest in its property 
tax collection apparatus. I also discuss some probable reasons why the town 
governments generally failed to extend property tax coverage to newly urbanised areas. 
In section 2.4, I shift my focus to the third level of government – the district – that has 
responsibilities of tax collection but does not get a share of its revenues. I give reasons 
for why the provincial Excise and Taxation Department (ETD) regained control of its 
field units that had been devolved to district governments under the reforms in 2001. I 
then explain that the loss of control over the field offices of the ETD led district 
governments to lose interest in property tax collection, and how this impacted property 
taxes. In section 2.5, I show that some of the reasons for lack of cooperation over 
property taxation are embedded in deep historical political rivalries between the 
provincial and local governments. By comparing some of the actions of the provincial 
government regarding property taxation before and after local government reforms in 
2001, I show that the provincial government may have been trying to restrict the money 
available to town governments. The last section concludes the discussion.   
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2.2 Literature review 
The literature on property taxation in general highlights the importance of cooperation 
and getting the incentives right when tax functions are divided between different levels 
of government. The literature points out that the actual division of responsibilities is 
usually influenced more by the historical and political factors rather than normative 
considerations of, for example, efficiency and transparency. It also shows that the ways 
in which responsibilities are divided can vary greatly among countries.  
Experts point out several reasons why property tax responsibilities in developing 
countries might be divided between different levels of government. Three common 
reasons are:  
• First, because property tax largely benefits small local jurisdictions that may 
have weak administrative capacity, higher-level governments may take over some 
functions. Performance of property tax functions by the higher level of government 
allows certain ‘economies of scale’ to be exploited, for example, hiring skilled 
professionals and investing in technology – to digitalise property tax cadastre and 
billing etc. (Ebel and Taliercio, 2005, Weingast, 2006, Mikesell, 2007, Martinez-
Vazquez et al., 2010, Mikesell, 2013, Smoke, 2013, Weingast, 2014).  
• Second, there can be a sensible case for taking some decisions, especially 
assessments, out of the hands of organisations especially vulnerable to local (elite) 
political pressures. This might reduce the chances of a property tax system being used 
unfairly to penalise or favour certain groups. More generally, property valuation and tax 
liability assessment activities might be more uniform and effective if they are not 
undertaken by the same political jurisdiction in which taxes are actually collected. 
• Third, getting involved with property tax allows higher-level governments some 
influence over local government fiscal policy. Control over tax functions of a lower 
level government may also give the higher-level government an opportunity to exercise 
more political influence over the local government. 
 
Experts also point out certain disadvantages (some of which, like the one immediately 
above, might be introduced by design) of property tax collection by the higher level of 
government. Local governments lose control over flow of tax revenues, since the 
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higher-level government might not transfer these to lower level governments accurately 
or punctually. In particular, in the case of taxes that generate low revenues, dependence 
on higher-level governments might discourage local governments from taking an active 
interest in ensuring that they receive the correct amount of transfers in a timely way. 
This may further discourage local governments from making any investments in 
policies or arrangements that might enhance tax collection (Mikesell, 2013). 
Since property tax revenues are generally assigned to local governments, there are some 
advantages for giving local governments responsibility for some of the tax functions for 
the purposes of accountability and an increased reliance on own source revenues (Bird, 
2010b). Although some experts believe property tax can be collected by relatively 
simple tax organisations, such as those at the local government level, in practice 
arrangements for property tax collection can vary among countries and are usually 
divided between two levels of government (Dillinger, 1991, Bird and Slack, 2004). 
These arrangements fall into one of the following four categories: central40 valuation 
and central collection; local valuation and local collection, central valuation and local 
collection, and local valuation and central collection (Mikesell, 2013).  
When different levels of government perform property tax functions, it is important that 
there is some balance between their incentives and their responsibilities. It is possible 
that, on the one hand, the higher level of government may get very little share of the tax 
and can become ‘indifferent’ to tax collection, while on the other hand, the local 
governments that enjoy majority of the tax share may not have the capacity to perform 
their roles effectively. It has been pointed out that in such situations division of 
responsibilities for property tax collection between the two levels of government might 
a trade-off between “indifference and incompetence”, since “the higher level 
government is capable but not keen while the local government is keen but not capable” 
(Dillinger, 1991; p.29). The importance of compensating the higher-level government 
for the costs it incurs in collecting the tax, perhaps to the extent of a share of the 
revenues, has been stressed. Without a commensurate share of revenues, there will 
always be incentive and cost issues faced by the higher level of government when 
collecting a local government tax. There are examples in the real world, of such tax 
collection arrangements working quite well. For instance, Canada has one of the highest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  This	  can	  also	  be	  the	  provincial	  government,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan.	  
 
 
56 
ratios of property tax to GDP in the world. Collection is the joint responsibility of two 
levels of government (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2005, Mikesell, 2007, 2013).  
To summarise, property tax functions are usually divided between two levels of 
government. The functions can be divided in ways that take advantage of the different 
strengths of these levels of government. For example, the familiarity of lower-level 
governments with local conditions and the technical capacities of the higher levels 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2005; p.37). For such arrangements to work well, the 
most important factor is to get the incentives right for each level of government to 
perform its functions effectively.  
2.3 Despite getting a share of property tax revenues the provincial 
and town governments have low incentives to raise property tax  
What is unusual about Punjab, and especially since the local government reform in 
2001,41 is the extent of division of both responsibilities and revenues among the sub-
national governments. Three levels of sub-national government – the provincial, district 
and town – now each have responsibilities in the collection process. Yet only two of 
them – the province and town – share the revenues. In this section I show that despite 
sharing property tax revenues, the provincial and town governments have low 
incentives to perform their tax collection roles effectively. The de facto division of 
responsibilities is summarised below (table 2.1). 
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  For	  a	  comprehensive	  description	  of	  the	  Pakistan’s	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  government	  system	  prior	  to	  2001,	  including	  fiscal	  relationships	  between	  various	  levels	  of	  sub-­‐national	  government,	  see	  Shah	  (2006);	  and	  Dillinger	  (1991;	  p.31)	  for	  property	  tax	  arrangements.	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Table 2.1: Property tax: Division of revenues and responsibilities 
Government/ 
Function 
Provincial District Town 
Share from Tax 
Revenues 
5% (collection charges) 
+ 14.25% (provincial share) 
0% 80.75% 
Tax Policy Setting tax rates 
Granting exemptions (tax 
base) 
None Declaring newly 
urbanised areas 
eligible for property 
tax collection42 
 (tax base) 
Tax 
Administration 
Property tax survey: 
Revaluation, cadastre 
maintenance & updating 
Liability assessment 
Billing  
Enforcement 
Review appeals against 
assessment 
Provision of operational 
budget to tax offices 
Administrative 
supervision and support 
to tax staff 
None 
Source: Author; updated from table in Cyan (2007; p.1474) 
After 2001, the complex distribution of property tax functions among the three levels of 
sub-national government was not congruent with the revenue shares accruing to each 
level. This resulted in low incentives for them to cooperate in raising property tax. The 
provincial government is responsible for the majority of the property tax collection 
functions, but is entitled only to about a seventh of the total revenues. The district 
government has some responsibilities but does not get a share of the revenues. Town 
governments receive about 81% of property tax revenues although they have only one 
significant formal responsibility: setting property tax rates (rating) newly urbanised 
areas, in order to expand the property tax base. In practice, town governments rarely 
live up even to that responsibility. I now discuss in more detail the financial incentives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  As	  I	  explain	  in	  section	  2.3.2	  the	  formal	  role	  of	  the	  town	  governments	  is	  to	  set	  property	  tax	  rates	  in	  the	  newly	  urbanised	  areas,	  eligible	  for	  property	  tax	  collection.	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facing the two levels of sub-national government that receive a share of the property tax 
revenues: provincial and town governments. 
2.3.1 The provincial government 
Because it receives a small share of property tax revenues relative to its collection 
responsibilities, the provincial government puts little effort into tax collection. The 
money that the provincial government obtains from its 14% share of property tax 
collections represents an insignificant fraction of its total annual income. In the financial 
year 2011-12, the provincial government’s share of property tax revenues was less than 
Rs. 1 billion, compared to its total income of Rs. 900 billion. This situation seems to 
adversely affect the willingness and capacity of the provincial government to collect the 
property tax through the two following mechanisms in particular.  
First, active engagement of the provincial government in trying to increase the yield 
from property tax would require it to take politically unpopular decisions regarding tax 
policy and administration. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the property tax is a relatively 
unpopular tax. The potential political costs of raising property taxes are high for the 
provincial government. Since it is responsible for majority of the tax collection 
functions, the public are likely to associate the tax with the provincial government. 
Changes in tax policy have to be announced in the annual budget speech made by the 
provincial Finance Minister in the Provincial Assembly. The public generally hold the 
provincial government responsible for any increases in their property tax bills.  
Property tax is politically sensitive. There are currently about 1 million property 
taxpayers in Punjab. This might seem like a relatively small fraction of the total 
population of the province, which is about 90 million. But those raw numbers can be 
misleading. The property tax is payable by the most politically influential fraction of the 
population: the more wealthy urban dwellers. And the population is urbanising quite 
fast. Between a third and a half of the population of the province is estimated to be 
living in urban areas (Ali, 2003, Mustafa and Sawas, 2013). Many people view 
themselves as potential property taxpayers. The potential political costs of raising 
property tax are high. This explains why throughout the 2000s the provincial 
government repeatedly reneged on commitments made to aid donors to take actions to 
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improve property tax collections, 43 included revaluing properties or indexing the 
property tax valuation table for inflation. Although it is mandatory under the Punjab 
Urban Immoveable Property Tax Law (1958) to revalue properties every five years, the 
most recent revaluation in 2014 came after a gap of 16 years. After revaluation, the 
provincial government imposed a condition that this should not result in an increase in 
individual property tax bills of more than 50%.  
Second, because it receives so little income from the property tax, the provincial 
government does not find it cost-effective to make the investments in technology and 
human resources that would enable it to increase its property tax collection capability. 
Experts have repeatedly recommended that the provincial government needs to invest in 
well-trained and dedicated staff for property tax collection in all the districts in the 
province, and digitalise the property tax cadastre, among other improvements. These 
measures are considered essential if the large property tax potential – estimated to be 
five times the current level of collection – is to be exploited (World Bank, 2009a, Nabi 
and Shaikh, 2011, World Bank, 2012b). One of the reasons cited for the repeated 
unsuccessful attempts to digitalise property tax records in Punjab is the reluctance of the 
provincial government to commit adequate and sustained resources to these projects 
(Khan and Inam, 2014). 
By contrast, the Punjab Provincial Government has invested in improving its capacity to 
collect some other provincial taxes – those that generate larger revenues and belong 
wholly to the provincial government. One example is motor vehicle taxes.44 Like the 
property tax, these are collected by the provincial Excise and Taxation Department. On 
average, the provincial government earns about Rs. 5 billion from motor vehicle taxes 
annually. This is slightly less than twice the total property tax collection (see figure 2.1), 
and about five times more than the provincial share of property taxes. By 2010, the 
provincial government had successfully installed and is since using a fully computerised 
and automated motor vehicle registration system operated by trained and dedicated 
teams in all the 36 districts in the Punjab. The system was initially installed in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  For	  example,	  under	  the	  loan	  conditionality	  of	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  (ADB)	  funded	  Punjab	  Government	  Efficiency	  Improvement	  Program	  (2002-­‐2012);	  the	  provincial	  government	  repeatedly	  reneged	  on	  mutually	  agreed	  policy	  actions	  pertaining	  to	  property	  taxes	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  ten	  year	  programme.	  Also	  see	  Chapter	  4.	  44	  These	  include	  three	  kinds	  of	  fees	  levied	  on	  motor	  vehicles:	  registration,	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  and	  annual	  road	  tax.	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Lahore district in 2006 and rapidly extended to the rest of the province. The total cost of 
the system was about Rs. 800 million, which is less than a fifth of the annual revenue 
from motor vehicle taxes. The computerised registration system has improved the 
efficiency, transparency and credibility of the motor vehicle branch of the ETD, 
resulting in high levels of client satisfaction (Asian Development Bank, 2009). 
The second example is the sales tax (on services), which was handed over to the 
provincial government for collection by the Federal Government, in 2010. The revenue 
collected from sales tax alone is almost equal to all other provincial taxes; it was about 
Rs. 33 billion out of total provincial tax revenue of Rs. 67 billion, in 2011-12. When the 
collection responsibilities were transferred to the provincial government, it immediately 
set up a new semi-autonomous tax collection agency, the Punjab Revenue Authority 
(PRA). The provincial government is considering a number of proposals to build the 
capacity of the PRA including, establishing regional offices of the PRA and hiring 
qualified staff on market-based salaries (as opposed to government pay-scales, which 
are much lower). 
For more than a decade now Punjab government’s aid donors have consistently pointed 
out weaknesses in the provincial property tax collection apparatus (World Bank, 1999, 
2006, Asian Development Bank, 2009, World Bank, 2009a, 2012b).45 In response to 
these criticisms, the provincial government typically makes slow moving and patchy 
reform efforts that do little more than provide some misleading reassurance to the 
donors that their concerns and conditions are being addressed. Numerous false starts to 
digitalising the property tax cadastre and billing system gave way in 2012 to a new 
initiative. This was supported of the World Bank and piloted in Sialkot, a medium sized 
city. Experts who reviewed the progress of this project found it wanting in a number of 
aspects and narrow in its scope. For example, the project did not include geographic 
information system (GIS) mapping (Khan and Inam, 2014). Currently (in 2015) the 
project has been scaled up to include the five City Districts in the Punjab, at an 
estimated cost of about Rs. 1 billion, which includes GIS mapping. ETD officials told 
me that the project is slow and it will be some time before it is fully operational in the 
whole province. It is noteworthy that the estimated cost of this project would be many 
times the annual provincial share of property tax revenues if it is extended to cover all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  See,	  http://prmp.pitb.gov.pk/Public_financial_management,	  for	  a	  collection	  of	  donor	  reports	  on	  tax	  reform	  in	  Punjab.	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the districts. For the provincial government, the cost-benefit ratio of investment in 
technological improvements is clearly much lower for property taxes collection than for 
motor vehicle taxes. 
The Punjab government has neither increased the human resource available to the ETD 
nor invested in training the available staff. Although the field staff of the ETD are on 
the payroll of the district governments, the district governments are wholly reliant on 
transfers from the provincial government. The ETD has about 3,000 staff, a figure that 
has remained unchanged for more than a decade. According to the departmental data, 
1,396 employees are responsible for property tax assessment and collection in more 
than 480 property tax circles in the province. By contrast, taxable property units 
increased from over a million in 2002 to about 1.3 million in 2012. At the provincial 
level there is an overall shortage of property tax staff. The ETD urgently requires 135 
additional positions of property tax Inspectors.46 Interestingly, due to a ban on 
recruitment imposed by the government to cut expenditures, the ETD cannot even hire 
staff in positions vacated by retiring employees. Provincial level officials of the ETD 
told me that, they deal with the overall shortage of property tax staff by ensuring that 
the five City Districts47 in the Punjab are well manned. These districts have large 
numbers of taxable properties and the ETD maintains dedicated property tax staff for 
their tax offices in these districts.48 In most other districts property tax staff are required 
to collect other minor provincial levies49 as well (see figure 2.1). ETD officials told me 
that the provincial Finance Department refuses to fund staff increases for property tax 
collection mainly for two reasons. One is that fewer staff will be required once the 
digitalisation projects are complete. The other is that, on the basis of past annual 
property tax targets and collection, officials of the Finance Department claim that there 
is no urgent need to increase in property tax staff.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  I	  got	  this	  information	  from	  a	  proposal	  initiated	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  ETD	  in	  2012	  for	  the	  Chief	  Minister’s	  approval.	  47	  Out	  of	  36	  districts	  in	  the	  Punjab	  province,	  5	  most	  populated	  (also	  most	  urbanised)	  were	  declared	  as	  City	  Districts,	  under	  the	  PLGO-­‐2001.	  I	  explain	  their	  significance	  to	  my	  arguments	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  48	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  I	  point	  out	  that	  even	  in	  the	  City	  Districts	  that	  I	  studied;	  the	  tax	  collectors	  hire	  some	  of	  the	  office	  staff	  (clerks)	  privately,	  at	  their	  own	  expense.	  49	  These	  include	  entertainment	  tax,	  hotel	  bed	  tax,	  farm	  house	  tax,	  professional	  tax,	  cotton	  levy	  and	  some	  indirect	  taxes.	  Tax	  collection	  responsibilities	  of	  property	  tax	  staff	  vary	  from	  district	  to	  district.	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Generally, the Punjab Provincial Government has not invested in building its capacity 
for tax collection or even tax policy analysis. As a former Secretary who headed both 
provincial and federal finance ministries remarked, “…the provincial government never 
really developed its tax function… it only concentrated on expenditure management.” 
The fact that neither the provincial Finance Department nor any of the provincial tax 
organisations developed a tax policy analysis capability – a severe shortcoming often 
pointed out by multilateral agencies – indicates the relative neglect by the government 
of its tax functions (Asian Development Bank, 2009). Within the Finance Department, a 
junior officer, a generalist from the civil service, performs the function of provincial tax 
policy analysis, along with other responsibilities such as general administration of the 
department.50 
Figure 2.1: Taxes collected by the ETD (Average for financial years 2006-07 to 
2011-12) 
 
Source: Office of Director General, Excise and Taxation, Punjab 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Similarly,	  over	  the	  last	  15-­‐20	  years,	  some	  slow-­‐moving	  reform	  initiatives	  have	  been	  on-­‐going	  in	  another	  provincial	  tax	  organisation,	  the	  Board	  of	  Revenue.	  For	  example,	  the	  Land	  Records	  Management	  and	  Information	  System	  (agriculture	  land	  records	  digitalisation)	  project	  –	  initiated	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  is	  still	  on-­‐going	  with	  donor	  support.	  Moreover,	  its	  primary	  objective	  is	  of	  ensuring	  ready	  availability	  of	  authentic	  property	  ownership	  deeds	  in	  order	  to	  spur	  economic	  growth	  in	  rural	  areas,	  through	  easing	  access	  to	  credit,	  expediting	  change	  of	  ownership	  and	  minimizing	  litigation	  about	  ownership.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  land	  records	  digitisation	  project,	  see:	  http://www.sbp.org.pk/sbp_bsc/BSC/DFSD/Workshop/Land-­‐Records-­‐Automation-­‐Punjab.pdf	  http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P090501/land-­‐records-­‐management-­‐information-­‐systems-­‐program-­‐lrmis-­‐p-­‐province-­‐Punjab?lang=en.	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At the current level of revenue collection and given its small share (14%), the provincial 
government sees little financial return for the relatively high financial costs it will have 
to bear to enhance its property tax collection capability. Moreover, the provincial 
government finds that it will have to bear potentially high political costs of increasing 
property taxes by performing its property tax functions effectively, in return for 
relatively small share in its revenues.  
2.3.2 Town governments   
In this sub-section I explain the lack of cooperation by the town governments, which 
receive a large share (81%) of tax revenues with the least responsibility. Despite rapid 
urbanisation in the Punjab and repeated requests by the ETD, the majority of town 
governments did not rate newly urbanised areas for property taxation. This is the sole 
responsibility of town governments; it requires passing resolutions by the elected 
officials of the town governments. Nearly a decade after the implementation of the 2001 
reforms, only two town governments in Lahore district – out of 70 towns identified by 
the ETD all over the province – had passed resolutions rating newly urbanised areas for 
imposing property tax. Here are four possible reasons:51 
• First, although formally tax rate-setting function is the responsibility of the town 
governments, in practice the provincial government exercises this power; the town 
governments are only expected to notify newly urbanised areas eligible for property tax 
collection. The provincial government ignores the Punjab Local Government 
Ordinance, 2001, in this regard and sets a uniform property tax rate throughout the 
province. Town government officials told me that, newly urbanised areas are not as well 
provided with municipal services as some old municipal areas; hence it is not fair to 
charge them the same property tax rate. Thus, it is possible that because of their 
inability to set lower property tax rates for newly urbanised areas, the elected officials 
of the town governments consider it to be politically unpopular to extend property tax to 
such areas. As mentioned earlier almost all the property tax functions are performed by 
the provincial ETD and town governments have no control over tax assessment, 
collection and enforcement. There is no legal mechanism in place that allows town 
governments to investigate or provide relief to their residents (who are also their voters) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  My	  findings	  are	  based	  on	  interviews	  and	  discussions	  with	  local	  government	  officials	  only	  during	  my	  fieldwork,	  in	  2011-­‐12.	  Elected	  local	  representatives	  had	  ceased	  to	  hold	  office	  in	  2010	  and	  were	  not	  available	  for	  interviews.	  
 
 
64 
regarding complaints against corruption or strict enforcement. Moreover, the town 
officials have no role in the mechanism of appeals against assessment. 
• Second, town level politicians lived in great uncertainty about when elections 
will be held, or indeed whether they will be held at all. That reduces the incentives to 
engage in long term political strategies that might involve, for example, raising more 
money in local taxes and getting the benefits of spending that money. These 
uncertainties are based on past experience of local governments in Pakistan, which I 
discuss in section 2.5.52 The apprehensions of the local politicians turned out to be true 
because local government elections have not been held since 2010, and civil servants 
appointed by the provincial government administer local governments. 
 
• Third, town officials resent the delays in transfers of their property tax revenues 
from the provincial Finance Department and the deductions that are often made from 
their shares (see figure 2.2). Town officials usually have to pursue the release of their 
property tax shares personally with the provincial Finance Department.53 Property tax 
shares are not released regularly and amounts vary due to unannounced unilateral 
deductions by the provincial Finance Department. Total disbursement of property tax 
revenue to all the town governments in Punjab, for the period from July 2003 to June 
2012, was Rs. 9.2 billion, while the total collection was Rs. 21.2 billion. Thus, only 
about 57%54 of the property tax revenues collected from town jurisdictions was being 
channelled back to the town governments, as opposed to their legally prescribed share 
of 81%. From time to time, the provincial Finance Department makes two types of 
deductions from the property tax share of the town governments. One is to pay their 
electricity bills to the utility company.55 This deduction is made across the board, for all 
the town governments in the Punjab. The second deduction is limited to the town 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Since	  the	  local	  government	  reforms	  in	  2001,	  only	  two	  rounds	  of	  local	  government	  elections	  were	  held,	  in	  2001	  and	  2005.	  53	  Property	  tax	  revenues	  are	  deposited	  by	  taxpayers	  into	  a	  centralized	  account	  of	  the	  provincial	  government.	  The	  provincial	  Finance	  Department	  is	  responsible	  for	  distributing	  81%	  of	  total	  property	  tax	  collection	  to	  respective	  town	  jurisdictions.	  Usually	  these	  transfers	  are	  delayed.	  I	  witnessed	  this	  in	  2008	  while	  working	  as	  Additional	  Finance	  Secretary,	  Punjab	  where	  I	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  local	  government	  finance.	  54	  Author’s	  calculation,	  based	  on	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  provincial	  Finance	  Department	  	  55	  Public	  sector	  consumers	  of	  electricity	  in	  Pakistan	  usually	  do	  not	  pay	  their	  electricity	  bills	  regularly	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  funds.	  Sometimes	  these	  accumulate	  and	  have	  to	  be	  paid	  in	  lump-­‐sum	  by	  the	  provincial	  government	  to	  avoid	  public	  inconvenience	  due	  to	  disconnection.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  town	  governments	  these	  bills	  are	  for	  street	  lighting.	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(governments) jurisdictions that are located in the five City Districts of Punjab. 
Including Lahore, five of the largest urban districts in the Punjab were declared ‘City 
Districts’ under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO), 2001, where the 
local government set up is different from the other districts. This is especially so with 
respect to division of responsibilities regarding water supply and sanitation which is 
generally a town government responsibility; but in the City Districts, existing Water and 
Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) were allowed to maintain their semi-autonomous status 
and do not report to the multiple town governments that are part of a City District.56 
WASAs usually do not recover their operational costs. Since the provincial government 
normally finances their deficits, it uses property tax share of town governments in these 
five City Districts to cover part of the deficits. Using property tax share of town 
governments is an informal practice followed by the provincial Finance Department and 
contrary to its legal obligations to town governments. 
Figure 2.2: Amount of property tax collected and transferred to town governments 
 
Source: Finance Department, Punjab 
 
• The fourth reason for the low level of interest that town governments show in 
property tax collection is the relatively comfortable financial position of town 
governments over the last decade. Quite possibly, town governments did not require 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  This	  was	  mainly	  because	  there	  is	  one	  WASA	  per	  City	  District,	  with	  centrally	  managed	  services.	  It	  was	  not	  considered	  technically	  feasible	  to	  break	  them	  up	  according	  to	  the	  multiple	  town	  jurisdictions	  within	  each	  City	  District.	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additional money on any urgent basis. In Chapter 3, I explain this in detail and show 
that, town governments have a number of sources of income. I also show that during the 
2000s town governments generally enjoyed a comfortable financial position, reflected 
in their end-year cash balances. 
 
In this subsection I provided a number of plausible explanations for why town 
governments did not cooperate over raising property taxes. These range from political 
uncertainty and the relatively weak political position of town governments, which lack 
control over policy, administration and transfer of property tax revenues. With relatively 
little control over property tax collection, town governments are passive recipients of 
whatever tax revenues are passed down. In the following section I explore additional 
reasons for the lack of cooperation by the district governments to collect property taxes, 
apart from the obvious one of having no share in property tax revenues. 
2.4 Bureaucratic interests reduce incentives for district governments 
to cooperate in property tax collection 
Because they receive no revenues from the property tax, district governments generally 
have little direct incentive to cooperate in property tax collection. The information I 
gained from talking to people in the public services suggests that their willingness to 
cooperate was further reduced after they lost an intra-bureaucratic tussle for control over 
the field units of the Excise and Taxation Department (ETD). District governments first 
obtained this control as a result of the decentralisation reforms of 2001. The new 
decentralisation arrangements formally subordinated the relatively senior public 
servants in charge of the district offices of the ETD to elected district level officials. 
This was very disturbing both for the officers involved and for the provincial 
government, that naturally wanted to exercise authority over the staff who were 
responsible for implementing its mandate to collect property taxes. The provincial ETD 
was eventually able, substantively rather than formally, to regain control over its district 
level staff. I was told that this generated resentment among the elected officials of 
district governments, and as further reduced their inclination to cooperate with the 
provincial government over property tax collection. I explore these processes in more 
detail in the next two subsections. 
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2.4.1 Bureaucrats resented the 2001 local government reforms 
The 2001 local government reforms in Pakistan reduced the authority of civil servants 
working at the district level – the  ‘district bureaucracy’. They deeply resented this. 
Prior to 2001 civil administration comprised a hierarchy of regional (divisional) 
Commissioners, district administrators (Deputy Commissioners/District Magistrates) 
and sub-divisional administrators (Assistant Commissioners/Sub-divisional Magistrates) 
who reported to the provincial government. Their tasks included maintaining land 
ownership records, collecting agricultural land taxes, and maintaining law and order. In 
addition, the civil administration was required to oversee and coordinate field units of 
provincial service delivery departments including health, education and civil works. 
Run by the Indian (later Pakistan) Civil Service and Provincial Civil Service officers, 
the civil service cadres have been referred to as the ‘steel frame’ through which the 
colonial state and, after independence, Pakistan, was run. Following independence in 
1947, a powerful bureaucracy initially controlled the political processes, especially at 
the local level in Pakistan, often in collusion with the military (Wilder, 2009).  
Prior to 2001, local ‘bodies’57 – under both the 1962 and 1979 local government 
reforms – were mere appendages to the well-established provincial administrative 
hierarchical system developed under the British Raj. There were separate ‘local bodies’ 
for urban and rural areas. Both had limited expenditure responsibilities, of municipal 
service provision in urban areas and some basic infrastructure development in rural 
areas. They were mostly financed by minor local taxes, user fees, octroi58 and 
discretionary grants from the provincial government (Shah, 1996, 1998). The district 
and the sub-district administration had an oversight role over the functioning of the 
local bodies, even when elected officials ran these. During periods when local 
government elections were not held, the district and sub-district officials administered 
the local bodies. 
There are four main reasons why the relatively senior civil servants working at the 
district level resented local government reforms that were implemented in 2001. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Since	  previous	  local	  government	  systems	  ran	  parallel	  to	  the	  district	  administrative	  hierarchy,	  they	  were	  referred	  to	  local	  ‘bodies’	  rather	  than	  ‘governments’.	  58	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  octroi	  was	  a	  distortionary	  tax	  and	  was	  abolished	  by	  the	  Federal	  Government	  throughout	  Pakistan	  in	  1998.	  It	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  federal	  grant:	  the	  ‘Octroi	  and	  Zila	  (district)	  Tax	  Grant’.	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• The first is that, the PLGO-2001required civil servants working at the district 
level and below to be directly accountable to the elected local government officials. The 
historically powerful office of the Deputy Commissioner was abolished and its 
successor, the District Coordination Officer, reported to the elected chairperson of the 
district government, the District Nazim. Field offices of all the provincial line 
departments report directly to the District Coordination Officer.59 At the town (sub-
district) level, the office of the Assistant Commissioner was abolished and the town 
government60 was placed under the control of an elected chairperson, the Town Nazim. 
The annual performance evaluation reports of officers working at the district and town 
levels were to be initiated (or counter-signed) by the respective Nazims. Civil servants 
resented this loss of status relative to local politicians. For example, previously, under 
local government system in the 1960s, district officers nominated local politicians for 
offices within the local bodies.  
• Second, abolishing the regional tier of the departmental hierarchy in the 
province meant the loss of a number of senior positions across all departments. Under 
the 2001 local government reforms, the regional tier of all the devolved provincial 
departments were abolished. For all these departments, officers serving at the regional 
level had to be adjusted down at the district level, which caused them a loss of status.61 
For example, Regional Directors in the ETD who were previously in charge of three to 
four districts were now limited to overseeing only one district. Severing the hierarchical 
link (partly a result of abolishing the regional level) between the provincial 
governments and district offices was a clear move to limit provincial influence over 
administrative functioning at the district level, thereby ensuring greater administrative 
autonomy for district governments. In section 2.5, I discuss in detail how the local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  provincial	  Irrigation	  Department	  and	  the	  Higher	  Education	  Department,	  all	  provincial	  departments	  were	  devolved	  to	  the	  district	  government,	  and	  grouped	  together	  under	  13	  district	  level	  offices,	  each	  headed	  by	  an	  Executive	  District	  Officer.	  	  60	  Town	  or	  Tehsil	  Municipal	  Administration	  (TMA)	  is	  the	  formal	  name	  of	  this	  level	  of	  local	  government,	  for	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas	  respectively.	  For	  ease	  of	  reference,	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  refer	  to	  both	  jointly	  as	  ‘town	  governments’.	  61	  In	  2000-­‐01,	  while	  posted	  as	  Additional	  Deputy	  Commissioner	  at	  Quetta,	  the	  provincial	  capital	  of	  Baluchistan,	  I	  headed	  the	  ‘District	  Transition	  Team’	  which	  oversaw	  the	  new	  local	  government	  system	  put	  into	  place.	  For	  officers	  of	  the	  civil	  services,	  it	  was	  a	  time	  of	  severe	  despondency	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  loss	  of	  power.	  General	  Musharraf	  wrote	  a	  demi-­‐official	  letter	  to	  each	  federal	  civil	  service	  officer	  (I	  also	  received	  one)	  eulogizing	  them	  for	  their	  historic	  nation-­‐building	  role	  and	  placating	  their	  fears	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  civil	  services	  etc.	  
 
 
69 
government reforms in 2001 reduced the control of the  provincial government over the 
local governments.  
• Third, civil officers at the district level resented the new local government 
system because of the loss of their power and status that they derived from their role as 
executive magistrates.62 The magisterial powers of the district civil officers were 
reallocated to the District Nazims and the district level judiciary. For the officers of the 
elite federal and provincial civil services, this caused a severe loss of morale as they 
were especially concerned about the loss of their magisterial powers, which was a 
source of prestige, especially because it gave them significant authority over the district 
police. There is a traditional rivalry between the civil servants and police officers. The 
police service had managed to stay totally unaffected by devolution and retained its 
regional and district set up intact. Senior police officers had convinced the military – 
which, some senior civil servants allege was more sympathetic to a fellow uniformed 
force – that reporting to elected local governments would politicise the police and 
undermine the public good. Civil and police service officers in Pakistan are inducted 
through the same competitive examination but historically the civil service officers have 
always considered themselves a notch above, in status, authority and protocol to their 
police batch-mates. An inter-service rivalry has traditionally defined the official 
interaction between these two elite and powerful federal services. 
• Fourth, apart from issues of prestige and status, reporting to the local 
government public representatives was technically problematic for provincial 
departmental officers. Since they are provincial government employees, matters relating 
to their career progression – posting and transfers, promotions and disciplinary issues – 
are decided by the provincial government. Civil servants working at the district level 
resented the new system partly because they were now subject to two lines of superior 
authority. Moreover, the provincial and local governments often found themselves in 
conflict (World Bank, 2009b). Numerous instances of friction and, at times, outright 
confrontation between newly elected District Nazims and senior civil servants were 
reported from various districts. Contention sometimes surfaced over occupation of 
office or residential buidlings by the newly elected district officials, but a more common 
reason were matters of professional nature emanating from the duality of control that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  These	  magisterial	  powers	  included	  the	  authority	  to	  prosecute	  and	  adjudicate	  cases	  under	  laws	  dealing	  with	  public	  order,	  public	  health	  and	  safety,	  etc.	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the system had created.63 Ways were found to deal with some of these issues, however, 
district and provincial level public servants were able to make a common cause against 
the new local government system. The elected officials and the senior civil servants at 
the provincial level who lost control over field offices and political influence within 
districts were upset by the local government reforms. Gradually they devised ways of 
circumventing some of the requirements of the PLGO-2001, especially those pertaining 
to the devolution of provincial departments and control over civil servants. Since in this 
thesis I am concerned with property taxes, I discuss below, how the provincial ETD 
regained control over its field offices. 
2.4.2 The provincial government regains control of the devolved ETD field offices 
Within a couple of years of the 2001 reforms, the provincial ETD re-established de 
facto control of its field offices. Since the local government law was not amended to 
reflect this de facto re-centralisation, the district governments continue to be formally 
responsible for the field level tax offices, including their funding and supervision.  
The provincial government was motivated to centralise the ETD field offices for three 
reasons.  
• The first is that, the provincial government does not want to lose its power 
embedded in the capacity to appoint, promote and transfer provincial civil servants, 
even if they are working at the district level. Commentators consider the 
decentralisation reforms of 2001incomplete because a number of the planned reforms 
were never implemented, including the establishment of a district civil service cadre, for 
which the district governments would have all the powers pointed out above. Even in 
the provincial departments which did not centralise their field offices, the provincial 
government did not fully relinquish control over appointments, transfers and promotions 
of district staff to the district governments (Manning et al., 2003). As I show in Chapter 
5, while explaining tax administration, authority to transfer field officers is the preferred 
option (and perhaps the only one they can effectively exercise) for higher level officials 
to control the behaviour of field level public servants. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  These	  were	  often	  discussed	  in	  the	  provincial	  secretariat	  of	  the	  Punjab	  government,	  where	  I	  was	  working	  as	  Deputy	  Secretary	  in	  the	  Finance	  Department	  in	  2002.	  Some	  issues	  were	  more	  obvious,	  for	  example,	  the	  District	  Nazims	  at	  times	  refused	  to	  allow	  district	  officers	  to	  attend	  meetings	  in	  the	  provincial	  secretariat.	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• Second, except property taxes, all the taxes collected by the ETD wholly belong 
to the provincial government (see figure 2.1). So it made little sense for the field offices 
of the ETD to report to the District Nazim (via the District Coordination Officer). There 
was the obvious risk that the tax staff would be easily influenced by local political 
pressures if they are under the overall adminstrative control of the District Nazim. A 
former provincial Finance Secretary told me that, the Secretary of the ETD at the time, 
informed the provincial government that without full control over field offices he might 
not be able to meet provincial revenue targets and honour the provincial government’s 
commitments regarding increased tax revenue generation with its aid donors. 
• Third, although property tax is a relatively minor source of income for the 
provincial government (as I pointed out earlier in this chapter), it is a significant 
indicator for the ETD’s organisational performance. Of all the taxes collected by the 
ETD (see figure 2.1), motor vehicle and property tax are most important to the 
department, as they reflect on its functioning and are considered important indicators of 
the performance of senior career civil servants posted in the department. 
 
Despite initial compliance by the provincial government departments with the 
organisational changes required under the PLGO-2001, by 2003 the Director General of 
the ETD had regained control of the ETD field offices, and  each of the nine Regional 
Directors was again in practice overseeing departmental activities in three or four 
districts. However, the PLGO-2001 was not amended to reflect this centralisation, 
mainly for two reasons:  
• First, it was in the financial interest of the provincial government to keep the 
district governments responsible for meeting the operational costs of the ETD field 
offices. As a result of the local government reforms in 2001, approximately 40% of the 
total provincial income was allocated to local governments. Therefore, there was an 
incentive for the provincial government to keep the field offices on the budget books of 
the districts while regaining administrative control over the field offices informally.  
• Second, the provincial government was unable to make any changes in the 
relevant law without the agreement of the Federal Government. But it was very unlikely 
that this agreement would have been forthcoming. The request would have been 
directed to the National Reconstruction Bureau, which was headed by a retired army 
general who had designed the new local government system. He was reported to be very 
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attached to it, and to suspect that any suggestions for changes were part of a conspiracy 
by the provinces and the civil service to subvert the new system. 
  
The resultant loss of administrative control over the field offices of the ETD led the 
district governments to lose any interest in their property tax functions. This had mainly 
two specific implications for property tax collection:  
• First, it led to a weakening of the system of appeals against property tax 
assessments. As part of the 2001 reforms, a senior district government officer – the 
Executive District Officer (Finance) who reports to the District Coordination Officer – 
is formally the second appellate authority for taxpayers who challenge their property tax 
assessments. Property tax assessment is carried out by the ETD field staff. The first 
appeal against assessment is adjudicated upon by officers of the ETD. Given the 
collusive environment within the Excise and Taxation Department (dicussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6), it is possible that an external check on the department by a local 
authority might have improved accountability and performance in the Department. Due 
to the informal centralisation of the ETD field offices, the designated district 
government officers reportedly showed no interest in exercising their authority. 
• Second, since the administrative control over field offices was informally 
assumed by the provincial ETD, the district governments are even less obliged to 
provide funds for tax collection activities of field offices or supervise them.64 Under the 
Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO), 2001, districts have practically no own 
source revenues and are wholly reliant on transfers from the provincial government. 
These regular monthly transfers are formula-based – estimated on a historical 
expenditure-basis for departments devolved to districts under the 2001 reforms – and 
unconditional, as I explain in Chapter 3. A large component of the transfers is the 
salaries of employees.  These reflect a national-level pay scale; district authorities have 
no scope to change remuneration levels. However, operational (non-salary recurrent) 
costs of the various departments reporting to the districts government are determined by 
the district government during their annual budget-making. As I explain in Chapter 4, 
politicians prefer to fund development projects rather than non-salary operational costs 
of public service departments. The district governments  have little incentive to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  I	  point	  out	  the	  non-­‐availability	  of	  funds	  to	  cover	  operational	  costs	  of	  the	  tax	  staff	  and	  how	  that	  partly	  affects	  their	  behaviour;	  tax	  staff	  fund	  tax	  collection	  activities	  from	  their	  informal	  income.	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adequately fund the operational costs of the ETD field offices. They obtain no revenues 
from the property tax and are not in practice held responsible for the performance of the 
ETD in property tax collections. Resultantly, the district governments are merely 
conduits for salaries of the ETD field-level employees. 
 
In this section I argued that, in addition to the absence of any financial benefit, loss of 
administrative control over the field units of the ETD was an important reason for the 
district governments to not cooperate in property tax collection. The provincial 
government regained control of the ETD field offices for a number of reasons including: 
unwillingness of senior provincial civil servants to be accountable to elected district 
governments; and the fact that the ETD collects mostly provincial taxes and it made no 
sense to report to the district government. The issues discussed in this section are 
relatively tangible and visible, at least to someone like me who has good access to the 
confidential views of relatively senior public servants. But there is another, less tangible 
reason for this lack of cooperation between the provincial and town governments: the 
the long history of provincial antagonism to local governments in Pakistan. 
2.5 Inter-governmental politics and property tax collection 
Historically the provincial and local governments have been political rivals. This rivalry 
has partly emanated from the fact that military governments have tried to empower local 
governments at the cost of the provincial governments. The latest round of local 
government reforms instituted by General Musharraf in 2001seemed to give a lot of 
power to local governments. He continually supported the local governments during his 
rule, from 1999 to 2008, and also maneuvered the 17th Amendment to the Constitution 
of Pakistan, which prevented provincial governments to amend laws concerning local 
governments. Since, they could not disband the system as they had repeatedly done 
before, the provincial governments made all possible efforts to thwart this latest round 
of local government reforms. In this section I argue that property taxation in the Punjab 
seems to have fallen victim to these developments. There is also a possibility that the 
interdependence of various levels of subnational government might have been created 
deliberately leaving them less powerful than it first appears. 
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2.5.1 A state of rivalry 
There is virtually always rivalry between different levels of government. They are often 
competitors for resources of various kinds. The rivalry is expected to be particularly 
intense among those levels that are entirely or to a large degree dependent on transfers 
from higher levels of government. That makes them very direct competitors. So there is 
nothing unusual about the inter-governmental rivalry in Pakistan. However, this rivalry 
is especially intense because of the military dimension, which I explain in this sub-
section.  
 
Local government systems have had a chequered history in Pakistan. The local 
government systems have been strengthened by military governments and weakened by 
elected federal and provincial governments. Since independence, in 1947, political 
developments in Pakistan have been punctuated with episodic experiments of 
strengthening the local government system during the military regimes of General Ayub 
(1958-1969), General Zia (1977-1988) and General Musharraf (1999-2008). Experts 
suggest two main reasons for this. The first is that, local governments are used by 
military regimes as a means of gaining legitimacy by showcasing ‘grass-roots’ 
democracy. The second is that, with the objective of creating broader political support, 
military regimes foster a class of ‘political collaborators’ at the local level. The military 
expects this support at the local level to help them consolidate power at the centre, and 
at the same time undermine the power of established political parties and the national 
and provincial level politicians. General Ayub went to the lengths of having local 
government councillors (know as Basic Democrats)65 declared as the electoral college 
for his election as President under the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan (Cheema and 
Mohmand, 2003, Zaidi, 2005, Cheema et al., 2006).  
 
Elected governments in Pakistan have repeatedly either scrapped local government 
systems instituted by military governments,66 hindered them financially, or failed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  General	  Ayub’s	  local	  government	  system	  was	  called	  ‘Basic	  Democracies’.	  It	  took	  Ayub	  Khan	  sometime	  to	  go	  to	  the	  military	  option,	  which	  was	  to	  some	  significant	  degree	  the	  result	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  democratic	  institutions.	  But	  democratic	  norms	  were	  very	  widespread	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  so	  there	  were	  strong	  pressures	  to	  incorporate	  some	  element	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  military	  regime.	  66	  Prime	  Minister	  Zulfiqar	  Ali	  Bhutto	  scrapped	  the	  Basic	  Democracies	  System	  instituted	  by	  General	  Ayub	  Khan	  in	  1971,	  branding	  it	  corrupt	  and	  patronage	  based	  (Zaidi,	  2005).	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hold local government elections. They preferred to administer local governments 
directly through provincially-appointed bureaucrats. The latest round of decentralisation 
reforms were undertaken by General Musharraf in 2001. After general elections in 2008 
General Musharaf resigned. Local government elections were due in 2010, but as of 
early 2015 they have not been held in majority of the provinces.67 The Constitution of 
Pakistan (1973) leaves it to the provincial governments to make and implement policy 
and laws on local governance. In the absence of their military originators, local 
governments find themselves at the mercy of elected govenments. Some of the 
explanations provided by experts for aversion of national and provincial level 
politicians to the local government system (Zaidi, 1996, Keefer et al., 2003, Zaidi, 
2005, Cheema et al., 2014) are as follows: 
 
• First, new local government systems were instituted by military dictators 
without consultation with national and provincial parties or politicians. This led to an 
absence of any broad political support for any of these three local government systems.  
 
• Second, in a political environment where patronage is rife, the provincial and 
local politicians compete for the same clientele in their constituencies. Elected local 
governments which can independently decide priorities regarding public expenditures 
can challenge provincial political influence in the local areas quite effectively. 
 
• Third, the well established political elites are threatened by political competition 
that results from a well functioning local government system. Local government 
systems with regular elections constantly spawn new politicians who can graduate to 
provincial and national politics. In Pakistan, where a political career requires a lot of 
money, higher (national and provincial) level politics is mostly an exclusive domain of 
the rich and established political families. Elections for local governments provide an 
opportunity for a relatively low-cost entry to new aspiring politicians. Thus absence of 
local governments curtails political competition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  The	  provincial	  government	  of	  Baluchistan	  has	  only	  recently	  held	  local	  government	  elections,	  in	  early	  2015.	  The	  other	  three	  provinces	  are	  still	  delaying	  local	  government	  elections	  despite	  pressure	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  announce	  election	  dates.	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2.5.2 Relatively powerful local governments created in 2001 
A new local government law was promulgated by the provinces following the 
‘Devolution of Power Plan – 2000’68 announced by General Musharraf, a year after his 
military coup. By far the most ambitious local government system, it differed from 
previous systems substantially, particularly in being protected through a constitutional 
amendment (Cheema et al., 2006). Some of its features that directly threatened 
provincial, political and bureaucratic interests emanated from the unprecedented 
political legitimacy and authority, including relative autonomy in decisions regarding 
public expenditures, that the PLGO-2001 granted to local governments. 
 
Unlike previous local government systems, the PLGO-2001 created relatively 
autonomous, multi-tiered local governments that had the final say on matters within 
their respective mandates. The three levels of local government (the district, town and 
union) are financially and administratively independent of one another but connected 
through their elected officials. At the lowest level, union council members and Union 
Nazims (chairpersons) and Naib Nazims (vice-chairpersons) are elected directly through 
popular vote.69 The Union Nazims and the Naib Nazims represent their union councils in 
the district and town governments respectively. Indirect elections are held for the posts 
of the Nazims and Naib Nazims both at the district and town government levels. This is 
noteworthy since indirect elections led to relatively independent and powerful postions 
of Nazims at the two important levels of local government. Indirect elections for these 
positions lead to the criticism that this diluted the accountability of the Nazims to their 
electorate, and made the system susceptible to political manoeuvring. Experts point out 
that the military regime expected the political executive at the local level to be its core 
supporters, which was allegedly the primary reason for introducing an empowered local 
government system (Keefer et al., 2003, Cheema et al., 2006).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  General	  Musharraf’s	  devolution	  plan	  was	  developed	  and	  implemented	  by	  a	  think-­‐tank,	  the	  ‘National	  Reconstruction	  Bureau’,	  especially	  set	  up	  for	  the	  purpose	  and	  headed	  by	  a	  retired	  army	  general.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  local	  government	  is	  a	  provincial	  ‘subject’	  under	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Pakistan	  (1973),	  in	  2001,	  a	  Local	  Government	  Ordinance	  was	  presented	  by	  the	  Federal	  Government	  which	  all	  the	  provincial	  governments	  had	  to	  promulgate.	  Since	  national	  and	  provincial	  assemblies	  had	  been	  disbanded	  when	  the	  military	  took	  over	  and	  provinces	  were	  being	  run	  by	  Governors	  –	  mostly	  retired	  generals	  appointed	  by	  General	  Musharraf	  -­‐	  the	  Federal	  Government	  faced	  no	  resistance	  in	  having	  the	  devolution	  plan	  implemented.	  69	  One-­‐third	  members	  in	  each	  council	  were	  elected	  indirectly	  against	  reserved	  seats	  for	  women,	  peasants,	  labour	  etc.	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The authority of the local government Nazims at each level was reinforced by severing 
the bureaucratic hierarchical linkages that ran through the provincial government and 
the three tiers of local government. The three tiers of the local government were not 
only independent of each other in terms of their administrative functioning but also of 
the provincial government (Khan and Ghalib, 2012). They only relied, to varying 
degrees, on the provincial government for their income, which mostly comprises 
formula-based transfers under the Provincial Finance Commission award, that I discuss 
below. The provincial government could not interfere with, or influence, functioning of 
the local governments at any level. The PLGO-2001 allowed for mechanisms to check 
any serious irregularities and corruption committed by local governments; however, the 
provincial government had very little administrative oversight or control over the local 
governments. Moreover, in order to reinforce local government autonomy in managing 
public servants working at the local levels, the historical administrative hierarchy of 
province-division-district was discontinued by abolishing the divisional (regional) 
Commissioner tier, as pointed out in section 2.4. This further weakened provincial 
political influence over the local governments. 
 
The PLGO-2001established a rule-based fiscal transfer mechanism that ensured 
unhindered flow of financial resources from the provincial to local governments. The 
transfer mechanism also ensured that the local governments were mostly70 free in 
setting their expenditure priorities. No previous local governemnt system had given this 
level of expenditure responsibilty to the local governments. The size of provincial 
government transfers to the local governments amounted to almost 40% of the total 
provincial income. Transfer to each level of local government was made directly by the 
provincial Finance Department. This was accompanied by the reassignment of a number 
of expenditure responsibilities from the provincial to local governments, involving the 
transfer of field offices of most provincial departments (Hasnain, 2008a). 
 
Compared to the district level, the town governments had substantial own source 
revenues, which might have raised political concerns at the provincial level. Although 
provincial transfers form a large part of local government income, local governments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  The	  local	  governments	  cannot	  reallocate	  resources	  from	  heads	  of	  employee	  salaries	  and	  allowances.	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were also granted some power directly to raise revenues. While the district governments 
did not raise any own source revenues,71 the town governments inherited some well-
established municipal taxes and fees, including revenues from urban property tax. 
Additionally, town governments were also assigned a new levy, of one percent on every 
immoveable property transaction within their jurisdiction, both in urban and rural areas 
(Cyan, 2007).72 As I show in Chapter 3, town governments were generally in a 
comfortable liquidity position over the 2000s. On the expenditure side, the district 
governments were handed over control of all provincial social and economic service 
field units operating at the district level including health, education and public works, 
which carried significant expenditure responsibility. Town governments were given 
mainly municipal responsibilities, for example, of water supply and sanitation (except in 
the 5 City Districts) and town planning (Government of Punjab, 2001).  
 
In principle, post-2001 local governments had significant power, and therefore likely to 
become the focus of considerable political activity. A clear indicator of the political 
importance of local governments formed in 2001 was the fact that the political elite 
became interested in contesting for positions in the local government. In the first local 
government elections held after promulgation of the new law in 2001, many national 
and provincial-level politicians chose to run for seats of district and town Nazims, while 
others fielded relatives for these powerful positions73 (Manning et al., 2003, World 
Bank, 2009b). A number of studies have found evidence that after 2001, elected local 
governments indulged in patronage politics, delivering targeted services and projects, 
which indicates that the local politicians were consolidating their client-base (Cheema et 
al., 2006, Mohmand and Cheema, 2007, Hasnain, 2008b). This  posed a challenge to the 
provincial politicians and resulted in a provincial reaction aimed at curtailing the 
political influence of the local governments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  District	  governments	  were	  empowered	  to	  raise	  new	  taxes	  to	  fund	  health	  and	  education,	  but	  these	  taxes	  were	  never	  levied	  by	  any	  district	  government	  in	  Punjab	  (Cyan,	  2007).	  72	  The	  provincial	  government	  sets	  a	  minimum	  value	  of	  land	  –	  usually	  much	  below	  its	  market	  value	  –	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  various	  property	  transaction	  levies	  are	  charged.	  73	  Note	  that	  general	  elections	  in	  the	  country	  were	  held	  in	  2002,	  a	  year	  after	  the	  local	  government	  elections.	  Since	  the	  military	  coup	  in	  1999,	  till	  2002	  national	  and	  provincial	  governments	  were	  run	  by	  unelected	  officials	  appointed	  by	  General	  Musharraf.	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2.5.3 Provincial reaction 
General Musharraf’s decentralisation reforms in 2001 were quite ambitious. 
Restructuring, almost overnight, a local governance structure that had functioned for 
more than a century was expected to encounter teething problems. While there might 
anyway have been problems, some or many of those that were observed resulted from 
the conscious actions of some agents at provincial level, for example, resistance by civil 
servants that I discussed in section 2.4. In this sub-section I argue that, once elected 
provincial governments assumed office in 2002, they started hindering the local 
government reform process without opposing it openly since the military still ruled the 
country.74 Provincial governments had good reason to resist the decentralisation reforms 
of 2001. One of the reasons was that, General Musharraf reneged on his promise of 
devolving more authority from the Federal to provincial governments. In the absence of 
the devolution of powers from the Federal to the provincial governments there was an 
acute sense of disempowerment at the provincial level. This forced provincial interests 
to devise ways in which to withhold the transfer of any real authority to local 
governments (Kaiser, 2005). For example, in the case of tax assignment, the provinces 
are themselves highly reliant on federal transfers and have very few taxes that they can 
re-assign to the local governments (Ghaus and Pasha, 1988, Manning et al., 2003, 
Pasha, 2013).  
 
The traditional provincial-local government rivalry resumed once elected provincial 
governments came into power after the general elections in 2002. Since General 
Musharraf stayed in power, the provincial governments could not eliminate elected local 
governments like they had done earlier. Instead, the provincial governments embarked 
upon resisting decentralisation by generally decelerating the reform process and 
flaunting local government law wherever possible. More specifically, provincial 
governments undermined local government authority by certain actions including: a) 
denying administrative powers and control over provincial civil servants, such as 
appointment, promotion and transfers within their jurisdiction; b) placing a ban on 
recruitment of lower level staff, that was to be undertaken by local governments; c) 
regaining control of some field offices; d) initiating provincial government-funded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  General	  Musharraf	  got	  himself	  elected	  as	  the	  President	  of	  Pakistan	  by	  the	  National	  Assembly	  after	  the	  general	  elections,	  held	  in	  2002.	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development projects – executed by the provincial government directly – in various 
sectors within local jurisdictions, bypassing local governments (Manning et al., 2003, 
World Bank, 2004).7576 
 
In order to exercise greater control over lower levels of government it is not unusual for 
the higher level to resort to cut-backs, delays and generally making fiscal transfers 
unpredictable, behaviour which has been referred to as “tragic brilliance” (Weingast, 
2006, 2014; pp.19-20). While explaining why the provincial government was so 
neglectful of property taxation during the 2000s, a former Punjab provincial Finance 
Secretary summed up the provincial attitude to local governments quite clearly. He 
recalled that the Punjab Chief Minister (2002-7) was always “annoyed with the local 
government system ……. (and) …… had misgivings about the amount of resources 
being transferred to them.” There are good reasons to believe that the provincial 
government actively denied the transfer of additional financial resources, or the 
potential of earning these, to the local governments than those mandated under the rule-
based mechanism in place. Property tax revenues are a prime example of this strategy. 
 
In Punjab, about 88% of the provincial-local fiscal transfers comprised recurrent costs, 
mostly salaries of the employees of the provincial departments devolved to local 
governments. Although 40% of provincial revenue, these transfers to the local 
governments gave very limited fiscal room for local governments to initiate their own 
development programmes (Cyan, 2007, Hasnain, 2008a). Assuming that the objective 
of the provincial government was to curtail the ability of local governments to develop 
independent development programmes; it would be logical for the provincial 
government to thwart the chances of earning or transfers of additional revenues to local 
governments outside of the rule-based transfer mechanism. This may have been a 
motivating factor behind some of the provincial governments’ (in)actions regarding 
property tax after 2001. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Since	  1985	  members	  of	  the	  national	  and	  provincial	  parliaments	  are	  provided	  with	  constituency	  development	  funds	  for	  programmes	  in	  their	  local	  constituencies	  with	  full	  discretion	  to	  identify	  projects	  (see	  Chapter	  4	  for	  details).	  76	  Large	  donor	  assisted	  social	  sector	  programmes	  in	  Punjab.	  For	  example,	  the	  Punjab	  Education	  Sector	  Reform	  Program	  (World	  Bank)	  and	  the	  Punjab	  Devolved	  Social	  Sector	  Services	  Delivery	  Program	  (Asian	  Development	  Bank).	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Although the provincial share of the property tax revenue remained unchanged after 
2001, there is a clear difference in the policies followed by the provincial government 
before and after 2001 local government reforms. It may be reasonable to assume that the 
change in policies may have resulted from the historic inter-governmental political 
rivalry. In the rest of this sub-section, I analyse provincial policy changes concerning 
property taxation before and after 2001, and suggest that regressive tax policies may 
have been a deliberate attempt to curtail the income of the town governments. 
 
In 1999, the provincial government changed the basis of property tax assessment from 
area-based77 to a system based on the capital value of properties. The broad objective of 
changing the way property tax was assessed was to improve tax collection, specifically 
by making assessments uniform and predictable. Three reasons were highlighted by the 
senior officers of the provincial government who led this change.78 The first was, to 
curtail excessive discretion exercised by the tax collectors who also assessed properties 
under the existing system. The second was, to increase tax collection in order to 
overcome significant shortage of finances due to suspension of international aid to 
Pakistan after it conducted nuclear tests in 1998. This forced the Federal and provincial 
governments to cut back expenditures and also introduce some tax reforms.79 The third 
was that, the change in property tax assessment was considered necessary since the 
relatively high incidence of property tax on rented properties was distorting the housing 
market, which was in need of greater investment. 
 
However, the change to capital value based assessment could not be implemented as it 
was declared unlawful by the courts on technical grounds. According to the Constitution 
of Pakistan, only the Federal Government can impose taxes on capital value.80 
Resultanly, the provincial government was constrained to implement a rental value 
based assessment system instead. It is noteworthy that, despite the same (14%) share in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  This	  can	  be	  area	  based	  or	  on	  the	  capital/	  rental	  value	  of	  the	  property.	  In	  Punjab’s	  case	  the	  tax	  before	  1999	  was	  a	  mix	  of	  both:	  a	  percentage	  of	  actual	  rent	  if	  the	  property	  was	  rented	  and	  area-­‐based	  if	  it	  was	  owner-­‐occupied.	  78	  I	  interviewed	  the	  team	  that	  implemented	  this	  reform,	  including	  the	  Minister,	  departmental	  Secretary	  and	  the	  technical	  staff.	  	  79	  Austerity	  measures	  usually	  imply	  cuts	  on	  operations	  and	  maintenance	  expenditures.	  I	  discuss	  this	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  Also	  see	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  financial	  liquidity	  position	  of	  the	  provincial	  government	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  80	  Subsequent	  amendments	  to	  the	  Constitution	  in	  2010	  have	  enabled	  provinces	  to	  tax	  capital.	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property tax revenues, the provincial government instituted a landmark policy change 
which was expected to improve property tax assessment and increase collection 
significantly. In contrast to the above, provincial policies were regressive after the local 
government reforms in 2001. 
 
Neglect of its property tax policy and administrative functions after 2001 reflects, at 
best, the provincial government’s indifference to the tax, partly due to the incentive 
structure that I discuss in section 2.3. At worst, this neglect was a deliberate attempt to 
deny additional resources to a lower level of government. The provincial government 
neglected most of its property tax functions, some of which it had been performing on a 
regular basis before 2001. Below I list non-perfomance of two such functions and one 
action of the provincial government, which affected property tax collection adversely 
(World Bank, 2006, Asian Development Bank, 2007, World Bank, 2009a, Nabi and 
Shaikh, 2011, World Bank, 2012b): 
 
• First, throughout the period of  incumbency of elected local governments – the 
decade of the 2000s – the provincial government did not revalue properties. It had 
revalued properties earlier, in 1999, when it changed to assessing property tax on the 
basis on rental value. Under the Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act (UIPT), 
1958, it is mandatory for the provincial ETD to conduct a complete property tax survey 
every five years to update the cadastre, identify new properties, and update property 
values.81 Since the promulgation of the UIPT Act in 1958, these five-yearly surveys had 
been undertaken by the ETD regularly. After the local government reform in 2001, the 
mandatory five-yearly property tax survey was not conducted for almost 15 years. This 
resulted in a large gap between market rental values and the property valuation table. 
Since the survey is mandatory under the law, the Secretary of the ETD has to seek 
special permission from the provincial Chief Minister that allows the ETD to continue 
with the existing property valuations. This affected property tax liability assessments 
significantly, due to the high rate of inflation and a bouyant property market where, in 
real terms, rents have gone up manifold since 1999.82 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Under	  the	  property	  tax	  law	  and	  rules,	  most	  of	  these	  activities	  (except	  property	  revaluation)	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  assessing	  authority	  at	  the	  local	  level	  on	  a	  six-­‐monthly	  basis	  as	  well.	  82	  Officers	  of	  the	  ETD	  refer	  to	  this	  when	  they	  (often)	  state	  that	  property	  tax	  demand	  in	  the	  Punjab	  is	  ‘suppressed’.	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• Second, in the absence of periodic surveys, the property valuation table was not 
indexed to cater for inflation since 1999, a gross oversight in a country with an annual 
rate of inflation of over 10% in most years. The provincial government’s reluctance to 
index valuation tables in the absence of new surveys is remarkable. As a result, the gap 
in the valuation table and market rental values is now so large that any effort to revalue 
properties would result in a politically untenable increase in property tax bills. There 
has been a recommendation to stagger the impact of revaluation over a number of years 
but was not accepted by the provincial political leadership till very recently.83 
• Third, notwithstanding a number of pre-existing exemptions,84 after 2001 the 
provincial government exempted additional categories of properties from the property 
tax, without the consent of town governments. There may be various reasons for 
granting exemptions, for example, to gain popularity or due to the influence of interest 
groups cannot be discounted. But it is noteworthy that exemptions affect town 
governments disproportionately because majority of the property tax revenues belong to 
them. During the 2000s there were no exemptions granted for any of the other 
provincial taxes. In his budget speech in 2006, the Chief Minister exempted residential 
properties up to five-marla (125 square yards) without consulting the provincial Finance 
Department85 or the ETD regarding its impact. Almost a quarter of the provincial 
property tax base was lost due to this exemption.86 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  in	  2014,	  the	  provincial	  political	  executive	  allowed	  property	  revaluations	  but	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  tax	  liability	  of	  individual	  properties	  will	  not	  increase	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  its	  previous	  annual	  liability.	  Also	  note	  that	  since	  2010	  elected	  local	  governments	  are	  not	  in	  power.	  The	  provincial	  government	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  promulgating	  a	  new	  local	  government	  law,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  making	  the	  local	  government	  less	  powerful	  than	  under	  the	  PLGO-­‐2001.	  84	  Since	  long,	  government-­‐owned	  properties,	  residential	  properties	  owned	  by	  widows	  and	  retired	  government	  servants	  are	  exempt	  from	  property	  tax.	  85	  The	  then	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Finance	  Department	  told	  me	  that	  this	  was	  not	  even	  part	  of	  the	  written	  budget	  speech	  of	  the	  Chief	  Minister.	  Apparently	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  and	  his	  inner	  coterie	  of	  political	  advisors	  took	  this	  decision	  without	  informing	  or	  consulting	  the	  concerned	  departments,	  which	  they	  expected	  to	  oppose	  this	  populist	  announcement,	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  including	  commitments	  with	  donors.	  86	  More	  recently,	  during	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  2012,	  the	  Punjab	  Chief	  Minister	  exempted	  poultry	  farms	  from	  property	  tax	  on	  the	  pretext	  that	  they	  were	  agricultural	  and	  hence	  outside	  the	  ambit	  of	  urban	  taxation	  irrespective	  of	  their	  physical	  location.	  The	  president	  of	  the	  poultry	  association	  told	  me	  that,	  after	  lobbying	  unsuccessfully	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  the	  association	  eventually	  succeeded	  in	  getting	  poultry	  farms	  exempted	  from	  property	  tax,	  through	  a	  direct	  intervention	  by	  the	  provincial	  Chief	  Minister.	  Reportedly,	  the	  Chief	  Minister’s	  family	  has	  large	  interests	  in	  the	  poultry	  business.	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After the local government reforms in 2001, the provincial government policies 
regarding property tax became regressive. This was in contrast to at least some efforts 
by the provincial government to reform property tax collection, prior to 2001. Misusing 
its authority over tax policy of a tax assigned to a lower level of government – and at no 
great loss of revenue to itself87 – can be attributed to political expediency. However, 
these actions, when considered with all others discussed in this chapter and given the 
history of the provincial-local government relationship, appear to be a deliberate attempt 
to constrain local government finances.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Sweeping local government reforms in 2001 resulted in complex division of property 
tax functions, involving three levels of sub-national government, of which only two 
enjoy a share of the revenues raised. This complexity impacted negatively on property 
tax collection. For a range of reasons, the various levels of sub-national government 
were unwilling and unable to cooperate to the degree required to improve the property 
tax system. In some cases at least, they were more or less consciously undermining one 
another.  
As a result of the mismatch between tax functions and financial rewards, none of the 
three levels of government performed their respective functions effectively. The 
provincial government failed to carry out five-yearly property tax surveys after 2001 
causing the property valuations to become out-dated.  During a period of high inflation, 
this is significantly depressed the yield from the property tax. The provincial 
government also granted a major exemption that eroded the property tax base 
considerably.  District governments did not provide the supervisory, administrative and 
operational support that they were expected to give to property tax collection. The town 
governments largely failed to extend property taxation to newly urbanised areas – a 
significant problem in a context of rapid urbanisation. The three main factors that led to 
low incentives for the three levels of government to cooperate in the collection of 
property taxes are: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Similar	  instances	  have	  been	  reported	  in	  other	  countries,	  for	  example,	  unilateral	  exemptions	  from	  property	  taxation	  granted	  	  by	  some	  state	  governments	  in	  India	  (Rao,	  2013).	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• The division of property tax revenues among various levels of government and 
their responsibilities for property tax collection were not matched appropriately. As the 
district government receives no revenue share at all, it has no incentive to cooperate.  
The provincial government receives only a small share of the property tax although it 
bears the political and most of the organisational burden of collecting it.  
• District governments have particular set of reasons for showing no interest in the 
property tax, in addition to the fact that they receive no revenue from it. They are 
required to meet some of the operational costs of property tax collection from their own 
budgets. But they have been losers in a bureaucratic tussle:  most of the substantive 
authority over the local offices of the Excise and Tax Department that was formally 
assigned to them in 2001 has being re-appropriated by higher-level officials in the 
Department. The district governments show no interest in fulfilling their formal 
responsibilities in relation to property tax collection; meeting recurrent costs and acting 
as appellate authorities. 
• The historic political rivalry between provincial and local governments, which 
has been exacerbated by the fact that military governments have consistently tried to 
build up the authority of local governments to provide political and bureaucratic 
competition to provincial governments and provincial level politicians.  
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3 Low fiscal equilibrium – Income and liquidity of sub-national 
governments 
3.1 Introduction 
The arguments in this chapter and the next one are closely interrelated. Both deal with 
the fiscal position of various levels of sub-national government, principally the Punjab 
Provincial Government. The material could have been presented in one chapter, but that 
chapter would have been very long. I have separated out the chapters as best I can. In 
this chapter I focus on the incomes of sub-national governments and on their liquidity 
positions. The next chapter deals with their expenditures. The unifying idea is what I 
have termed low-level fiscal equilibrium. I use this term to signify a situation in which 
sub-national governments neither make the kinds of efforts one might expect to obtain 
more revenues for themselves nor appear to be under strong pressures to spend more 
money on public goods. This context of low fiscal equilibrium is important to 
understanding my core research question because the property tax is a very obvious 
mechanism through which two levels of sub-national government – the town level, but 
also the provincial level – could raise additional resources for themselves.  
I should explain from the outset that the argument of this chapter is based in part on 
speculation and deduction. But that speculation is in turn informed by my long 
experience of working within the system that I describe and by the ideas that I derived 
from reading the academic literature on decentralisation and fiscal transfers between 
various levels of government. While I do not have cast-iron evidence for several of the 
points that I make, I believe that they are at least very plausible. These various sources 
of ideas and evidence – my field research, my extensive work experience, and the 
academic literature – seem largely to point in the same directions.  
In the next chapter, I argue that the political and institutional pressures on sub-national 
governments to spend money are less than one might expect in a country that so 
obviously lacks many public services. In this chapter, I argue four main points –about 
revenues and fiscal balances within this context of low fiscal equilibrium. 
In section 3.2, I show that sub-national governments have relatively easy access to 
sources of income other than their own locally raised revenues. In particular, they have 
relatively generous access to fiscal transfers from higher levels of government and to 
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loans. As a consequence, own revenues in general, and property tax revenues in 
particular, are not significant sources of income for them. But to provide the facts about 
the relative insignificance of the property tax for sub-national government revenues 
does not provide us with an explanation of why they are so low, and why governments 
do not make greater efforts to increase them.  
I begin to move from fact to explanation in section 3.3, where I review the broader 
academic literature to show that there is considerable evidence that the kind of generous 
access to fiscal transfers and loans that we find in Pakistan are likely to create 
disincentives for sub-national governments to put much effort into raising local taxes of 
any type. In particular, there is evidence that, once local own revenues fall such that 
they only provide a small portion of the income for sub-national governments, the 
political incentives are to keep things that way: it makes more sense politically for sub-
national governments to try to extract more revenue from other sources than to start a 
major local revenue raising effort.  
In section 3.4, I provide four pieces of evidence that indicate how and to what extent the 
processes pointed out in section 3.3 are at work in the case of property tax in the Punjab. 
The first two pieces of evidence are discussed in detail elsewhere in this thesis. The first 
is concerned with the incentives for the provincial government to invest in its capacity 
to collect property taxes. The second is about the significance of property tax revenues 
as income sources for town governments. I summarise them briefly at the beginning of 
section 3.4. Then: 
• In sub-section 3.4.1, I show that the fiscal transfer mechanisms followed in 
Pakistan discourage sub-national governments from making efforts to increase own 
source revenues.  
• In sub-section 3.4.2, I show that the Punjab Provincial Government has 
relatively easy access to foreign loans. That likely reduces its incentives to raise its own 
source revenues. I argue that the Federal Government allows provincial governments to 
borrow from multilateral agencies because it benefits from the foreign exchange 
resources generated.   
Section 3.5 begins to link the revenue with the expenditure side, by looking at financial 
balances of the provincial and selected town governments for the decade of the 2000s. I 
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show that these sub-national governments have generally retained positive cash 
balances. This decreases pressures to raise additional revenues of any kind.  
3.2 From where do sub-national governments get their money? 
I am not in this section concerned with the district level governments because they do 
not share in property tax revenues (Chapter 2). The provincial and town governments 
get their income from different sources. However, both are reliant on transfers from the 
higher levels of government, and in each case revenues from property tax are a small 
proportion of total income. Both points are especially true for the provincial 
government. I deal with the provincial government and town governments separately, in 
sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 respectively. In the case of provincial governments I discuss 
why transfers and loans are so prevalent.  
3.2.1 The provincial government 
The Punjab Provincial Government is highly reliant for its income on sources other than 
tax revenues that it raises itself (‘own source revenues’). This reliance has increased 
over time. Figure 3.1 shows that own tax revenues are a low and generally declining 
proportion of the total provincial government income over the decade of the 2000s. 
Over the long term, the ratio of provincial tax revenues to provincial GDP ratio has 
declined from 1.4% in 1971-72 (Ghaus and Pasha, 1988) to about 1% in the 1990s, and 
about 0.8% in the 2000s (SBP, 2012).88  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Despite	  this	  poor	  performance,	  Punjab’s	  tax	  effort	  is	  the	  highest	  amongst	  the	  four	  provinces	  in	  Pakistan	  (Hussain	  and	  Rana,	  2010).	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Figure 3.1: Punjab Provincial Government own source revenues and total income 
as % of GDP 
 
Source: Finance Department, Punjab89 
In Pakistan, the main reason that provincial governments rely on federal transfers is that 
most of the buoyant taxes belong to the Federal Government.90 After Pakistan obtained 
independence in 1947, for a number of reasons, including imminent bankruptcy and 
separatist tendencies in various regions, the Federal Government centralised most taxes 
(Kardar, 1985). The Federal Government collects 92% of the total national tax revenues 
and the provincial governments collect only 8%, which amounts to less than 1% of 
GDP. By contrast, the Federal Government is responsible for only 72% of total 
government expenditures and the provincial governments spend 28% (Pasha, 2013, 
p.14). The immediate result of this mismatch between expenditure responsibilities and 
tax assignments of the Federal and provincial governments is that 80% of the income of 
provincial governments comprises transfers from the Federal Government (Shah, 1996, 
Bahl et al., 2008b).91  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Author’s	  calculations	  using	  provincial	  GDP	  estimates	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  (2013b)	  and	  deflator	  used	  by	  the	  State	  Bank	  of	  Pakistan.	  90	  Federal	  taxes	  in	  Pakistan	  include	  the	  following	  direct	  and	  indirect	  taxes:	  All	  income	  (except	  agriculture),	  corporate	  taxes	  and	  capital	  value	  tax;	  customs,	  central	  excise,	  sales	  tax	  (on	  goods),	  excise	  and	  surcharges	  on	  natural	  resources.	  	  91	  With	  the	  18th	  Amendment	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Pakistan,	  promulgated	  in	  2010,	  expenditure	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  provinces	  have	  increased	  significantly,	  but	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  matched	  with	  increased	  federal	  transfers.	  Experts	  point	  out	  that	  this	  has	  increased	  the	  gap	  between	  provincial	  expenditure	  responsibilities	  and	  their	  available	  resources,	  and	  requires	  significant	  increase	  in	  provincial	  tax	  collection	  (Ahmad,	  2013).	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Historically, the Punjab Provincial Government (like other provincial governments in 
Pakistan) has been a net borrower. Earlier it borrowed from the Federal Government to 
fund part of its annual capital (development) budget. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the 
Punjab Provincial Government contracted Cash Development Loans (CDLs) from the 
Federal Government that had a gestation period of 25 years and a grace period of five 
years. More recently the Punjab Provincial Government borrowed significantly from the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (Manoel et al., 2012). During the 2000s, 
budgetary support, a new lending instrument, was introduced by multilateral agencies. 
These programme-based loans supported the general budgetary operations of the Punjab 
Provincial Government.92 Figure 3.2 shows the high fiscal dependence of the provincial 
government on federal transfers and loans from multilateral agencies and the low ratio 
of provincial own source tax revenue to total provincial government income. Between 
2000 and 2011, on average, federal transfers constituted 77% of provincial government 
income and loans accounted for 6%. During this time, on average, the provincial own 
source revenues constituted 7% of provincial government income, while the provincial 
share of property tax revenue amounted to 0.08% of its total income.93 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  In	  addition	  to	  general	  budgetary	  support	  loans,	  in	  the	  2000s,	  the	  Punjab	  Provincial	  Government	  also	  contracted	  sector-­‐specific	  programme	  loans	  from	  multilateral	  development	  banks,	  for	  example,	  the	  Punjab	  Education	  Sector	  Reform	  Program	  (World	  Bank)	  and	  the	  Punjab	  Devolved	  Service	  Delivery	  Program	  (Asian	  Development	  Bank).	  Since	  sector-­‐specific	  loans	  are	  fungible,	  they	  also	  provide	  wide	  leverage	  to	  the	  political	  executive	  in	  how	  the	  money	  is	  actually	  spent.	  	  93	  Data	  from	  the	  Finance	  Department,	  Punjab	  
 
 
91 
Figure 3.2: Income profile of the Punjab Provincial Government94 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data provided by the Finance Department, 
Punjab 
Property tax revenues are an insignificant source of revenue for the provincial 
government. The provincial government has good access to other sources of revenue in 
addition to its own revenues.  
3.2.2 Town governments 
I used financial data from more than a third of the town governments in the Punjab, 49 
out of 144 towns. These are spread over 10 out of 36 districts. My sample includes 34 
out of 38 towns that constitute the largest (most urbanised) five City Districts, namely, 
Lahore, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Faisalabad and Multan; they together generate about 
three-fourths of the total property tax revenue in the province. Out of the 49 towns 
budgetary data from 35 towns covers the time period from 2001 to 2010 while for 14 
towns, budgetary data is for the years 2006 to 2010. Thus my sample of town 
governments is highly representative of urban Punjab that pays property tax. 
During the decade of 2000s, on average, property tax constituted about 9% of the total 
income of the town governments in Punjab.95 This might seem very low since town 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  ‘Extra	  Ordinary	  Receipts’	  refers	  to	  one-­‐off	  revenues	  like	  sale	  of	  government	  assets,	  and	  sometimes	  can	  also	  reflect	  an	  accounting	  adjustment;	  these	  are	  significant	  for	  the	  financial	  years:	  2007-­‐08	  to	  2009-­‐10.	  Foreign	  grants	  are	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  Punjab	  Provincial	  Government	  income,	  and	  did	  not	  exceed	  1%	  of	  its	  income	  during	  this	  time	  period.	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governments are the major beneficiaries of property tax revenues. Under the Punjab 
Local Government Ordinance (PLGO) 2001, the income sources of the town 
governments include transfers from the provincial government and a number of own 
sources of revenue, including property tax. Town governments also collect revenues 
from various traditional municipal levies and fees that they inherited from the municipal 
authorities that they succeeded.96 For the purposes of my analysis, I categorise the 
income sources of town governments into four main headings. Figure 3.3 shows the 
relative importance of these sources of income for my sample of town governments. 
Figure 3.3: Average income profile of selected town governments 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Director General, Local 
Government and Community Development Department, Punjab 
• Provincial transfers   
Transfers from the provincial government constitute about 52% of the total income of 
the town governments. Rule-based financial transfers from provincial to local 
governments were introduced for the first time in Pakistan under the PLGO-2001 (see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  	  The	  town	  level	  accounting	  system	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  provincial	  accounting	  system	  maintained	  by	  the	  Accountant	  General	  of	  Punjab.	  This	  data	  is	  neither	  readily	  available	  at	  the	  provincial	  level	  nor	  is	  it	  collated	  by	  any	  department.	  I	  procured	  this	  data	  officially	  from	  town	  offices	  through	  the	  Director	  General,	  Local	  Government	  and	  Community	  Development	  Department,	  Punjab.	  There	  is	  no	  way	  of	  cross-­‐checking	  this	  data	  but	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  reliable	  since	  it	  was	  officially	  conveyed	  to	  the	  DG	  Local	  Government	  under	  the	  seal	  and	  signature	  of	  the	  Town	  Officer	  (Finance)	  in	  each	  town	  government.	  96	  Source:	  Second	  Schedule	  of	  Punjab	  Local	  Government	  Ordinance,	  2001.	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Chapter 2 for details). Practically unconditional, these transfers to the town 
governments are based on a formula involving the total population of the town and its 
level of urbanisation.97  
• Tax on transfer of immoveable property (TTIP) 
Receipts from the tax on transfer of immoveable properties are significant but quite 
variable over time. Like all such taxes, receipts depend on property prices and on the 
level of activity in property markets. Between 2001-02 and 2009-10, TTIP accounted 
for between 11% and 20% of town government revenues. Prior to the PLGO-2001, only 
the provincial government collected taxes on transfers of immoveable property.98 An 
additional 1% surcharge on the existing provincial tax on transfer of immoveable 
property was imposed in 2001, and assigned to town governments. Town governments 
have to collect this surcharge themselves. They place contractors in the local offices of 
the District Registrar. 
• Other own source revenues 
Other sources of town government revenue comprise about 15 traditional municipality 
fees and levies mostly collected through local contractors appointed by the town 
governments. These traditional sources of town government revenue declined from 
almost 40% of total income in 2001-02 to under 20% in 2009-10.  
• Property tax  
In the decade of 2000s, on average, property tax constituted about 9% of the income of 
town governments. Although, not insignificant, this is relatively low when compared to 
other countries. Property tax revenues amount to an average of 19% of the total income 
for local governments in developing countries (Bird and Slack, 2004; p.6). As explained 
in Chapter 2, property tax is assessed and collected by the provincial Excise and 
Taxation Department (ETD). Formally, under the PLGO-2001, the provincial Finance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  This	  formula	  only	  applies	  to	  towns	  in	  the	  five	  City	  Districts	  in	  Punjab;	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  towns	  in	  Punjab,	  the	  award	  is	  based	  solely	  on	  population.	  The	  difference	  in	  the	  formula	  is	  because	  more	  urbanised	  towns	  have	  relatively	  larger	  expenditure	  responsibilities	  of	  delivering	  municipal	  services.	  98	  The	  provincial	  government	  charges	  a	  transfer	  tax	  on	  immoveable	  properties	  in	  addition	  to	  various	  other	  levies	  like	  stamp	  duty,	  registration	  fee	  and	  capital	  value	  tax.	  These	  provincial	  government	  levies	  –	  based	  on	  a	  basic	  pre-­‐determined	  official	  capital	  value	  of	  urban	  properties	  and	  historical	  transaction	  values	  in	  cases	  of	  rural	  properties	  –	  are	  collected	  by	  the	  Registrar	  (of	  legal	  deeds)	  at	  the	  district/town	  level,	  and	  amount	  to	  about	  6%	  of	  the	  official	  property	  value.	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Department should pass 81% of revenues down to the towns from where the property 
tax is collected. However, for reasons I discussed in Chapter 2, on average, the town 
governments received only 57% of the total property taxes collected.  
Before going on to analyse the effects on the property tax of the ways of funding sub-
national governments, I look at what the academic literature has to say on these issues. 
3.3 Review of literature on inter-governmental fiscal transfers 
Sub-national governments worldwide rely on fiscal transfers (or ‘grants’) from higher 
levels of government.99 These transfers fund about 60% of sub-national expenditures in 
developing countries and transition economies, and about a third in OECD countries 
(Boadway and Shah, 2009; p.351). The most fundamental reason for inter-governmental 
transfers is that public expenditure functions of sub-national governments are not 
adequately funded by the taxes, fees and user-charges usually assigned to them.100  
Inter-governmental fiscal transfers are considered to have three inherent, interlinked 
risks that can lead sub-national governments to indulge in irresponsible fiscal 
behaviour. First, recipient governments might neglect to raise revenues from taxes 
assigned to them as they become excessively reliant on transfers from the higher level 
of government.101 Second, sub-national governments might overspend, expecting to be 
bailed out by the central government. Central governments can only do this at their own 
risk. Third, inter-governmental fiscal transfers may weaken the accountability of sub-
national governments towards their citizens, because they are less reliant on locally-
generated revenues (Gamkhar and Shah, 2007, Weingast, 2009, Scott and Alam, 2011, 
Muwonge and Ebel, 2014). 
Inter-governmental transfers can be designed to mitigate some of these risks. They 
might also be designed to achieve a number of other national policy objectives: funding 
centrally-set minimal service delivery standards at sub-national level; addressing issues 
of equity between sub-national jurisdictions, providing a relatively stable and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  See	  Bahl	  and	  Linn	  (1994)	  and	  Ahmad	  and	  Searle	  (2006)	  for	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  how	  resources	  are	  usually	  divided	  between	  central	  and	  sub-­‐national	  governments	  in	  developing	  countries.	  100	  See	  Bird	  (2010c)	  for	  sub-­‐national	  tax	  assignment	  theory	  and	  practice.	  
101	  Economists	  refer	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  an	  easement	  as	  a	  ‘soft-­‐budget	  constraint’,	  as	  opposed	  to	  what	  sub-­‐national	  governments	  should	  be	  presented	  with	  –	  a	  ‘hard-­‐budget	  constraint’,	  to	  encourage	  own-­‐source	  revenue	  generation	  (Kornai	  et	  al.,	  2003).	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predictable source of income, amongst others (Tanzi, 2010). Some of these policy 
objectives conflict with each other. The most significant conflict arises out of the need 
for the national government to distribute financial resources among sub-national 
jurisdictions equitably and at the same time avoid the risk of discouraging sub-national 
governments from raising their own revenues (Bahl and Linn, 1994, Ahmad and Searle, 
2006).  
Experts state that a ‘good’ transfer design should take into account the fiscal capacity 
and tax effort of sub-national governments. If it is only their ‘needs’ that are taken into 
account, then the sub-national government that makes the least effort to raise its own tax 
revenues will receive a higher share of total transfers. In order to reduce the chances of 
such perverse incentives from transfers, two conditions are considered necessary. First, 
transfers need to be designed “so that the amount received is neither larger when local 
fiscal effort is lower nor smaller when it is higher” (Bird and Smart, 2002; p.904). 
Second, local governments must have the freedom and responsibility to impose some 
significant taxes of their own. According to some experts, the size of the transfers, 
compared to sub-national government income, is irrelevant to any incentive or 
disincentive effects. Provided the grant design is good, perverse incentives that can lead 
to reduced tax effort by sub-national governments will be minimized. The basic idea is 
that as long as the recipient sub-national government knows in advance that it will 
receive only a certain level of resources, even if that covers say 90% or more of its 
expenditures, it will continue to make the effort to raise the remainder (Bird and Smart, 
2002).  
However, there are difficulties in implementing these two principles for a good transfer 
system. First, taxes assigned to sub-national governments might not have the potential 
to generate revenues that are significant compared to their total income. Second, the 
transfer system might be under pressure to achieve conflicting objectives: for example, 
providing extra financial support to poorer sub-national governments while also giving 
more money to those – usually the richer jurisdictions – that raise relatively more own 
source revenues. This can complicate the design of transfers considerably. Third, a 
sophisticated transfer design may require information – about, for example, the fiscal 
status of subnational governments and human development indicators within their 
jurisdictions – more accurate and up-to-date and is actually available (Sen and Trebesch 
(2004). Lastly, political factors, constitutional and legal frameworks, wider inter-
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governmental relations, and, in particular, concerns for equity across sub-national 
regions, impact considerably on the way transfers are distributed among sub-national 
governments (Ahmad and Searle, 2006, Weingast, 2009).  
Not unsurprisingly, there is evidence from low income countries, as well as some high 
income countries – where sub-national governments generally have significant own 
source revenues – that sub-national governments prefer to access more transfers from 
higher levels of government rather than raise additional taxes locally (Caiden and 
Wildavsky, 1980, Cowan, 2013). There is also evidence of anomalous behaviour by 
recipient governments. A decrease in own source revenue collection is relatively greater 
when transfers increase, compared to an increase in revenue collection when transfers 
are reduced by the same amount (Smart, 1998, Barja Daza et al., 2013, Dash and Raja, 
2013). On the whole there is considerable evidence from a wide range of countries that, 
unless mitigating measures are taken, transfers from higher levels of government lead to 
irresponsible fiscal behaviour by the recipient governments, including reduced efforts to 
increase own source revenues (Bird and Smart, 2002, Boex and Kelly, 2013).  
Experts believe that, for decentralisation to work effectively and for sub-national 
governments to be accountable to their citizens, it is important that they are provided 
with: (i) a clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities, (ii) some own source 
revenues, (iii) an effective inter-governmental transfer system, and (iv) limits set by 
higher level government on local government borrowing (Boex and Kelly, 2013; p.261). 
However, there can be a number of political considerations that prevent the ideal from 
being achieved. For example, for various political reasons, central governments may 
transfer some ‘unfunded’  responsibilities to sub-national governments; sub-national 
governments may not be fully in control of their own source revenues or be able to 
exploit them; their borrowing abilities may be too low (or high); and there can be 
numerous issues resulting from inter-governmental transfers. There is also a general 
issue about uncertainty: the higher-level governments may more or less deliberately 
keep lower-level governments in a situation of uncertainty, to be better able to influence 
or control them for electoral or other reasons (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998b, Rodden, 
2000, Boadway and Shah, 2007, Bahl, 2008, Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008, 
Weingast, 2009, Boex and Kelly, 2013). 
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The literature on inter-governmental transfers points out that recipient governments run 
a high risk of neglecting to raise revenues from taxes assigned to them unless transfers 
are designed to mitigate this risk. Experts emphasize the need to balance the various 
objectives of transfers, most importantly the financial needs of sub-national 
governments and their efforts to raise revenues from taxes assigned to them. For this to 
work well, the sub-national governments need to have some freedom to impose taxes 
and the ability to collect them. However, for political reasons and because higher level 
governments may want to exercise greater control over sub-national governments, 
transfers do not normally follow the ideals recommended by the experts. 
Borrowing allowances to sub-national governments are also expected to impact the tax 
efforts of sub-national governments. Higher-level governments usually restrict the 
amount of that sub-national governments can borrow, mainly to avoid usual risks 
associated with irresponsible fiscal behaviour. 
3.4 Effects of sub-national government sources of income on their 
own tax effort 
In this section I provide four pieces of evidence that the intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer mechanisms in Pakistan have many of the dysfunctional features and effects 
discussed in the previous section. The first two pieces of evidence have already 
presented in Chapter 2. I quickly summarise them here. 
The first is that the Punjab Provincial Government invests more effort in trying to 
maintain the infrastructure for collecting the relatively more lucrative provincial taxes 
than for property taxes. Sub-national governments are more likely to invest in 
improving the tax collection apparatus where they expect it may pay off in terms of 
tapping into additional revenue potential. In Chapter 2 (section 2.3.1), I showed that the 
provincial government readily invested to build its capacity to collect motor vehicle 
taxes but made relatively low investments in its property tax collection apparatus. 
The second is that town governments, which are supposed to receive majority of 
property tax revenues collected by the provincial government, do not actually receive 
their shares fully or punctually. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, on average 
property tax revenues constitute about 9% of the total income of town governments in 
Punjab. Although this figure is not insignificant, the value of these revenues to the 
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recipients is reduced because the provincial government makes unannounced and 
unexplained reductions when it transfers these revenues to town governments.  The 
uncertainty of property tax revenues discourages town governments from making 
efforts to bring newly urbanised areas into the property tax net (Chapter 2, section 3.2). 
 My third argument, presented in detail here (sub-section 3.4.1), is that the fiscal 
transfer mechanisms followed in Pakistan discourage sub-national governments from 
making efforts to increase own source revenues. The fourth is that the Punjab Provincial 
Government has relatively easy access to foreign loans. That reduces its incentives to 
raise its own source revenues (sub-section 3.4.2).  
3.4.1 Transfers from the higher level of government  
Experts have pointed out that, in Pakistan, historically generous federal transfers have 
deterred provinces from raising own source revenues (Bahl et al., 2011). According to 
one estimate, every rupee increase in federal transfers to the Punjab Provincial 
Government, has led to a decline of five paisas in own revenue collection by that 
government (World Bank, 2013b; p.7). Two features of the system of inter-
governmental fiscal transfers in Pakistan discourage sub-national governments from 
raising more revenues from their own tax bases.  
The first reason why, in the case of Pakistan, transfers do not incentivise sub-national 
efforts to raise taxes assigned to them is the history and availability of additional 
transfers. The provincial governments can obtain additional transfers during the course 
of the year, beyond those originally budgeted, by using various kinds of political 
mechanisms. The Federal tax revenue sharing under the National Finance Commission 
(NFC) award is not the only resource flow from the Federal to provincial governments. 
Additional transfers are made under heads of ‘straight transfers’ and ‘grants and 
subventions’. Straight transfers are largely development surcharges, excise duties and 
royalties on gas and hydropower profits owed to the provinces by the Federal 
Government. Special grants and subventions are given to provinces for various purposes 
such as fiscal equalisation or special development needs, sometimes even to meet fiscal 
deficits (NFC Secretariat, 2010). Despite being detrimental to fiscal prudence at the 
sub-national level, such additional transfers are quite common due to political 
imperatives (Bird and Smart, 2002). Additional transfers are expected to violate a basic 
rule for good inter-governmental transfers: that the recipient government should know 
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how much money it has to raise locally, and should not expect additional grants from 
the higher level government during the course of the financial year. Although, currently 
the Punjab Provincial Government receives relatively less additional transfers compared 
to other provinces on a regular bases, these are forthcoming when the need arises, for 
example, during the relief operations and reconstruction after the extra-ordinary floods 
in the Punjab in 2010.102 
The second important feature of fiscal transfers is that they are unconditional. They 
normally do not involve any conditions on how the money should be spent or how much 
own source revenues the recipient sub-national governments raise. On rare occasions, 
some such conditions have been formally introduced. But the conditionality has never 
been taken seriously. There are understandable political motivations for this lack of 
conditionality. 
As I have explained earlier there are a number of transfers from the Federal Government 
to the provinces; one of these is rule based. Transfers from the provincial government to 
local governments are solely rule based. The National and the Provincial Finance 
Commissions determine these transfers respectively.  
Prior to 2010, the National Finance Commission (NFC) awards did not take into 
account the relative fiscal efforts made by the provincial governments. This changed in 
principle in 2010, when the criterion for the award was changed to take into account: the 
population of each province (with an 82% weighting), the provincial poverty index 
(10.3%), tax revenue generation by the province (5%) and population density of the 
province (2.7%). However, to date, the condition earmarking 5% of the transfer on 
provincial tax revenue performance has not been implemented. There is a perception 
that, due to differences in the potential to raise additional taxes in the various provinces 
and issues of government capacity, this condition will favour the richer provinces and 
cause resentment amongst the poorer ones.103 Changes in tax policy and administrative 
improvements in taxation made by the provincial governments are now being regularly 
monitored and documented in the biannual reports prepared by the federal Ministry of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Most	  recently,	  the	  provinces	  are	  pressuring	  the	  Federal	  Government	  to	  help	  them	  financially	  to	  set	  up	  power	  plants	  to	  overcome	  the	  energy	  crises.	  Although	  electric	  power	  is	  primarily	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Federal	  Government,	  provincial	  governments	  can	  also	  invest	  in	  power	  generation	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  wattage	  limit.	  103	  All	  provinces	  get	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  money	  under	  this	  condition,	  which	  basically	  negates	  the	  basic	  concept	  of	  the	  condition.	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Finance (NFC Secretariat, 2010, 2010-13, Pasha, 2013). Similarly, in the case of the 
Provincial Finance Commission awards, the condition of 5% of transfers to local 
governments being based on their own source revenue raising effort has not been 
implemented since 2001.104 
In the rest of this sub-section I explain that politically it is difficult to enforce conditions 
in the case of transfers in the context of Pakistan. At the Federal level, the transfer 
mechanisms that developed in Pakistan are primarily shaped by politics. These 
mechanisms are designed to achieve political consensus over sharing of Federal 
revenues rather than to incentivise sub-national revenue collection. The transfer 
mechanisms are designed to primarily promote equity between provinces, and to cater 
to the needs of the economically weakest province. Since 1951, the Federal Government 
has distributed federal resources between provinces through a formula-based system; 
the formula has to be agreed upon by all four provinces. The National Finance 
Commission (NFC) is constituted by the President of Pakistan to consider the views of 
all provinces and recommend formulae for sharing federal tax revenues, as mandated by 
the Constitution of Pakistan105 (1973).106 The resultant NFC award governs transfers to 
provinces for a period of five years. After that, a new commission is formed to 
reconsider and make a fresh award. The award also governs other federal transfers to 
provinces and sets borrowing limits for the provincial governments.  
Globally, there are four main kinds of institutional arrangements that are used by 
governments to decide on federal-provincial (state) fiscal transfers: (i) where the 
Federal Government is solely responsible to design the grant mechanism and 
distribution criteria, (ii) through a quasi-independent technical commission, (iii) through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Evidence	  of	  non-­‐application	  of	  this	  condition	  is	  based	  on	  my	  own	  experience	  as	  Additional	  Secretary,	  Punjab	  Finance	  Department,	  as	  in-­‐charge	  of	  local	  government	  finance.	  During	  my	  fieldwork	  I	  also	  confirmed	  this	  fact	  from	  colleagues	  working	  in	  the	  Finance	  Department,	  and	  through	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  on	  the	  provincial	  transfers	  to	  town	  governments.	  105	  Article	  160	  (Government	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973),	  available	  at,	  http://www.finance.gov.pk/nfc_cons.html	  	  106	  The	  Federal	  Government	  decides	  the	  percentage	  of	  federal	  revenues	  that	  are	  to	  be	  distributed.	  Prior	  to	  the	  7th	  NFC	  award	  (2010)	  the	  Federal	  Government	  retained	  about	  55%	  of	  federal	  revenues	  and	  distributed	  45%	  between	  the	  provinces.	  The	  7th	  NFC	  award	  has	  reduced	  the	  retained	  proportion	  to	  about	  50%	  increasing	  resource	  transfer	  to	  the	  provinces	  –	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘divisible	  pool’.	  However,	  this	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  18th	  Amendment	  to	  the	  constitution	  transferring	  more	  expenditure	  responsibilities	  to	  the	  provinces.	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federal-provincial committees, (iv) through a variation of an inter-governmental-cum-
legislative-cum-civil society committee with equal representation from all constituent 
units but chaired by the Federal Government. The National Finance Commission in 
Pakistan is an example of the latter type of arrangement. The commission represents all 
four provinces equally and the Federal Finance Minister heads it. Each of the four 
provinces are represented by their finance ministers and by a private individual with 
relevant technical expertise nominated by provincial government (Boadway and Shah, 
2009). There are two characteristics typical of such an inclusive and politically 
motivated commission, which have also been reported in the case of Pakistan.  
• The first is that, though inclusive and transparent, a downside of this model 
generally is that such a committee can be slow in changing rules and incentive systems 
that govern transfers, such as those required to encourage sub-national resource 
generation (Boadway and Shah, 2009; p.387). This is partly because of the dominant 
role of the representatives from the provinces in this arrangement. 
• The second, especially pointed out in the case of Pakistan, is that, political 
considerations supersede technical ones when it comes to setting or enforcing any 
conditions within the award that might encourage provinces to increase their own 
source revenue collection. The award does not impose any conditions on the transfers 
because of concerns about the fragility of the federation and the history of separatist 
tendencies. In the interests of national cohesion, the award is normally designed to give 
special preference to the economically weakest province (Khan, 2006).  
From its inception in 1951 until 2010, the NFC award remained unchanged. The 
membership of the NFC is more political than technical; for example, as compared to 
India where all the members are technocrats.107 This partly explains why it has been 
difficult to change the NFC award for so long. In 2010, the Federal Government was 
able to convince all the provincial governments to agree to some key changes in the 
distribution formula, but only after increasing the total share of transfers to the 
provinces by 5% of total federal financial resources – in order to compensate provincial 
governments that opposed change because of fear of losing out on revenues.108 These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  In	  India	  the	  Finance	  Commission	  is	  a	  (non-­‐political)	  technical	  body	  which	  uses	  multiple	  criteria	  to	  transfer	  central	  resources	  to	  state	  governments	  (Sen	  and	  Trebesch,	  2004).	  108	  Soon	  after	  the	  NFC	  award	  in	  2010,	  the	  Federal	  Government	  passed	  down	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  service	  delivery	  responsibilities	  (through	  the	  18th	  Amendment	  to	  the	  constitution)	  to	  the	  provincial	  governments.	  Experts	  are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  additional	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changes basically comprised moving from a population-only criterion to multi-indicator 
criteria for the distribution of resources among provinces and earmarking 5% of federal 
transfers to be based on the tax efforts made by the provincial governments. Historically 
the Punjab government has resisted any change toward multiple criteria for the division 
of federal transfers among provinces. Being the most populous province, it expected to 
lose out under any formula not based solely on the population criterion. A formula 
based partly on indictors of underdevelopment was a longstanding demand by some of 
the provinces that have relatively smaller populations. Similarly, the less populated and 
relatively poorer provinces have always resisted any conditions relating to their tax 
effort, because they argue that their tax bases and level of economic activity are 
relatively low. Thus historically, while the award mechanism might have managed to 
meet its objective of political consensus on federal revenue sharing, it has practically 
not incentivised provinces to increase their own revenue collections. 
At the provincial level, although the Provincial Finance Commission members are 
mostly technocrats and there is only a token representation of local governments. 
Despite the fact that the PFC award has 5% of the transfer earmarked for local 
government tax effort since its inception in 2001, the condition has never been applied. 
This basically reflects that it is politically not viable to base grants on tax efforts of 
various jurisdictions, both at the provincial and local levels of government. 
3.4.2 Borrowing by the provincial government 
Earlier in this chapter, I showed that over the 2000s, on average the Punjab Provincial 
Government borrowed equivalent of about 6% of its total income from multilateral 
agencies. Easy access to loans reduces incentives for governments to make efforts to 
raise their own source revenues. In this sub-section I show that the Federal Government 
allows provincial governments to borrow from abroad because it stands to gain from 
this, in two ways:109 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  transfers	  to	  provinces	  are	  much	  less	  than	  the	  expenditures	  that	  the	  additional	  responsibilities	  entail.	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  these	  developments	  and	  their	  potential	  negative	  impact	  on	  service	  delivery,	  if	  provincial	  tax	  revenues	  are	  not	  raised	  substantially,	  see	  Ahmad	  (2013)	  and	  Pasha	  (2013).	  109	  Some	  senior	  officers	  of	  the	  Punjab	  Finance	  department	  informed	  me	  that	  the	  Federal	  Government	  usually	  encourages	  provincial	  governments	  to	  borrow	  from	  multilateral	  development	  banks.	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First, loans contracted by the provincial governments from multilateral institutions help 
bolster foreign exchange reserves of the Federal Government. The Federal Government 
retains the foreign currency in which multilateral loans are disbursed and passes down 
loans to the provinces in local currency. The Federal Government has historically 
struggled with fluctuating and mostly low foreign exchange reserves (averaging about 
US$ 3.5 billion over the last 30 years)110 due to a chronic external account deficit.111 
The Federal Government requires foreign exchange for repayment of foreign loans and 
its large petroleum import bill, amongst other imports. Political commentators and 
opposition leaders often gauge the Federal Government’s economic management and 
the fiscal stability during different regimes by the amount of foreign exchange reserves. 
The popular press usually enumerates foreign exchange as the number of days that the 
country can pay for its oil import.   
Second, the Federal Government has for some time now been running a high budget 
deficit and has been accumulating a large amount of debt. The provincial governments, 
at least in the case of Punjab, do not have large debts. The Federal Government prefers 
that provincial governments borrow from abroad and has stopped extending Cash 
Development Loans to provinces since budgetary support has become available to 
provinces from multilateral agencies, since early 2000s. 
The Federal Government has a wide array of debt raising instruments (see table 3.1), 
and has historically received foreign aid. Of late the deficit in the Federal Government 
budget has increased rapidly. Federal deficits averaged over 3% of GDP from 2001to 
2010. In 2011-12, the federal budget deficit increased to 8% of GDP; the debt to GDP 
ratio was approximately 60%;112 and the debt to revenue ratio was about 500%. This led 
the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)113 to issue warnings about the unsustainability of the 
Federal Government debt (SBP, 2012). 
The Punjab Provincial Government has relatively low debt to GDP ratio and has a wide 
margin to increase its borrowing. The provincial governments can only borrow from the 
Federal Government or, with its permission, from multilateral agencies (see table 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Pakistan/Reserves/	  111	  Pakistan	  has	  been	  floating	  in	  and	  out	  of	  IMF	  lending	  programmes	  since	  the	  1980s.	  See,	  https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extrans1.aspx?memberKey1=760&endDate=2015-­‐04-­‐04&finposition_flag=YES,	  and	  McCartney	  (2012).	  112	  The	  average	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  for	  low	  income	  countries	  is	  about	  40%	  (SBP,	  2012,	  p.75)	  113	  Pakistan’s	  central	  bank	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3.1).114 Moreover, the provincial governments can only approve balanced budgets, 
implying that estimated expenditures should equal estimated income – including federal 
transfers, borrowing and own source revenues. For short-term cash flow shortages, the 
provincial governments can also avail an overdraft facility from the State Bank of 
Pakistan. Despite increased levels of borrowing throughout the 2000s, Punjab 
government’s total outstanding debt in 2011 stood at Rs. 413 billion, about 4% of 
provincial GDP, while its debt servicing was Rs. 43 billion, 8% of total provincial 
revenues. The various debt ratios of the Punjab government are relatively low 
(compared to the Federal Government) and there is a wide scope for the provincial 
government to borrow. The Federal Government is already strapped for financial 
resources and readily grants permission to provincial governments to borrow from 
multilateral agencies, and prefers to avoid sharing additional federal resources with 
them.  
Table 3.1: Sources of credit available to various levels of government in Pakistan 
 Foreign  Public Debt115 Commercial 
Banking Sector 
State Bank of 
Pakistan 
Higher level of 
government 
Federal  Yes116 Yes Yes Yes - 
Provincial117 Yes118 No No119 No120 Yes 
Local121 
(Town) 
No No No No No122 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Clause	  3,	  Article	  167	  of	  the	  Constitution	  115	  Undertaken	  by	  floating	  bonds,	  treasury	  bills	  and	  various	  other	  instruments	  in	  the	  financial	  markets	  116	  Federal	  Government	  has	  also	  raised	  credit	  internationally	  by	  floating	  bonds	  	  117	  I	  have	  shown	  the	  de	  facto	  position	  before	  2010.	  With	  the	  passage	  of	  18th	  Amendment	  to	  the	  Constitution	  the	  provinces	  have	  acquired	  the	  right	  to	  borrow	  from	  domestic	  and	  international	  lenders,	  subject	  to	  limits	  and	  conditions	  set	  by	  the	  National	  Economic	  Council	  (Manoel	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  118	  Multi-­‐lateral	  agencies	  only	  119	  Provinces	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  do	  this	  when	  trading	  commodities,	  like	  wheat,	  when	  the	  provincial	  government	  buys	  some	  stock	  for	  strategic	  purposes	  and	  sells	  it	  over	  the	  year	  and	  returns	  the	  loan	  contracted	  from	  a	  consortium	  of	  commercial	  banks.	  120	  Provincial	  government	  can	  only	  avail	  a	  temporary	  ‘overdraft’	  facility	  from	  the	  State	  Bank	  of	  Pakistan.	  121	  The	  local	  governments	  cannot	  access	  credit	  from	  any	  source,	  except	  from	  the	  provincial	  government,	  and	  then	  only	  in	  exceptional	  circumstances.	  Section	  120	  of	  Punjab	  Local	  Government	  Ordinance	  prohibits	  local	  governments	  from	  incurring	  debt.	  However,	  semi-­‐autonomous	  bodies	  in	  large	  cities	  like	  water	  and	  sanitation	  agencies	  and	  city	  development	  authorities	  sometimes	  borrow	  from	  the	  Punjab	  Provincial	  Government.	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Source: Author123 
Although the Federal Government is the ultimate sovereign guarantor for these loans, it 
does not bear the burden of repayments or other risks – of rupee devaluation, for 
example – associated with provincial multilateral loans.124 This is because the Federal 
Government deducts loan repayments from federal transfers to the provinces.125  
3.5 Sub-national government liquidity and the likelihood of 
increasing own source revenues 
This section does not fit too neatly in this chapter and might well be part of the next 
chapter. Issues of liquidity are intermediate between issues of revenue and expenditure. 
I include the section on liquidity here for practical reasons of chapter length: Chapter 4 
would otherwise be too long. In this section I show that, over the decade of the 2000s, 
the provincial and the town governments were generally in a relatively comfortable 
liquidity position, in terms of cash-at-hand. In the case of the provincial government, 
there is some evidence that during earlier episodes of ‘fiscal stress’, it made efforts to 
increase its own source revenues. This is normally expected behaviour by governments 
when faced with sustained periods of ‘fiscal stress’. Diamond defines ‘structural fiscal 
stress’ as the tendency for government expenditures to grow faster than revenues 
resulting in a persistent liquidity problem. There is an expectation that a persistent 
liquidity problem over the medium term will encourage the government to raise more 
revenues (Diamond, 1996; p. 53). The logical corollary is that, if a government is 
persistently in a fiscally liquid position in the medium-term, there is a reduced 
probability that it will increase own revenue collection.126 It is likely that absence of 
efforts to raise additional revenues in the case I am dealing with is partly because of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  This	  can	  happen	  under	  exceptional	  circumstances	  but	  did	  not	  happen	  during	  2001-­‐10.	  123	  Collated	  from	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973,	  and	  Punjab	  Local	  Government	  Ordinance,	  2001;	  and	  discussions	  with	  the	  Finance	  department	  officers	  124	  Loan	  and	  interest	  repayments	  are	  ‘charged	  expenditures’	  under	  the	  Constitution	  the	  provincial	  assembly	  cannot	  vote	  on	  them	  when	  the	  budget	  is	  presented;	  Articles	  73-­‐88	  of	  the	  Constitution	  deal	  with	  budget	  and	  other	  money	  matters.	  125	  This	  is	  because	  technically	  foreign	  loans	  are	  contracted	  by	  the	  Federal	  Government	  and	  loaned	  on	  to	  the	  provinces.	  126	  Others	  have	  linked	  the	  issue	  of	  persistent	  positive	  end-­‐year	  cash	  balances	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  –	  that	  appear	  puzzling	  since	  governments	  of	  poor	  country	  supposedly	  lack	  resources	  for	  investment	  and	  public	  services	  and	  hence	  require	  foreign	  aid	  –	  to	  lack	  of	  capacity	  to	  spend,	  underdeveloped	  budgetary	  institutions	  and	  multiple	  uncertainties	  (Caiden	  and	  Wildavsky,	  1980;	  p145).	  	  
 
 
106 
relatively comfortable liquidity position of the Punjab Provincial Government (sub-
section 3.5.1) and also of the town governments (sub-section 3.5.2). 
3.5.1 The provincial government 
For most of the 2000s, the Punjab Provincial Government was fiscally liquid. I use 
average cash balances over the year as a proxy for liquidity, since government 
accounting in Pakistan operates on a cash basis and these balances reflect the fiscal 
position of the government.127 In periods where the provincial government has found 
itself facing persistent negative cash balances, it introduced some tax reforms, which I 
discuss below; but largely the provincial government relied on implementing strict 
austerity128 measures – a recurrent behaviour, which I discuss in Chapter 4. From 2001 
to 2008, the government was flush with cash (see figure 3.4); this is the only time 
period in recent history when austerity measures were not imposed.  
Figure 3.4: Cash balance of the Punjab Provincial Government (Base year: 2001-02) 
 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan129  
There is some evidence of efforts to increase tax collection by the provincial 
government during periods of sustained fiscal stress. For example, during the 1990s, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  The	  provincial	  government	  holds	  a	  consolidated	  account	  with	  the	  State	  Bank	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  all	  its	  transactions	  are	  reported	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  	  128	  Austerity	  measures	  include	  a	  10-­‐15%	  cut	  in	  expenditures,	  mostly	  related	  cutting	  operational	  expenditures	  including	  repair	  and	  maintenance,	  foreign	  tours	  by	  officials,	  purchase	  of	  vehicles,	  creation	  of	  new	  public	  sector	  jobs	  and	  hiring	  against	  vacant	  positions.	  129	  Data	  procured	  through	  the	  Finance	  Department,	  Punjab	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government dealt with the negative liquidity position first by declaring austerity 
measures and eventually making an effort to increase own revenues. In 1997, the Punjab 
Provincial Government introduced a comprehensive tax reform package; including 
improving the Stamp Duty Act and imposing the provincial agriculture income tax 
(World Bank, 1999).130 As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1999, the provincial government 
took a landmark decision to streamline the basis for property tax assessment and 
introduced standardised valuation tables. This was a substantial policy change that was 
expected to increase property tax collection. Changes in property tax policies were 
expected to decrease discretion of tax inspectors (assessors) and bring property 
valuations closer to market values. From 2008 to 2010 there was again a dip in cash 
balances. This was partly caused by a newly elected provincial government initiating 
large food subsidy programmes and more generally due to decreases in transfers from 
the Federal Government.131 These food subsidies were scaled down, partly because of 
cost, and the provincial government returned to a positive cash balance position in 
2011-12.132 During this period (2008-09) of negative cash balances, the provincial 
government introduced two new taxes: farm house tax and luxury vehicle tax.133 This 
move is in line with the expectation that the government is more inclined to make an 
effort to increase its tax revenues during times of fiscal stress. 
3.5.2 The town governments 
Under the PLGO-2001, town governments are required to maintain positive cash 
balance equivalent to 5% of their estimated annual expenditures. Unlike the provincial 
government, they cannot access short-term overdrafts. One would not expect them to 
have negative end-year cash balances, and indeed they do not. I found that the aggregate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  However,	  due	  to	  lax	  enforcement	  for	  various	  reasons	  revenues	  from	  agricultural	  income	  tax	  were	  barely	  Rs.	  1	  billion	  in	  2012.	  This	  is	  considered	  a	  huge	  under	  exploited	  provincial	  tax	  base	  given	  that	  agriculture	  amounts	  to	  about	  a	  quarter	  of	  Punjab’s	  GDP.	  Potential	  revenue	  from	  agriculture	  income	  tax	  for	  Punjab	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  between	  50	  to	  70	  billion	  rupees	  (Nasim,	  2013).	  131	  Largely	  due	  to	  a	  sharp	  decline	  in	  the	  federal	  tax	  revenues	  due	  to	  increased	  terrorism	  in	  2007-­‐8,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  general	  unrest	  and	  agitation	  in	  the	  country	  after	  Benazir	  Bhutto’s	  assassination.	  132	  I	  was	  serving	  in	  the	  provincial	  Finance	  Department	  as	  Additional	  Secretary	  at	  the	  time.	  133	  In	  fact	  the	  luxury	  vehicle	  tax	  in	  Punjab	  was	  largely	  counterproductive;	  after	  imposition	  of	  the	  tax	  luxury	  vehicles	  are	  mostly	  being	  registered	  by	  owners	  outside	  Punjab,	  which	  makes	  Punjab	  lose	  annual	  token	  tax	  revenues	  on	  those	  vehicles,	  in	  addition	  to	  registration	  fees.	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year-end real cash balances of selected town governments in the province rose 
throughout the 2000s. This indicates a comfortable degree of liquidity and, as in the 
case of the provincial government, no urgent fiscal pressure to raise additional revenues. 
I categorise town governments according to their level of urbanisation in order to check 
if more urbanised towns had a different cash position. I investigate this by analysing 
time series cash balance data for 49 towns in 10 districts, including the 5 City Districts. 
The Punjab Provincial Government categorises union councils that constitute town 
jurisdictions as urban or rural (Government of Punjab, 2012). I denote town 
governments that consist of only urban or rural union councils as ‘U’ and ‘R’, 
respectively; town governments that consist of predominantly (more than 50%) urban 
councils as ‘UR’ and those predominantly comprising (more than 50%) rural union 
councils as ‘URR’. 
On average, except ‘predominantly-urban’ (UR) towns, the rest of the towns in Punjab 
show (figure 3.5) a trend of increasing cash balances in real terms, from 2001 to 2011. 
This is partly due to the cumulative effect of non-lapsable cash transfers. Under the 
PLGO-2001, town governments work outside the government financial accounting 
system through checking accounts in prescribed local banks, so their cash-at-hand does 
not lapse into the provincial treasury at the end of the financial year.134  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Town	  governments	  enjoy	  a	  unique	  accounting	  status	  of	  working	  outside	  the	  normal	  government	  accounting	  system.	  The	  provincial	  and	  district	  government	  levels	  are	  part	  of	  an	  online	  accounting	  system	  which	  has	  so	  far	  not	  been	  extended	  to	  the	  town	  level.	  The	  predecessors	  of	  the	  town	  governments,	  the	  municipalities,	  were	  also	  not	  part	  of	  the	  provincial	  accounting	  system.	  The	  audit	  system	  of	  the	  town	  governments	  is	  also	  separate	  and	  run	  by	  the	  Local	  Fund	  Audit	  rather	  than	  the	  Auditor	  General	  of	  Punjab.	  
 
 
109 
Figure 3.5: Town government cash balances (Base year: 2001-02) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations; data from Director General, Local Government and Community 
Development Department, Punjab 
Based on my earlier discussion linking cash balances with the probability of increasing 
tax collection, there is a possibility that, on average, (except predominantly-urban [UR] 
towns) town governments were in a comfortable liquidity position and had little 
incentive to raise additional revenue from property taxes, or any other levy for that 
matter. Even in the case of predominantly urban (UR) towns the cash balance position 
stabilized after 2005-6.135 Positive real cash balances provide a probable explanation for 
why most town governments did not include newly urbanised areas into the property tax 
net – the sole responsibility of the town governments regarding property taxation (see 
Chapter 2).   
The foregoing cash-balance analysis of town governments corroborates accounts of 
some town government officials that I interviewed. They told me that town politicians 
did not feel any need to increase own source revenues, not even from those sources that 
the town governments controlled directly.136 As reflected in their liquidity position, 
town governments were not under any sustained fiscal stress that could possibly prompt 
efforts to increase their revenue collection.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  There	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  these	  town	  governments	  hit	  their	  minimum	  requirement	  of	  holding	  at	  least	  5%	  of	  their	  estimated	  annual	  expenditures.	  136	  Town	  government	  officials	  told	  me	  that	  town	  level	  politicians	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  awarding	  contracts	  for	  collection	  of	  municipal	  levies	  to	  people	  connected	  to	  them	  personally	  or	  politically,	  but	  that	  is	  not	  my	  direct	  concern	  here.	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3.6 Conclusion 
My arguments in this chapter are in part speculative and deductive. They are based on 
my own experience of working in the government, my fieldwork, the relevant literature 
and a great deal of searching for and analysis of fiscal data from various levels of 
government in the Punjab. Evidence from elsewhere suggests that when transfers from 
the higher level of government and other sources of revenue are available to sub-
national governments; there is a possibility that the sub-national governments will not 
make efforts to increase their own source taxation. In the case of Punjab, I found that 
both the provincial and the town governments are highly reliant on sources of revenue 
other than their own source taxes generally and property tax specifically. As expected, 
this leads to a number of disincentives for them to increase revenues from property tax 
substantially.  
There is some evidence of four channels through which the fiscal transfer and loan 
mechanisms in place in the Punjab discourage provincial and town governments from 
making more efforts to increase property tax revenues: the provincial government does 
not expect any significant financial benefit from investing in maintaining or improving 
its capacity to collect property tax; the town governments are uncertain of financial 
gains from adding new areas in the property tax net – mainly due to the unreliability of 
transfers of their share of property tax revenues; transfers from the higher level of 
government are not conditional to own source tax efforts of the sub-national 
governments; and the provincial government has easy access to loans. 
In the end, I started linking the revenue side of the low fiscal equilibrium to the 
expenditure side. I showed that the provincial and town governments generally 
maintained positive cash balances during the 2000s. I argued that a comfortable 
liquidity position reduced the probability that the governments will make efforts to 
increase their tax collection. In the next chapter I look at the expenditure side of the low 
fiscal equilibrium. 
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4 Low fiscal equilibrium – lack of incentives to spend  
4.1 Introduction  
Like the previous two chapters, this chapter deals with the reasons why sub-national 
governments in Pakistan are not very highly motivated to raise additional revenue 
through the property tax. In Chapter 2, I explained how the division of both 
responsibilities and revenues between the three levels of sub-national government 
results in weak incentives for any one of them to put significant effort into improving 
the performance of the property tax system. The poor design of the property tax 
collection machinery is, at best, a partial explanation of low efforts to collect property 
tax. Indeed, one might say that I have done no more than shift the focus of the question. 
Why is it that sub-national governments have not made more effort to overcome, 
directly or by pressuring the central government, the various problems with the property 
tax system set out in Chapter 2? Part of the answer is that, property taxes are not 
popular with property owners, and governments do not like to become unpopular if they 
can avoid it, as I explain in Chapter 3. But that is true of all taxes. If governments were 
to refrain from taxing because of the unpopularity of taxes, they would raise no 
revenues at all. The unpopularity of taxes is on average counterbalanced politically by 
the popularity of public spending. Why do the sub-national governments in Punjab – 
above all the provincial government – not make serious efforts to raise more own 
revenues to meet the political demands for more spending that one might expect to 
emanate from (a) the poor, who are grossly underprovided with public services, (b) the 
people with the most immediate and visible interest in public spending – the public 
servants and, (c) the aid donors, who fund the provincial government significantly and 
extract commitments from governments to also spend on public services?  
My main argument in this chapter is that provincial government is not under such strong 
pressures to raise revenue to fund public services as one might believe on the basis of 
the standard narratives, discourses and procedures through which it conducts its 
business and represents itself to the outside world. The government normally has 
enough resources to fund politically prioritised expenditures such as employee-related 
expenses (salaries, allowances and pensions) and development projects (capital budget). 
There are no pressing internal political pressures to raise additional revenues because, 
for a number of reasons, the government is not under strong political pressures to spend 
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on public services. Firstly, political demands for expanded service delivery are 
relatively weak, despite appallingly low levels of provision, because of the prevalence 
of patronage politics; political dominance of the relatively well off who are largely not 
reliant on publicly provided services; and weak public and social accountability of the 
provincial government for the ways in which it spends its budget. Secondly, the 
provincial government is rarely at serious risk of upsetting a powerful interest group, its 
own employees, because it always prioritises their salaries, even if that means cutting 
back on expenditure elsewhere. Thirdly, the provincial government can effectively 
ignore pressure (in terms of conditionality) from aid donors to raise expenditures on 
service delivery without risking its long-term relationship with them. 
In this chapter I use three broad expenditure categories to make my argument. The first 
two are ‘recurrent’ expenditures. First are the ‘employee related expenditures’ that 
include salaries, pensions and other benefits of civil servants; second are ‘operations 
and maintenance costs’ (O&M) that include consumables, repairs, maintenance, utilities 
and other operational necessities also referred to as ‘non-salary recurrent costs’. The 
third are capital expenditures that include new development projects.137 
Budgets need to be formally balanced at the beginning of the fiscal year and the 
provincial government is required by the Federal Government to maintain a positive 
liquidity position. However, very little effort is put into funding service delivery. 
Inadequate provision is made for operations and maintenance costs that are critical to 
effective public service delivery. Because it is normally able to remain liquid in cash 
terms and to retain unspent balances at the end of the year, as shown in Chapter 3, the 
provincial government broadly satisfies the fiscal objectives imposed by the Federal 
Government.  
Note that this chapter focuses almost exclusively on the Punjab Provincial Government. 
It is the prime actor in respect of the issues discussed here. Since it largely controls the 
collection and rate setting apparatuses, it is the level of government best placed to 
change levels of property tax revenues. It is also wholly responsible for funding the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  In	  the	  case	  of	  loan	  repayments,	  the	  interest	  payments	  on	  loans	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  recurrent	  budget	  while	  the	  capital	  repayments	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  capital	  budget.	  Loans	  repayments	  do	  not	  concern	  me	  in	  this	  analysis	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  as	  I	  show	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  these	  are	  not	  large	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Punjab.	  Second,	  these	  are	  ‘charged	  expenditures’	  of	  the	  government	  which	  are	  not	  controlled	  by	  politicians	  and	  not	  voted	  upon	  in	  the	  Provincial	  Assembly.	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delivery of all the basic social and economic services, for example, primary health, 
education, local civil works etc.138 It both funds and directly manages the provision of 
higher level (tertiary) services, for example, large hospitals, colleges, large (inter-
district) infrastructure etc. Thus, one might expect that there would be strong public 
pressures on the provincial government to provide and fund public services.139  
The provincial government seems relatively comfortable, in a political sense, with the 
current situation in which it (a) depends mainly on federal transfers for revenues and (b) 
rarely runs into the kinds of liquidity crises that could force it to increase tax collection. 
One cannot satisfactorily explain this situation without delving deeply into the politics, 
political economy and public finances of Punjab in particular and Pakistan more 
generally. For example, Easterly (2003) finds considerable evidence for explanations of 
‘elite domination’ and ‘ethnic factionalism’ for poor public service delivery in the case 
of Pakistan. Though I raise some of these issues in my analysis of the reasons for low 
pressures to spend on public service delivery, a detailed examination of these issues 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis. I focus on those elements of the explanation 
for poor service delivery that became most evident to me in the course of my review of 
the literature (see section 1.5.1), my fieldwork and my earlier work experience in the 
Pakistan public service. In the following sections, I provide some evidence that is 
consistent with my arguments, and therefore renders them at least plausible. 
In Section 4.2, I provide evidence that, despite large gaps in service delivery, the 
government of Pakistan spends much less on key social sectors than other governments 
in the South Asia. Based on my review of the literature on budgeting (section 1.5.1), I 
also investigate and show that ‘operations and maintenance costs’ (O&M), which are 
critical to service delivery, are insufficiently funded. In the three sections that follow, I 
provide evidence that point to low political pressures on the government to deliver 
expanded public services, that is consistent with the literature. The kind of evidence I 
provide in these sections varies. In places I rely on secondary data and in others on my 
personal impressions and experience while working for the government.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  These	  funds	  are	  given	  to	  the	  district	  governments	  that	  deliver	  these	  services.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  district	  governments	  have	  no	  own	  source	  revenues	  at	  all	  and	  are	  financially	  dependent	  on	  the	  provincial	  government.	  	  139	  Under	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Pakistan,	  it	  is	  primarily	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  provincial	  government	  to	  provide	  all	  public	  services.	  The	  provincial	  government	  can	  decide	  which	  services	  to	  provide	  directly,	  and	  which	  ones	  to	  provide	  through	  local	  governments.	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In section 4.3, I discuss, with evidence, three possible reasons for why public service 
delivery is a low priority for the government. These three explanations are conditional 
to the broad point about the nature of politics in Pakistan that I mentioned earlier and 
interact with one another in complex ways and are not separate and distinct causes. 
They are: (a) politicians prefer to spend on new projects rather than fund operations and 
maintenance (O&M) costs of service delivery; (b) the relatively well-off do not use 
most public services; and (c) generally, there is weak social and political accountability 
of the ways in which the government spends public money. My argument of weak fiscal 
accountability is mostly deductive in nature and is supported largely by secondary 
evidence.  
In section 4.4, I show that the provincial government does not face any strong pressures 
from a powerful constituency which has an obvious interest in increased public 
spending, i.e. the civil service, which is paid its salaries regularly, even when the 
government is short of funds.  
Section 4.5 is largely based on my personal experience of working for a donor-funded 
public sector reform programme. I use it as an example to argue that the government is 
not under any strong pressures to expand public services from its aid donors – in the 
sense that it can effectively ignore any conditionality linked to aid. I conclude the 
discussion in section 4.6. 
4.2 Low levels of service delivery and operations and maintenance 
costs 
The standard of public service delivery to poor people in the Punjab is very low. A 
major reason is that the budgetary resources allocated for service delivery are very low. 
This suggests that public service delivery is low priority for the government. 
Punjab is the largest province in Pakistan, with more than 50% of the country’s 
population of 180 million. Pakistan has low human development indicators; it ranks 146 
out of 187 countries on the HDI scale.140 The fact that Pakistan is nine places lower on 
the human development index than on its per capita national income ranking reflects the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  The	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI)	  is	  a	  composite	  statistic	  of	  life	  expectancy,	  education,	  and	  per	  capita	  income	  indicators,	  which	  is	  used	  to	  rank	  countries	  into	  four	  tiers	  of	  human	  development.	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gap in service delivery (UNDP, 2013). Pakistan is one of the few countries in the world 
to have been unsuccessful in eradicating polio. Experts point out that one of the reasons 
for Pakistan’s low human development is low expenditure on social services (Easterly, 
2003).141 Social sector expenditures in Pakistan are considerably lower than the average 
for countries in South Asia (see table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Public social sector expenditures, as % of GDP 
Country/Region Total 
government 
expenditure 
Education Health Social 
protection 
Total social 
sector 
expenditure 
Pakistan 16.33 1.05 0.46 0.00 1.50 
Average for 
South Asian 
countries 
18.74 2.66 1.17 0.88 4.71 
Source: Adapted from Table 1.2 in World Bank (2012a) 
Another reason for the large and increasing gaps in service delivery in Punjab is the 
rapidly growing population. A joint UNDP-Government of Punjab report on multiple 
deprivations found that while the overall number of those deprived (of social services) 
in the province had decreased from 45% in 2003-04 to 43% in 2007-08, there was an 
increase in the actual number of people classified as deprived from 32 to 33 million, out 
of a total population of about 90 million. This numerical increase clearly points to a 
failure of public services to adequately reach and serve more than a third of the 
population of the province. The report derives a deprivation index based on periodic 
UNICEF-led Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys conducted in Punjab. It includes 
indicators on health, education, water supply and sanitation, amongst others. Though 
there is wide regional and urban-rural variation within Punjab, in 2008, 20% of the 
population was deprived in terms of health and education, and 69% were deprived of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Easterly	  (2003)	  emphasizes	  Pakistan’s	  low	  human	  development	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  per	  capita	  GDP	  and	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  countries	  at	  the	  same	  level	  of	  income.	  He	  points	  out	  reasonable	  levels	  of	  annual	  growth	  without	  corresponding	  improvements	  in	  human	  development.	  He	  also	  points	  out	  that	  compared	  to	  other	  countries	  at	  same	  level	  of	  income	  Pakistan’s	  defence	  expenditure	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  is	  significantly	  higher,	  by	  about	  3%,	  which	  mirrors	  its	  lower	  social	  sector	  spending.	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water supply and sanitation services (UNDP and Punjab, 2011). There are complex 
reasons for gaps in service delivery in Punjab including those of governance, 
accountability and state capacity.  
Amongst other factors responsible for the relatively low human development indicators 
in Punjab, experts point to low allocations for operations and maintenance costs (O&M) 
that are critical for service delivery (Easterly, 2003, World Bank, 2013b). Of its 
recurrent expenditures, the provincial government allocates about 16% for O&M 
(World Bank, 2013b; p.12).142 Typically, a scarcity of financial resources at the point of 
service delivery results in, for example, schools being without teaching material, health 
care facilities without consumables and medicines, and emergency vehicles without fuel 
and spare parts.143 Since O&M costs also include funds for repairs and maintenance of 
capital stock, a shortfall results in dilapidated public buildings, equipment in disrepair, 
and broken down official vehicles that restrict field-staff movement and affect the 
general functioning of the government. The government does not provide even basic 
materials like stationery for official work.144  
Similar budgetary issues also persist in the economic sectors. For example, scarce funds 
for O&M costs lead to a neglect of road and irrigation infrastructure, which at times can 
lead to disastrous consequences, as experienced in 2010 when massive flooding 
displaced millions of people.145 Neglected maintenance of embankments was declared 
by a floods inquiry committee to be a contributory factor.146 In the case of irrigation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  this,	  at	  the	  Federal	  Government	  level,	  the	  military	  budget	  has	  an	  O&M	  cost	  which	  is	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  its	  employee	  related	  expenditures	  (PILDAT,	  2012b).	  Over	  the	  years,	  along	  with	  other	  factors,	  this	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  outcome	  that,	  as	  some	  have	  pointed	  out,	  the	  military	  in	  Pakistan	  is	  the	  only	  effective	  and	  resourceful	  institution	  (Lieven,	  2011).	  143	  The	  press	  usually	  reports	  cases	  where	  absence	  of	  government	  funding	  for	  delivery	  of	  public	  services	  can	  result	  in	  disasters.	  For	  example,	  recently	  deaths	  of	  27	  new	  born	  children	  were	  reported	  in	  a	  government	  hospital	  in	  a	  major	  town	  (Sargodha)	  because	  the	  hospital	  was	  reportedly	  short	  of	  oxygen	  cylinders,	  amongst	  other	  issues.	  See,	  http://www.dawn.com/news/1146780	  	  144	  I	  discuss	  the	  point	  about	  tax	  collectors	  bearing	  the	  day	  to	  day	  expenditures	  of	  tax	  collection	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  145	  Punjab	  has	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  man-­‐made	  canal	  irrigation	  systems	  in	  the	  world.	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  how	  low	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  expenditures	  have	  affected	  the	  irrigation	  system,	  see	  (Bengali,	  2009).	  146	  “A	  Rude	  Awakening:”	  Report	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Flood	  Inquiry	  Tribunal	  on	  the	  causes	  of	  major	  breeches	  in	  River	  Indus	  during	  the	  exceptionally	  high	  floods	  in	  2010.	  (Available	  from	  Punjab	  Government)	  The	  report	  points	  out	  the	  issues	  but	  does	  not	  go	  into	  the	  reasons,	  apart	  from	  lack	  of	  supervision	  and	  implied	  corruption.	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infrastructure, experts point out that, rather than maintaining its capital assets the 
government follows a practice of “build-neglect-rebuild” (Briscoe and Qamar, 2006; 
p.8).  
The provincial government repeatedly reaffirms its commitment to uplift the provincial 
population both socially and economically. Despite the political rhetoric,147 reflected in 
numerous policy documents,148 expenditure on public service delivery remains low. In 
the following three sections, I argue that this is partly because of low political pressures 
on the government to deliver public services. 
4.3 Service delivery to the poor is a low priority for the government 
How and why government policies and priorities are set is complex and dependent on a 
number of interconnected factors. In this section, I suggest three possible reasons why 
the provincial government does not prioritise public service delivery. My arguments are 
based on my fieldwork, secondary data, and my prior experience and personal 
impressions of working for the Punjab Provincial Government in the Finance 
Department and the Planning and Development Department.  
(a) Politicians prefer to fund new projects (mostly civil works) over investing in 
maintaining existing government capital stock and/or delivering better public services 
through the existing infrastructure. The annual budget of the Punjab province contains 
three main expenditure categories: employee-related expenses and O&M costs 
constitute the recurrent expenditure of the government, while the rest of provincial 
income is spent on capital (development) expenditure.149 
 
There are four possible reasons why politicians allocate more resources for capital 
expenditure than for O&M costs (see figure 4.1).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  For	  example	  see	  various	  reports	  on	  “Punjab	  Development	  Forum”	  (PDF)	  –	  an	  annual	  conference	  with	  donors	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  –	  	  held	  regularly	  by	  Punjab	  government	  in	  the	  2000’s,	  at	  http://prmp.pitb.gov.pk/prmp1.	  148	  For	  example,	  “Vision	  2020”	  (Government	  of	  Punjab,	  2004);	  “Poverty	  focused	  investment	  strategy	  for	  Punjab”	  (Government	  of	  Punjab,	  2006)	  and	  “A	  strategy	  for	  accelerating	  economic	  growth	  and	  improving	  service	  delivery”	  (Government	  of	  Punjab,	  2009).	  The	  latter	  two	  are	  available	  at	  http://prmp.pitb.gov.pk/publications.	  149	  Loan	  repayments	  and	  interest	  payments	  are	  less	  than	  3%	  of	  Punjab	  government’s	  total	  annual	  expenditures.	  Punjab’s	  debt	  burden	  is	  less	  than	  4%	  of	  its	  GDP	  (Manoel	  et	  al.,	  2012).	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Figure 4.1: Major provincial expenditures150 
 
Source: Finance Department, Punjab  
Firstly, the provincial political executive uses capital budgets to control provincial and 
local level politicians. There is a tendency within the political executive to control a 
greater share of capital funds directly in order to exercise greater leverage over 
politicians, from both the ruling party and the opposition. For example, the government 
places large amounts in the capital budget as un-specified ‘block-allocations’ to be used 
by the political executive for any project they desire during the course of the year.151 
Final approval of projects funded by the provincial capital budget and their subsequent 
cash releases are granted by the Chief Minister’s secretariat, which keeps politicians 
closely bound to the political executive. Controlling politicians through use of O&M 
budgets would be relatively difficult, for two reasons: (1) The O&M funds are budgeted 
(thinly but) more or less evenly for the whole province and are part of the recurrent 
budget (along with salaries) that are automatically drawn by the provincial line 
departments through the online budget accounting system run by the Provincial 
Accountant General. Manipulating these expenditures on a case to case basis or 
constituency-wise is technically problematic since estimates of recurrent expenditures 
are approved by the Provincial Assembly in the form of general grants, at the beginning 
of the financial year. As opposed to this, the political executive for specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  These	  include	  actual	  (as	  opposed	  to	  estimated)	  combined	  expenditures	  of	  provincial	  and	  district	  governments,	  in	  real	  terms,	  with	  2010	  as	  the	  base	  year.	  The	  ‘operating’	  expenditure	  in	  the	  graph	  legend	  stands	  for	  ‘operations	  and	  maintenance’.	  151	  This	  practice	  persists	  despite	  aid	  donors’	  pressure	  to	  discontinue	  it.	  
0	  
50	  
100	  
150	  
200	  
250	  
300	  
350	  
2010-­‐11	   2011-­‐12	   2012-­‐13	   2013-­‐14	  
Ru
pe
es
	  	  i
n	  
Bi
lli
on
s	  
Employee	  Related	  
OperaIng	  
Capital	  
 
 
119 
constituencies can earmark development projects; (2) As explained in Chapter 2, 40% 
of the provincial income is transferred to local governments. The majority of this money 
funds recurrent costs (including O&M) of local government functions, over which the 
provincial government has very little control. 
Secondly, politicians use public resources to strengthen their political position within 
their constituencies. Capital budgets also include constituency development funds 
(CDFs)152 that are at the disposal of elected public representatives and are used for 
development projects. Politicians reward supporters and deny publicly funded projects 
to political opponents; a fact fairly well documented in case of Pakistan. At the local 
level, ruling party politicians reinforce patron-client relationships through new projects. 
Studies have found a highly unbalanced distribution of resources within jurisdictions, 
favouring areas where political leaders have a larger support base (Keefer et al., 2003, 
Mohmand and Cheema, 2007, Hasnain, 2008b, World Bank, 2013b). Politicians cannot 
manoeuvre O&M expenditures, as easily, for reasons explained in the point above.   
Thirdly, politicians encourage greater resources for capital budgets that mostly fund 
infrastructural projects that are highly visible and give them an opportunity to show 
tangible development in their constituencies. While professing to pursue development 
policies that target the poor, capital expenditures are mostly used by politicians to build 
their image and gain popular support through expensive high-profile infrastructure 
projects. For example, Easterly (2003) cites the Lahore-Islamabad six-lane expressway 
built in the 1990s, which, at that time, was used at only 10% of its carriage capacity.153 
As a senior Finance Department official put it: “Politicians don’t get any political 
mileage from funding operational costs…. these are invisible…. they are attracted to 
new visible things….”  
Lastly, new projects offer greater opportunities for corruption. Politicians and civil 
servants not only seek commissions from awarding contracts, but politicians get a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  For	  CDF’s	  in	  Pakistan,	  see	  International	  Budget	  Partnership	  (2010;	  pp.	  45-­‐46)	  153	  A	  similar	  recent	  example	  is	  the	  Metro-­‐bus	  project	  in	  Lahore,	  built	  in	  record	  time	  and	  by	  diverting	  major	  funding	  from	  other	  provincial	  expenditures.	  It	  drew	  a	  lot	  of	  criticism	  from	  various	  quarters	  over	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  including,	  absence	  of	  proper	  environmental	  impact	  studies	  and	  city	  mass-­‐transit	  planning.	  But	  most	  importantly	  for	  diverting	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  Punjab’s	  capital	  budget,	  which	  is	  meant	  for	  90	  million	  people,	  spent	  on	  one	  project	  in	  a	  city	  with	  a	  population	  of	  12	  million.	  In	  my	  opinion	  it	  is	  not	  that	  these	  projects	  are	  not	  required,	  but	  given	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  and	  other	  pressing	  social	  sector	  requirements,	  it	  is	  an	  example	  of	  political	  priorities.	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chance to reward business interests and contractors who support their election 
campaigns, and normally fund their expenses. Corruption in the use of O&M funds is 
most probably as prevalent as in the capital budget. However, as explained above, 
O&M funds are usually too widely (and thinly) dispersed making it a less ‘efficient’ 
way of rent-taking.154 
Given the political preference for greater capital expenditures and employee-related 
expenditures (which I discuss in section 4.3), the provincial Finance Department faces 
considerable political pressure to keep low annual budget estimates for O&M costs. 
During annual budget-making, the Finance Department estimates the resources 
available for capital expenditures after deducting estimated recurrent costs from 
expected provincial income, which includes federal transfers and provincial own source 
revenues. Since other constituents of recurrent costs, such as salaries, pensions and debt 
(interest) repayments are more or less fixed, political pressure to increase capital 
expenditures results in the Finance Department giving a low priority to operations and 
maintenance. As a result the Finance Department is quite stringent when evaluating 
O&M cost estimates presented by line departments during budget making, partly with 
the objective of securing more resources for the capital budget.155 
(b) The likelihood of improving public services would be greater if the wealthy, who are 
relatively more influential politically, were reliant on public services. Their demands for 
better public services would have a greater possibility of a positive response from the 
government. In Pakistan, the relatively well off, broadly speaking, those who (would) 
pay most of the provincial taxes, including property tax, have mostly opted out of using 
public services including health, education, drinking water and even security.156 
Although I have not come across any academic studies on privatisation of security 
services in Pakistan, over the last two decades private security companies have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  Large	  O&M	  contracts,	  for	  example,	  repairs	  involving	  large	  amount	  in	  departments	  like	  irrigation	  and	  civil	  works,	  as	  well	  as	  centralised	  procurement	  of	  medicines	  can	  be	  as	  lucrative	  as	  development	  projects.	  But	  such	  opportunities	  are	  relatively	  few.	  155	  For	  technical	  details	  of	  budget-­‐making	  in	  Pakistan,	  see	  Bahl	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  Qureshi	  and	  Ahmad	  (1993)	  and	  Bengali	  (2006).	  	  Low	  provision	  for	  O&M	  costs	  is	  observed	  in	  other	  countries	  as	  well,	  for	  which	  various	  reasons	  have	  been	  identified	  including,	  absence	  of	  setting	  service	  delivery	  targets	  and	  costing	  them	  realistically,	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  annual	  expenditure	  estimation	  rather	  than	  over	  the	  medium-­‐term	  (Caiden	  and	  Wildavsky,	  1980,	  Peterson,	  1996).	  156	  Dreze	  and	  Sen	  ([2013]	  2014;	  pg.xi)	  make	  a	  similar	  argument	  in	  the	  case	  of	  India	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mushroomed, while gated communities are common and houses of the relatively well 
off are usually guarded by private security guards. 
 
In fact, the phenomenon of accessing alternatives to most public services is not limited 
to the wealthy. For example, over the last 30 years, the number of private health care 
and education service providers has vastly increased in urban as well as rural areas. The 
share of private sector education in Pakistan rose from 3% of total enrolment in 1983 to 
36% in 2009 (Salman, 2010). Private social service providers cater to a wide range of 
income groups, including the middle and low-middle income groups. It is mostly the 
poor, who cannot even afford the cheapest private clinics or schools, who access 
government primary social services, or go without any services at all. Furthermore, in 
terms of quality of service provision, at least in the case of education, studies show that 
private schools in Punjab provide better quality education than the public schools. This 
disparity is also partly reflected in the significant wage differential between private and 
public school graduates. Experts are of the opinion that, while there is a wide gap in the 
public provision of education, the poor, who cannot afford private education, do not 
seem to have the political clout required to ensure they receive quality public education 
(Andrabi et al., 2002, Shaikh and Hatcher, 2005, Andrabi et al., 2008b, Asadullah, 
2009). 
(c) Social and political accountability regarding the ways in which the provincial 
government in Punjab spends public resources is generally weak. Experts argue that, 
generally, greater transparency of the budget and public debate help to create pressures 
on the government to allocate resources which are more in line with public needs, and 
that civil society institutions have an important role to play regarding government 
budgets (Robinson, 2008). However, in the case of Pakistan generally, until very 
recently, there were no social institutions or mechanisms in place to analyse and inform 
public opinion on government expenditure priorities. Later in this section, I refer to 
some of the studies undertaken by the recent civil society initiative for social 
accountability of the budget, the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and 
Transparency157 (PILDAT).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  PILDAT	  is	  a	  civil	  society	  initiative	  with	  a	  ‘mission	  to	  strengthen	  democracy	  and	  democratic	  institutions’.	  Since	  2011	  PILDAT	  is	  publishing	  reports	  on	  budget	  analysis	  and	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The provincial government is not reliant on its citizens for most of its income, which 
may be a reason for the provincial government not being accountable to them for the 
ways in which it spends public resources (see figure 4.2). Political accountability of 
public expenditures is weak for a number of reasons including the prevalence of 
patronage-based politics and narrow interests of legislators, which I discussed in the 
preceding sub-sections.  
Figure 4.2: Provincial government: Income, expenditures and accountability 
	  
Source: Author; based on data from the Finance Department, Punjab 
The provincial government raises very few taxes from its citizens; on average, 7% of its 
annual income over the last decade. The main source of provincial government income 
is the Federal Government. However, federal transfers (discussed in Chapter 3) are 
unconditional in terms of their use. Provincial income from aid donors varies from year 
to year (see figure 3.2), but in some years it is a significant source of government 
income. In section 4.6, I argue that pressures – in terms of loan conditionality – on the 
government from aid donors to increase service delivery are transient and generally not 
very strong. For a number of reasons, including the fact that funds are fungible, the 
provincial government is practically free to set its own expenditure priorities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  holding	  workshops	  for	  training	  of	  elected	  representatives,	  amongst	  other	  initiatives.	  It	  is	  the	  only	  civil	  society	  organisation	  in	  my	  knowledge	  that	  is	  regularly	  analysing	  Federal	  and	  Provincial	  budgets.	  However,	  PILDAT’s	  analysis	  is	  limited	  to	  annual	  budget	  estimates	  and	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  actual	  expenditures	  of	  the	  government,	  which	  can	  vary	  considerably	  from	  the	  budget	  estimates	  (www.pildat.org).	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Weak political accountability at various levels affects government expenditures as well. 
At the departmental level, provincial ministers have no objective criteria, for example 
performance indicators, to review the functioning of their departments or hold 
bureaucrats accountable for service delivery. Departmental performance is neither 
measured nor benchmarked. There is no mechanism158 in place to determine a desirable 
level of service delivery or costing it, partly due to the practice of input-budgeting (or 
line-item costing) which has no corresponding link to service delivery outputs or sector 
policies.159 Standing Committees of Provincial Assembly (parliament) for oversight of 
departments are mostly not functional.160  
During the annual budget approval process, the Punjab Provincial Assembly does not 
hold the political executive accountable for the previous year’s expenditures and does 
not effectively scrutinise or debate the budgetary allocations for the upcoming year. The 
provincial government’s budget has to be approved by the Provincial Assembly before 
the beginning of every fiscal year. The budgetary documents include not only the 
upcoming year’s income and expenditure estimates, but also the expenditures161 for the 
previous year. The objective of the Assembly’s oversight and approval of the budget is 
partly to seek a debate amongst public representatives on the expenditure priorities of 
the government, and to hold it accountable for use of public resources. However, for 
political reasons, very little time is allocated to the Assembly to hold this debate. This is 
primarily because in a parliamentary political system the continuity of the government 
is contingent on the passage of the annual budget. Failure to pass the annual budget 
shows that the government does not enjoy a majority in the parliament and could lead to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Seven	  (out	  of	  forty)	  provincial	  departments	  for	  which	  medium	  term	  expenditure	  budgeting	  was	  initiated	  with	  technical	  assistance	  from	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  (discussed	  in	  section	  4.6)	  are	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  way	  expenditure	  estimates	  are	  generally	  prepared	  by	  departments	  in	  Punjab.	  However,	  various	  problems	  regarding	  these	  seven	  departments	  were	  reported	  by	  experts	  advising	  the	  government	  on	  financial	  reforms.	  These	  included	  inability	  of	  the	  provincial	  Finance	  Department	  to	  stick	  to	  its	  medium	  term	  expenditure	  framework	  and	  make	  adequate	  resources	  available	  to	  these	  seven	  departments	  in	  order	  for	  the	  departments	  to	  achieve	  their	  service	  delivery	  targets.	  159	  Input-­‐budgeting	  is	  practiced	  in	  a	  large	  number	  of	  countries	  and	  is	  considered	  by	  experts	  to	  be	  problematic	  for	  service	  delivery	  since	  it	  is	  not	  amenable	  to	  performance	  audits	  (United	  Nations,	  1986).	  160	  Provincial	  Public	  Accounts	  Committee	  in	  Punjab	  is	  functional,	  but	  does	  not	  concern	  us	  here	  since	  it	  mostly	  oversees	  whether	  fiscal	  and	  procurement	  rules	  and	  procedures	  are	  being	  followed	  by	  departments	  and	  follows	  up	  on	  external	  audit	  reports.	  It	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  departmental	  performance	  relating	  to	  service	  delivery.	  161	  These	  are	  called	  ‘revised	  estimates’.	  ‘Actual’	  expenditure	  figures	  are	  released	  later	  in	  the	  year,	  by	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Accountant	  General	  of	  Punjab.	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the dissolution of the incumbent government. Thus, the political executive pushes for an 
expeditious passage of the annual budget. Over the last decade, the average time spent 
on having general discussions on the annual budget in the Punjab Provincial Assembly 
was 5.5 days, whereas the previous year’s expenditures were not discussed at all. 
Generally, politicians are more interested in their constituency funds and present and 
push motions for getting more development projects in their constituencies rather than 
scrutinising the overall budget or proposals for expenditures presented by the 
government (PILDAT, 2012a). It is possible that, because the government is not held 
socially or politically accountable for its expenditures, it continues to be driven by 
narrow political interests in deciding how to spend public resources.162 
In this section, I have argued that there are low political pressures on the government for 
expanded service delivery. The various factors responsible for low pressure to deliver 
services are both complex and interconnected. Some of the factors that I identified 
include: the relatively wealthy who are politically influential do not use public services, 
while due to the nature of politics in Pakistan, the poor, who are most in need of these 
services, do not have the political clout to apply pressure on the government; political 
preference for new projects restricts funding for delivery of public services; and, 
generally the absence of public oversight of government expenditures leaves the 
political executive free to pursue its expenditure priorities. Below, I discuss why 
another important constituency, the public servants, who might be expected to have an 
interest in increased public spending, do not pressure the government to increase 
financial allocation for O&M costs. 
4.4 Low pressure for public service expenditure from public servants 
Despite a large wage bill, the government always manages to pay its employees, even 
during periods when it is relatively short of money. In the absence of any service 
delivery targets or political pressures for expanded service delivery, public servants are 
largely satisfied with allocations for recurrent expenditures – employee-related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  International	  Budget	  Partnership	  (2012)	  reports	  similar	  findings	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan’s	  Federal	  Government	  budget.	  It	  finds	  that	  legislative	  oversight	  of	  the	  federal	  budget	  is	  ‘moderate’	  and	  public	  engagement	  is	  ‘weak’,	  with	  most	  mechanisms	  that	  enable	  public	  engagement	  absent	  in	  the	  budgeting	  process.	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expenditures and O&M costs – providing they get paid and maintain their privileges.163 
The Punjab government employs about one million people, who hold permanent and 
pensionable jobs.164 Employee-related expenditures (salaries, allowances and pensions) 
that are more or less a fixed cost for the government, take up about 85% of its total 
recurrent expenditure on average,165 and even reached 87% in 2012-13. Between 2010 
and 2014, real growth in employee-related, O&M and capital expenditure has been 
14%, 12% and 15%, respectively. This reflects the relative expenditure priorities of the 
government, given that O&M expenses are already low, at less than 15% of the 
recurrent budget. In the preceding section, I explained the political significance and 
preference for capital expenditures.  
There appear to be three reasons for the relatively greater increase in already high 
employee-related expenditures (see figure 4.1), compared to O&M expenses. First, the 
provincial government is bound to increase salaries and pensions every year since the 
public service enjoys a standard countrywide pay scale structure that is set by the 
Federal Government.166 Second, the number of government employees rises 
continuously, as new projects are completed and have to be supported by staff. 
Politicians are interested in creating new jobs, especially non-skilled jobs, where 
politicians normally recruit their supporters and clients.167 Third, the annual pension bill 
of the Punjab government is growing rapidly.168 
Relatively higher growth rates of employee-related and capital expenditures compared 
to O&M expenditures point to the low priority given to O&M expenditures. During 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  From	  my	  experience	  of	  working	  in	  the	  Finance	  Department,	  senior	  civil	  servants	  normally	  pursue	  cases	  of	  buying	  a	  new	  official	  car	  or	  a	  bigger	  electric	  generator	  for	  their	  offices	  more	  aggressively	  than	  for	  larger	  financial	  allocations	  that	  could	  help	  their	  department	  deliver	  better	  public	  services.	  164	  An	  oft	  quoted	  quip	  in	  the	  civil	  service	  is	  that,	  ‘it	  is	  easier	  to	  fire	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Pakistan,	  than	  a	  peon	  in	  a	  government	  office’.	  165	  Also	  see	  (World	  Bank,	  2013b)	  166	  	  In	  order	  to	  counter	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  inflation,	  the	  Federal	  Government	  usually	  increases	  salaries	  by	  10-­‐15%	  annually.	  167	  Punjab,	  and	  Pakistan	  generally,	  has	  a	  high	  ratio	  of	  unskilled	  public	  servants.	  Hiring	  of	  office	  peons,	  sweepers,	  drivers,	  etc.	  is	  usually	  the	  prerogative	  of	  departmental	  ministers	  or	  local	  politicians.	  Since	  they	  are	  pensionable	  government	  jobs,	  normally	  politicians	  get	  their	  supporters	  and	  clients	  hired	  to	  these	  positions.	  Reportedly,	  the	  going	  rate	  to	  be	  hired	  as	  a	  sweeper	  in	  the	  Punjab	  government	  is	  equivalent	  of	  US$	  5000.	  168	  Actuarial	  studies	  show	  that	  Punjab’s	  pension	  liabilities	  are	  rising	  rapidly	  and	  increase	  exponentially	  in	  about	  10	  years’	  time	  (Cheema,	  2010).	  To	  cater	  for	  the	  rising	  pension	  liability	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  cajoled	  the	  Punjab	  government	  to	  establish	  and	  capitalise	  a	  pension	  fund.	  I	  discuss	  its	  outcome	  in	  section	  4.5.	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periods of fiscal stress, both in the late 1990s and again after 2008 (see figure 3.4) the 
provincial government imposed austerity measures and cut O&M expenditures across 
the board.169 These cuts make more resources available to pay the provincial wage bill. 
If the provincial income is drastically reduced, capital expenditures are also deferred by 
withholding contractor payments, amongst other measures.170 The provincial Finance 
Department issues austerity notifications that cut O&M expenditures when it faces a 
shortage of financial resources. The notifications are usually fairly standard and 
typically direct all departments, irrespective of their service delivery mandate, to cut 
their O&M expenditures by up to 15%, amongst other measures.171 One of the austerity 
measures is that all permissions for re-allocation of resources need to be referred to and 
approved by the office of the Chief Minister, further centralising expenditure decision-
making. The decisions are driven by some of the motives I outlined in section 4.3.  
Partly because there is little pressure to deliver public services, as discussed in the 
preceding section, the government can cut O&M expenditures without any immediate 
political risk. In absence of political pressure to deliver services and because the 
government so far has been able to pay salaries even during periods of resource 
shortages, public servants have little reason to pressure the government to increase its 
income, through increased taxes, for example.  
The third possible constituency that can pressure the government to increase public 
spending on service delivery is the aid donors who give a considerable amount of 
money to the government in lieu for commitments to increase public spending. In the 
following section, I show why donor imposed conditions for aid might not be effective 
by giving an example of a donor-supported programme.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  For	  example:	  No.	  FD.SO(G-­‐1)6-­‐40/2009	  dated	  9th	  October	  2009	  and	  No.	  FD.SO(Goods)44-­‐4/2011	  dated	  6th	  August	  2013	  (Source:	  Finance	  Department,	  Punjab).	  Similar	  notifications	  were	  issued	  after	  international	  aid	  to	  Pakistan	  was	  suspended	  when	  Pakistan	  tested	  its	  nuclear	  capability,	  in	  1997.	  170	  As	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  Provincial	  government	  is	  highly	  reliant	  on	  federal	  resources,	  which	  are	  transferred	  on	  a	  monthly	  basis.	  Sometimes	  transfers	  from	  the	  Federal	  Government	  are	  less	  than	  expected	  due	  to	  low	  Federal	  tax	  collection,	  amongst	  other	  reasons.	  171	  The	  2013	  notification	  is	  slightly	  modified	  exempting	  certain	  procurements	  meant	  for	  health,	  education	  and	  flood	  protection.	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4.5 Ignoring pressures for expanded service delivery from aid donors 
The government’s ability to satisfy donor conditions for continued financial support 
without actually changing its expenditure priorities in favour of service delivery is a 
possible explanatory factor for the overall lack of pressures to deliver services. In this 
section, I analyse this possibility using, amongst other evidence, the example of a 
recently concluded donor programme in partnership with the Punjab government that 
partly involved public spending commitments.172 My objective is to show how the 
provincial government can avoid acting on any commitments to donors that involve 
finances and go against its political priorities. Although it commits to the donors, 
changes its policies and even passes legislation to satisfy donor aid conditionality, the 
Punjab government usually ignores all implied expenditure commitments.173  
Multi and bilateral donor interventions in Punjab increased significantly after 2001. 
General budgetary and sector specific donor support in terms of loans (see figure 3.2) 
and grants were complemented by significant technical assistance in the area of public 
financial management. Monitoring of government policies, budgetary allocations and 
tracking its expenditure in key service delivery areas by the aid donors, for example, in 
the health and education sectors accompanied these interventions. Since, financial 
support is linked to certain donor conditions, periodic public expenditure reviews and 
monitoring missions by donors have increased considerably (World Bank, 2000, 2001, 
2013a).  
A recent project completion report174 produced by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
declared one of its largest public sector reform programmes with the government of 
Punjab as ‘largely unsuccessful’. The Punjab Government Efficiency Improvement 
Program (Phases I and II), executed between 2002 and 2012, was designed to support 
the Punjab government to undertake multiple reforms in areas of budgeting and taxation 
(including property tax), amongst others.175 The objective of the programme was to 
make additional resources available over the medium- to long-term in order to fund 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  I	  use	  the	  example	  of	  an	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  supported	  public	  sector	  reform	  programme	  which	  I	  headed	  as	  Program	  Director	  for	  two	  years,	  prior	  to	  my	  doctorate.	  173	  Some	  tax	  reforms	  were	  also	  part	  of	  this	  programme,	  which	  were	  also	  not	  undertaken.	  174	  The	  report	  was	  shared	  with	  me	  in	  May	  2013	  by	  ADB	  Manila	  for	  comments,	  since	  I	  was	  the	  Programme	  Director	  for	  two	  years,	  from	  2008-­‐10.	  175	  The	  programme	  reform	  agenda	  was	  wide-­‐ranging	  including	  civil	  service	  reform	  and	  private	  sector	  development	  in	  addition	  to	  public	  financial	  management.	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expanded service delivery. Over the course of eight years, the programme provided the 
Punjab government with a general budgetary support loan of US$ 850 million divided 
in tranches released every 15 months, subject to the government meeting mutually 
agreed conditions. With the objective of achieving better service delivery, some of the 
reform actions included in the programme were to: (i) develop a medium-term 
framework for expenditure projections and revenues; (ii) establish and capitalise a civil 
servants’ pension fund in view of the exponentially rising pension liability; (iii) 
undertake medium-term expenditure forecasting in service delivery departments, and 
build departmental capacity to link financial inputs with planned sector policy outcomes 
and outputs; (iv) enhance coordination between capital and recurrent budgets, with the 
objective of allowing more flexibility for departments to deliver services; (v) decrease 
the number of underfunded projects added to the capital budget every year that spread 
available resources too thinly, resulting in time and cost overruns;176(vi) reform 
provincial tax departments and change policies, including rationalising exemptions, 
primarily focused on property tax.177 
I do not intend to examine the causes of the (alleged) failure of this reform programme, 
which arguably revolve around the incentive structures of both the donor and the 
recipient. However, it is noteworthy that for eight years the government qualified for 
numerous loan tranches and ADB quarterly review missions declared the programme as 
proceeding satisfactorily. A number of programme conditions were process-oriented 
and revolved around policy changes and, at times, amendments in laws, which the 
government undertook expeditiously. The ADB expected the government to implement 
various recommendations made by experts based on the multiple diagnostic studies 
conducted with ADB assistance. In particular, in the area of public financial 
management, large teams of consultants were deployed in some departments to build 
capacity and support them in identifying service delivery outputs and outcomes, for 
which unit costs were also calculated for the first time. Loan conditions partly 
comprised the production of documents, such as a medium-term expenditure 
framework, by the government and their approval from different levels of authority, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  Development	  projects	  in	  Punjab	  normally	  take	  twice	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  resources	  for	  completion	  compared	  to	  original	  estimates	  (World	  Bank,	  2013b).	  177	  See	  http://prmp.pitb.gov.pk/publications	  for	  various	  reform	  areas	  and	  related	  reports	  etc.	  
 
 
129 
including the Chief Minister, the Cabinet and, in certain cases, new legislation by the 
Provincial Assembly.  
Dealing with donors is primarily the task of senior provincial civil servants who ensure 
that donor requirements are fulfilled and aid tranches are released on time. The 
provincial government set up a well-equipped and staffed Program Management Unit 
for the programme to ensure that donor conditions were fulfilled in coordination with 
the relevant line departments. A high-level programme steering committee was 
established under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, the head of the provincial 
civil service, who held regular programme review meetings especially prior to donor 
review missions. As Program Director, my brief from the government was quite clear: I 
was to ensure that the loan tranche was delivered on time. I had full access to, and 
support of, the Chief Secretary as well as the Chief Minister’s secretariat, in order to 
ensure timely issuance of approvals, notifications, presenting policies for Cabinet 
approval as well as for passing any required legislation by the Provincial Assembly, to 
fulfil donor conditionality for tranche release.  
However, none of the loan conditions had any impact in the long run on the way the 
government prioritises its expenditures, despite various policies being approved by the 
political executive. For example, the medium-term expenditure framework, which 
entailed enhanced financial allocation for O&M expenditures, was never fully 
implemented. Most reform initiatives were abandoned after the conclusion of the 
budgetary support programme with the ADB and the government retracted some of its 
commitments including those with financial implications. For example, in the case of 
the Punjab Pension Fund, it retrieved billions of rupees it had dispersed to capitalise the 
Fund, as part of loan conditionality.  
Similar programmes in health and education sectors supported by multiple donors have 
reportedly made some progress in ensuring continued government commitment through 
close monitoring of budgetary allocations and actual expenditures. Some service 
delivery and outcome improvements have been achieved through ‘ring-fenced’178 
financial donor support. Donor funding for these programmes is sector specific and can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  Funding	  in	  such	  programmes	  is	  sector	  specific	  and	  can	  only	  be	  spent	  on	  certain	  types	  of	  expenditures.	  Progress	  and	  expenditures	  are	  closely	  monitored	  by	  donors.	  Arguably,	  even	  in	  such	  programmes	  the	  government	  uses	  its	  own	  resources	  elsewhere,	  since	  donor	  funding	  is	  being	  used	  in	  programme	  sectors.	  	  
 
 
130 
only be spent on certain types of expenditures. Arguably, even in ‘ring-fenced’ 
programmes that are closely monitored by donors, political priorities impact on 
financial allocations. For example, reportedly, in education and health sector 
programmes, government financing is highly skewed in favour of urban areas and 
tertiary services (World Bank, 2013b).179 
Donor pressure on government for service delivery is weak and temporary. My main 
example of the donor supported reform programme mentioned above points to partly 
process-driven donor conditions that do not require the government to change its 
expenditure priorities. However, even when they do, these changes may only be 
temporary, as in the case of the pension fund mentioned earlier. In addition, in the case 
of health and education programmes, the World Bank (2013b) reports that the 
government’s political priorities were driving sector expenditures, even though aid 
donors closely monitored the programmes. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Explanations based on property tax collection mechanisms and the unpopularity of 
property tax do not explain low tax collection on their own. Problems in the collection 
mechanism can be fixed and political resistance to taxation is usually counterbalanced 
by the popularity of government spending on public services. In the case of Punjab, the 
provincial government appears to be stuck in a low level fiscal equilibrium; it can 
sustain itself without taxing its citizens extensively and without providing them with 
adequate public services. In this chapter, I put forward some reasons for why the 
provincial government has low political pressure to deliver public services, and 
provided some evidence that supports my explanations. I found that there are, broadly 
speaking, three groups that might be expected to pressure the provincial government to 
increase expenditures on expanded service delivery, which could then perhaps lead to 
increased taxation. 
First, citizens, who are potential users of public services, do not exert pressure on the 
government to spend more on the provision of public services. I provided some 
evidence for my argument that the relatively wealthy who are expected to be politically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  For	  an	  earlier	  period	  (1958-­‐1999),	  Easterly	  (2003)	  points	  out	  that	  despite	  heavy	  donor	  involvement	  and	  financial	  support	  (US$	  58	  billion),	  social	  sector	  performance	  in	  Pakistan	  was	  disappointing.	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influential, have little incentive to pressure the government to increase public services 
since most do not use these services. The poor, who would certainly use these services, 
do not have the political clout to pressure the government because of the nature of 
politics in Pakistan. Politics in Pakistan is largely patronage-based and political 
priorities for public expenditures favour new projects rather than funding delivery of 
public services. Moreover, political expenditure priorities persist unchecked possibly 
because social and political accountability of public expenditures is generally weak.  
Second, public servants who have an obvious interest in increasing public expenditures 
do not pressure the government to increase expenditures for provision of public 
services. This is possibly because civil servants are not accountable for achieving any 
service delivery targets and hence are not particularly concerned about low O&M 
expenditures. Moreover, civil servants do not run the risk of not getting paid by the 
government. Even when the government is short of resources, it cuts or delays other 
expenditures in order to pay salaries and pensions.  
Third, the provincial government can effectively ignore pressure from its aid donors for 
increased service delivery (or taxation) by doing enough to broadly satisfy most 
conditions for aid without changing its expenditure priorities significantly. 
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5 The Informality of formal tax collection 
5.1 Introduction 
Although the Excise and Taxation Department (ETD)180 is Weberian in form – with a 
clear hierarchy, formal rules, a system of recruitment, postings, promotions and a 
certain level of institutionalised answerability – its operations in Punjab are mired in 
informality. That impacts property tax assessment and collection. The system combines, 
(a) a high degree of informal behaviour, (b) control of detailed information at lower 
levels that makes it hard for higher level management to change the system or increase 
collections, (c) modest rent-taking at lower levels, and (d) their responsiveness to local 
pressures to go easy on tax collection. Informal ways of working and the exercise of 
discretion by frontline workers are normal within most organisations. But in the ETD 
case, the ways in which rents are created and shared, and the fact that informal 
behaviour is embedded and routinized presents a major obstacle to substantially 
increasing tax collection. One important underlying factor is the very large tax rate 
differentials between residential and commercial properties and between owner-
occupied and rented properties. Since the field level tax collectors themselves assess 
property tax liabilities, they have ample opportunities to exercise discretion, and 
therefore to collude with taxpayers. As I mentioned in earlier chapters, the rents that 
collectors harvest from this collusion serve not only to increase their incomes, but also 
to fund some of the operational costs of the Department.  
There appears to be no in-depth study of a property tax organisation in a developing 
country that explains how the system actually works in terms of: What motivates tax 
collectors? How do they operate? Why and how administrative discretion is exercised 
and how does this impact on property tax revenues? On the basis of my long 
observation of tax field offices and other fieldwork, I explain the incentives that 
motivate different levels of the ETD, formal and informal intra-organizational 
relationships, and the critical role of control and hoarding of information. This chapter 
deals with the ways in which the department functions under normal circumstances. In 
Chapter 6, I analyse the behaviour of tax collectors when they are under extraordinary 
pressures to increase tax collection. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  180	  Most	  of	  the	  material	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  common	  to	  Piracha	  and	  Moore	  (2015)	  and	  Piracha	  and	  Moore	  (2016).	  The	  data	  used	  in	  both	  are	  from	  my	  doctoral	  fieldwork.	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After a brief review of the literature on property tax administration and frontline 
workers in section 5.2, I outline some important background points about the structure 
and functioning of the tax department in section 5.3. In section 5.4 I start with reporting 
a routine office interaction and explain tax collection at the local level. I show that tax 
collectors have good knowledge of properties in their jurisdiction and use discretion in 
assessing liabilities. In section 5.5 I analyse relationships between various levels of the 
department, again beginning with a specific incident. I show, on the one hand, how tax 
collectors control flows of information to higher levels and insulate themselves from 
demands of increased tax collection, and on the other, in the absence of information, 
how higher level management uses its authority to try to enforce greater tax collection. I 
conclude the discussion in the last section. 
5.2 Review of literature on property tax administration and frontline 
workers 
I found very little guidance from the literature on property tax administration on how 
the tax is actually collected, despite there being ample evidence from elsewhere (and in 
my own experience of working in Pakistan) that there is lots of informality in 
government organisations in developing countries. My work on the ways in which 
property tax collection actually takes place was informed and motivated by literature in 
similar contexts, of how the state actually works, which I reviewed earlier in section 
1.5.1. The literature on recurrent (annual) property taxation underscores tax 
administration as critical to revenue generation and often uses the aphorism that 
‘property tax administration is tax policy’. Surprisingly then, the literature on property 
tax that deals with its administrative aspects is mostly normative and has limited insight 
into actual practice. For example, I found that a recent edited volume authored by a 
number of leading international experts on property taxes in developing countries 
(Kelly, 2013b) has very little to add to Dillinger (1988) regarding property tax 
administration in developing countries, despite a gap of three decades. The literature 
mostly points to weaknesses in the three key steps involved in the property taxation 
process that can result in low tax collection (Dillinger, 1988, Bird and Slack, 2004, Bahl 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008, Powers, 2008, Bahl and Wallace, 2010, UN-HABITAT, 
2011, Kelly, 2013a, 2013b, Kitchen, 2013, Ahmad et al., 2014):  
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(i) Property identification: All property units in a jurisdiction, their ownership, 
description and unique reference number are prerequisites for a cadastre that forms the 
basis of annual property taxation. This information requires continuous updating which 
can be costly and at times difficult. In most countries, property records and building 
permissions are usually not integrated into the cadastre and property transfers may not 
be reported to the tax department. For a number of reasons, including lack of regular 
property surveys, coverage of properties in the cadastre may not be complete or 
accurate. 
(ii) Assessment and appeals: For revenue productivity and fairness to taxpayers, 
property tax assessments need to be up-to-date and uniform within the same 
jurisdiction. Absence of regular property revaluations for various reasons, including 
lack of valuation skills and/or resources, can lead to property taxes that are 
‘dramatically under-assessed’. Additionally, a system to correct errors in assessments 
that allows taxpayers to appeal against tax liabilities is also essential for fairness. A 
cumbersome appeals mechanism may deter some taxpayers from using it, and it may 
affect their willingness to pay the tax. However, relatively wealthy taxpayers with 
higher liabilities may consider going through the appeals process worthwhile. 
(iii) Tax collection and arrears: Tax collection involves billing taxpayers, collecting 
taxes, and ensuring payment. Once the tax is assessed for individual properties, bills are 
sent to taxpayers. If a taxpayer does not appeal against assessment, s/he is expected to 
pay within a certain time period. In case of non-payment, tax collectors can enforce 
compliance through various methods, including sale of property, to clear the tax liability 
(in cases of long-term delinquency). Non-payment and accumulation of substantial 
arrears in the absence of enforcing tax collection is a major factor for low property tax 
collection in developing countries. This is attributed largely to lack of ‘political will’ to 
undertake enforcement measures that can be coercive and hence unpopular. 
The literature also suggests that, because of the ways in which assessment and 
collection are undertaken, recurrent property taxation is highly susceptible to collusion 
between taxpayers and tax collectors. This is mainly because property tax is almost 
universally assessed by tax staff and is not self-assessed. Regularly updating property 
records is key to correct assessment. Property tax assessment activities require physical 
verification. As such, there is greater scope for collusion between the assessor and the 
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taxpayer than with accounts-based verification, where the assessor has little or no direct 
interaction with taxpayers. The possibility of collusion is even greater where the tax 
assessor is also responsible for tax collection activities (Moore, 2013a).  
Use of information technology is considered by experts to be an effective way of 
overcoming some of the shortcomings of property tax administration mentioned above. 
For example, use of geographic information system (GIS) maps improves the process of 
property identification and hence coverage. Digitalisation of the property tax cadastre 
and automation of billing and collection records increases the efficiency of collection 
processes. Digitalisation also reduces some of the opportunities for tax staff to use their 
discretion while assessing and collecting property tax. Compared to manual record 
keeping, it also makes property tax data easily accessible to higher-level management 
for better oversight and monitoring of tax collectors, strategic management and analysis. 
However, it is pointed out that technological improvements have only a limited impact 
on tax collection unless accompanied by wider organisational reforms that influence tax 
collector incentives. Information technology systems do not completely eliminate tax 
collector discretion and require continuous data updating. The effectiveness of 
technology is also limited if the integrity of the data in the system is questionable. 
Moreover, enforcement, an important collection function, is not directly linked to use of 
technology (Bird and Zolt, 2008, Bird, 2010a, Kelly, 2013b, Khan and Inam, 2014). 
It is well-known that frontline workers or ‘street level bureaucrats’  – i.e. the public 
service workers that interact directly with the public – often exercise considerable 
discretion when formally implementing organisational policies; they do not always 
follow formal rules and standard operating procedures. In some cases, this exercise of 
discretion may be either inevitable, if the job is to be made manageable, and/or may be 
desirable (Lipsky, 2010). Informal ways of working along with their well-defined norms 
are not limited to frontline workers. The prevalence of informality within organisations 
around the world is well documented (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981, Wilson, 2000, 
Grzymala-Busse and Luong, 2002, Colignon and Usui, 2003, Helmke and Levitsky, 
2006, Dodson, 2009, Hodder, 2010, Mayo, [1949] 2014). Although there are plenty of 
studies (see my literature review in section 1.5.1) that deal with the informal working of 
the state and its interactions with citizens, only a few studies deal with the detailed 
internal workings of state agencies in developing countries (Dilulio, 1994, Grindle, 
1997, Hilderbrand et al., 1997). This is understandably due to the lack of access granted 
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to outsiders and secrecy about issues that mainly pertain to corruption and illegality. 
Wade’s (1982) work on canal irrigation in India and more recently, a study on taxes on 
cross-border trade in Africa (Titeca and Kimanuka, 2012) and Blundo (2006) are the 
only ones that are meaningfully similar to my case. 
The personal and group interests of workers, social norms, expediency, compulsions of 
field-level conditions, or simply the pressure to ‘get the job done’ might influence the 
behaviour of frontline workers. But this does not in any significant degree have to be 
the case with property tax assessment and collection. Tax collectors should stick to the 
rules and procedures, especially in relation to their key tasks of assessing, billing and 
collecting.          
Since the informal ways of working in public bureaucracies is not always in plain view, 
interventions aimed at improvement that are not informed by an understanding of real 
organisational workings have lower chances of success (Schick, 1998). Thus, partly to 
improve chances of success of any interventions to improve the property tax collection 
system, it is important to find out how the system actually works. 
5.3 Property tax administration in Punjab 
To make it easier to follow analysis in later sections I first outline the formal hierarchy 
of the Punjab Excise and Taxation Department (ETD) and the functions performed by 
its various levels. For simplicity, I refer to three hierarchical levels (see figure 5.1): 
• The ‘higher level’ (or ‘higher management’) includes: the departmental 
Secretary, who is responsible for overall target achievement, administration and tax 
policy work; and the Director General who is responsible for the tax field offices of the 
whole province. Generalist career civil servants are usually posted to these positions. 
Usually they have no prior experience of working in the Department, and are posted for 
relatively short tenures, of about a year or less. 
• The ‘middle level’ comprises Regional Directors who are senior departmental 
officers responsible for meeting tax collection targets in the 9 property tax Regions. 
Each Region comprises 3-5 Districts. Mostly recruited as Tax Inspectors or directly as 
Excise and Taxation Officers (ETOs), Regional Directors have about fifteen or more 
years of experience in tax collection at various levels and have usually served in various 
districts. They have a good knowledge of departmental functioning. 
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Figure 5.1: The ETD hierarchy and functions181 
 
Source: Author  
• The ‘lower level’ includes the Excise and Taxation Officers (ETOs),182 Assistant 
Excise and Taxation Officers (AETOs), and Circle staff that comprise a Tax 
Inspector,183 a Clerk and a Constable. The most senior of the field level staff are the 
Excise and Taxation Officers, who is in-charge of a whole district or a zone in larger 
districts. There are there are about 50 property tax zones/districts in Punjab province, 
which in 2011-12, included about 483 property tax Circles. Each Excise and Taxation 
Officer (ETO) is assisted by an Assistant Excise and Taxation Officer.184  Each ETO 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  Functions	  of	  Regional	  Directors,	  ETOs	  and	  AETOs	  vary	  in	  Regional	  headquarter	  districts	  and	  smaller	  districts,	  as	  I	  explain	  in	  this	  section.	  	  In	  smaller	  districts	  an	  ETO	  heads	  a	  district.	  The	  larger	  districts	  are	  sub-­‐divided	  into	  a	  number	  of	  property	  tax	  ‘Zones’,	  each	  headed	  by	  an	  ETO.	  182	  ETOs	  are	  public	  service	  grade	  17	  gazetted	  officers.	  A	  few	  who	  are	  promoted	  to	  grade	  18	  are	  given	  the	  title	  of	  Senior	  ETO.	  Most	  ETOs	  were	  initially	  recruited	  as	  Inspectors	  and	  have	  since	  been	  promoted.	  Some	  are	  directly	  recruited	  to	  the	  post	  of	  ETO	  through	  a	  competitive	  process	  conducted	  by	  the	  provincial	  Public	  Services	  Commission.	  	  183	  Under	  the	  Punjab	  Excise	  and	  Taxation	  Service	  Rules,	  1980,	  60%	  of	  Tax	  Inspectors	  are	  directly	  recruited	  to	  that	  post	  and	  40%	  are	  promoted	  from	  lower	  ranks,	  of	  which	  75%	  are	  to	  be	  from	  among	  senior	  Clerks	  and	  25%	  from	  Stenographers.	  Source:	  Excise	  and	  Taxation	  Department,	  Punjab	  184	  The	  role	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  AETO	  varies	  in	  large	  and	  smaller	  districts;	  I	  explain	  these	  later	  in	  this	  section.	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supervises about ten Circles. The Circle is the lowest unit in the hierarchy. A Tax 
Inspector, who is assisted by a Constable and an office Clerk, heads each Circle. Circle 
staff share the same office buildings as their ETO and the staff of the other Circles in 
the district or regional tax offices.  
 
In order to grasp the informal working of the department, there are four important things 
the reader needs to know: 
  
Firstly, under the property tax law, the higher level of the ETD is not directly involved 
in the assessment or collection of property tax. The higher management has overall 
responsibility for meeting annual tax collection targets set by the provincial government 
and recommending tax policy changes to the government. It exercises administrative 
authority over the lower levels including deciding postings, transfers, and initiating 
disciplinary action. Higher management can conduct field or record inspections. The 
latter are mostly carried out on its behalf by a Monitoring Wing (headed by a Director) 
based at the Director General’s office. There are no monitoring cells at the Regional or 
district levels. Regional Directors and ETOs are expected to undertake inspections 
personally in their areas of jurisdiction. 
 
Secondly, the lower level performs all property identification, assessment, billing, 
collection and enforcement tasks. The AETO performs the internal audit function, and 
is expected to physically crosscheck a certain number of properties and their 
assessment, as well as audit the records and various registers for each Circle. The 
AETOs functions are somewhat varied in smaller (non-regional headquarter) districts, 
where the ETO is the appellate authority and the AETO is the assessing authority. In 
smaller districts there is no dedicated staff for internal audit. The role of the Circle staff 
remains unchanged irrespective of the size of the district.185 
Thirdly, taxpayer appeals against assessment are adjudicated by the Regional Directors 
in large (regional headquarter) districts where the ETOs are assessing authority. In 
smaller districts, where the AETO is the assessing authority, the ETO performs the 
appellate function. Thus, the first appeal against assessment in both small and large 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  Out	  of	  36	  districts	  in	  Punjab	  8	  are	  regional	  headquarters.	  Therefore,	  in	  28	  districts	  tax	  field	  offices	  have	  no	  internal	  auditor.	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districts lies within the departmental hierarchy, while the second (review) appeal lies 
outside the departmental hierarchy, that is, with the district government.186 
Lastly, the provincial Auditor General is responsible for the external audit of tax offices. 
However, external audit is limited to checking for discrepancies within office records. 
External auditors make no attempt to crosscheck the accuracy of actual property 
assessments.187  
5.4 Tax collection at the local level 
A few weeks into my field research I was sitting in the office of a senior ETO here 
pseudonymously called Saeen. ETOs are formally responsible for ruling on the property 
tax assessments for individual properties. As mentioned earlier, they are in charge of 
about ten Circles, each headed by a Tax Inspector and assisted by one Clerk and one 
Constable. The Tax Inspector is primarily responsible for initial assessment of 
properties and updating the property records. The Constable is supposed to report 
information from the field and go house to house to deliver property tax bills. The staff 
of a Circle typically operates as a cohesive group. They share a great deal of 
information and overlap with one another in the tasks they perform. The staff members 
at the ETO’s office and in the circle are localist in orientation. Because they expect to 
work in the same office for a long time, they are motivated to avoid conflicts with local 
people and politicians. 
As I was sitting in the Saeen’s office, a middle-aged woman, whom I will call Mrs 
Chalak, walked in. She showed Saeen her recent property tax bill, explaining that it 
related to a residential house owned by her mother-in-law. She complained that the 
assessment must be wrong, as the bill never used to be this high. Saeen took the bill and 
asked Mrs Chalak if her mother-in-law was a widow. Mrs Chalak said that she was. 
Saeen then picked up his cell phone and called the relevant Tax Inspector, telling him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  The	  second	  (review)	  appeal,	  which	  challenges	  the	  outcome	  of	  first	  appeal	  against	  assessment	  is	  filed	  with	  the	  Executive	  District	  Officer	  (Finance)	  of	  the	  respective	  District	  government.	  For	  reasons	  pointed	  out	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  this	  function	  is	  not	  effectively	  performed	  by	  the	  district	  governments.	  Further	  appeals	  can	  be	  filed	  with	  the	  provincial	  High	  Court	  and	  finally	  the	  federal	  Supreme	  Court.	  187	  Various	  informants	  reported	  that	  these	  audit	  teams	  ‘charge	  them	  fixed	  fees	  per	  Circle’	  to	  produce	  reports	  finding	  only	  minor	  discrepancies	  which	  are	  easy	  to	  address.	  External	  audits	  seem	  to	  be	  driven	  more	  by	  desires	  to	  make	  claims	  on	  informal	  earnings	  than	  a	  credible	  crosscheck	  on	  tax	  staff.	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the house address and the bill amount, and asking how it was calculated. There followed 
a three-way conversation as Saeen spoke to his Inspector on the phone and to the lady 
sitting in front of him. 
Saeen (to Mrs Chalak):  Your mother-in-law died last year. 
Mrs Chalak:    Ah... yes (slightly embarrassed as her lie is discovered). 
Saeen (to Mrs Chalak): You live upstairs and downstairs you have a beauty 
parlour. 
Mrs Chalak:   Oh, that is still under construction... 
Saeen (to Inspector):  Isn’t that still under construction? 
Saeen (to Mrs Chalak): There is some finishing work going on, but it is functional 
isn’t it? 
Satisfied, Saeen puts down his cell phone and addresses Mrs Chalak. 
Saeen:    So how much rent do you get for the parlour? 
Mrs Chalak:   It’s not on rent; I am running it myself. 
Note that the property tax payable would be considerably higher if the premises in 
question were, first, being used for commercial purposes and, second, rented out by the 
owner. Saeen did not seem too convinced with Mrs Chalak’s answer, but went on to 
make some calculations on the back of her bill. He kept calculating aloud so that Mrs 
Chalak could hear what he was doing and object if she did not agree with something. He 
kept flipping the bill to see the size of the plot and of the constructed area of upper and 
lower stories of the building. After applying the relevant rates and remissions he came 
up with a final assessment figure, which he underlined twice. He flipped the bill one last 
time and read off the figure, which was the same as the one on the bill Mrs Chalak had 
brought with her. Saeen then explained the classifications he has used: ‘self-occupied 
residential’ for the upstairs floor of the building in which Mrs Chalak lives and ‘self-
commercial’ for the beauty parlour on the ground floor. He had treated the car porch 
area on the ground floor as being in self-residential use and not commercial use, in 
exactly the same way as his Inspector had when preparing the original bill. Saeen told 
Mrs Chalak that under the law he is to presume that any property not occupied by the 
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owner is rented, but he will be lenient in her case. He advised her to get the property 
transferred in the name of the heir/s of her deceased mother-in-law as this is required 
under the law. Mrs Chalak did not have anything further to say, but still did not seem 
very happy with her bill. She went away without saying anything about paying, and 
Saeen did not ask.  
Saeen then turned to me and explained that the increase in the bill was because the 
property no longer qualified for the reductions granted to widows. He remarked that 
Mrs Chalak would pay up once that information had sunk in. Saeen did not seem to 
resent the way in which she had tried to hide the truth about the death of her mother-in-
law, the commercial use of the downstairs section as a beauty parlour, or the fact that it 
was likely rented out. Indeed, he had given her the benefit of the doubt on the latter 
point. Had he classified the downstairs as rented commercial premises, the tax bill for 
that part of the property would have increased five-fold. He explained that he had been 
lenient because he preferred to make a lower assessment and have her pay up rather 
than assess her strictly and risk non-payment. He added that, “Even a rupee more in 
assessment than the ‘fair’ assessment in the mind of the assessee raises the risk of non-
payment multiple times”. That was a lesson he had learned in a quarter century of 
assessing and collecting property tax. 
This routine interaction over Mrs Chalak’s bill is representative of numerous similar 
issues that regularly came up during my observation of tax offices and discussions with 
lower level tax staff in three different Regions. Based on this interaction and other 
ethnographic data, several important dimensions of property tax assessment and 
collection processes at the local level emerged. 
• First, most property tax bills are very low, mostly because the government has 
not re-valued properties for almost fifteen years. For example, the annual bill that Mrs 
Chalak disputed was probably about the same as her monthly electricity bill, which she 
likely pays promptly and without questioning. Typically, the annual property tax billed 
to an owner-occupied house built on 500 square yards in the highest valued ‘A’ 
category is only about Rs. 5000, roughly 50 USD.188 
Property tax bills are significant in size only where (a) properties are rented out rather 
than owner-occupied and/or (b) they are classified as being in commercial rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  This	  holds	  for	  2012.	  Property	  valuations	  have	  been	  revised	  recently,	  in	  2014.	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residential use. Commercial rented properties are assessed at five times the owner-
occupied commercial rate, because they have a higher rental value. The differential for 
residential properties is ten times (in which case bill would increase from 50 to 500 
USD, in the example above). From the economists’ perspective, property tax has 
become very close to an income tax on property that is rented, especially for 
commercial purposes. 
• Second, Circle staff have a deep knowledge of virtually all properties within 
their jurisdictions, including both those that are registered (on average about 1,100 per 
staff member) 189 and those that have not been registered and therefore escape payment. 
The staff maintain a written register of all properties, which contains basic information 
on assessments, payments, and arrears. But their knowledge is more extensive. When 
called by his ETO, the Inspector for the Circle in which Mrs Chalak resided 
immediately recognised her property and knew the relevant recent history: the death of 
her mother-in-law and the progress in converting the ground floor into a beauty parlour. 
The Inspector had put an end to the widow’s deduction on the property without waiting 
for Mrs Chalak to formally record the change in ownership of the property with the 
District Registrar. This was typical of the interactions I observed in various tax offices, 
reflecting the extensive amount of field information tax staff possesses.  
The Constable in particular is constantly out on the streets and haunts the local bazaars. 
He is supposed to wear the departmental uniform,190 but almost never does. This is not 
only to avoid being conspicuous but also to hide the fact that he is a mere Constable. As 
an ETO remarked, “in a lot of places the Constable usually introduces himself as a tax 
officer,” implying that he is in a decision-making position and can be negotiated with. 
He is locally referred to by an honorific – Chaudhri Sahib, Malik Sahib, Mian Sahib, 
Khan Sahib, Shah Sahib etc. – according to his caste or lineage. He knows what is going 
on in the area, both generally and particularly with respect to properties. He has close 
contacts with local real estate dealers. Typically, the Constable serves his whole career 
of about thirty years in one Circle. He may see a house being constructed, and knows 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  However,	  the	  range	  is	  quite	  varied.	  Large	  cities,	  particularly	  Lahore,	  are	  very	  well	  staffed,	  while	  smaller	  and	  more	  remote	  districts	  are	  grossly	  understaffed.	  This	  determines	  the	  ‘size’	  (number	  of	  properties)	  of	  the	  Circle,	  which	  impacts	  collection.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  smaller	  districts	  I	  interviewed	  an	  Inspector	  with	  9,000	  properties	  in	  his	  Circle.	  However,	  this	  was	  an	  extreme	  case.	  	  190	  Tax	  inspectors	  also	  are	  required	  to	  wear	  the	  departmental	  uniform,	  but	  do	  not.	  The	  uniforms	  have	  distinctive	  shoulder	  ranks	  for	  inspectors	  but	  none	  for	  the	  constables.	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who owns it, what the owner does for a living, when it is occupied and hence becomes 
liable to be taxed, whether it is owner-occupied or rented out, and whether it is being 
used for residential or commercial purposes. He also makes it his business to find out 
the political and social connections of the owner in order to assess their negotiating 
power.  
This valuable unwritten information is monopolized by the permanent Circle staff, and 
not shared with the office assistants that they typically hire unofficially and privately to 
do clerical work.191 These are sharp young graduates with good numeracy skills. They 
are willing to work long hours for a relatively low monthly salary and an occasional 
‘bonus’. Their main motivation is the opportunity of being hired permanently if and 
when formal recruitment takes place.192 Only then will the permanent staff begin to 
share the rich informal information about the real property tax base and the associated 
informal income with them.193 As temporary and informal assistants, they are never 
taken into the field. Further, as one of them described, they have to ‘run out’ of the 
building if there is an inspection visit by the Director General or some other senior 
officer. 
• Third, detailed information about properties and tax collection is not available to 
higher levels. Cadastral records along with assessment, billing, collection, and arrears 
are maintained and updated manually in multiple registers held by the Tax Inspector at 
the Circle level. Various monthly reports pertaining to any changes in property 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  The	  work	  of	  a	  Tax	  Inspector’s	  office	  includes:	  maintaining	  the	  cadastre	  and	  a	  number	  of	  registers	  that	  record	  assessments,	  exemptions,	  appeals,	  remissions,	  payments	  and	  arrears;	  issuing	  tax	  bills	  and	  reminders;	  issuing	  notices	  for	  enforcements	  etc.,	  all	  of	  which	  is	  done	  manually.	  The	  work	  is	  routine	  but	  large	  in	  volume.	  Apart	  from	  the	  5	  City	  Districts	  in	  Punjab,	  property	  tax	  staff	  is	  also	  responsible	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  various	  other	  provincial	  levies.	  There	  is	  a	  general	  shortage	  of	  clerical	  staff	  in	  the	  department;	  out	  of	  483	  Circles	  only	  268	  have	  ‘official’	  clerks	  working	  in	  them	  (Source:	  Excise	  and	  Taxation	  Department).	  Informal	  hiring	  of	  Circle	  Clerks	  is	  a	  widespread	  phenomenon	  (Khan	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  p.6).	  192	  Mainly	  due	  to	  financial	  constraints,	  the	  government	  bans	  recruitment	  against	  existing	  vacancies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  posts	  for	  years	  on	  end	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  The	  Chief	  Minister’s	  special	  permission	  is	  required	  to	  fill	  any	  existing	  departmental	  vacancies	  during	  the	  ban.	  193	  Retired	  Circle	  staff	  members	  are	  never	  re-­‐hired	  for	  these	  jobs,	  as	  they	  have	  the	  knowledge	  to	  cut	  into	  the	  informal	  incomes	  of	  their	  successors.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  the	  (agricultural)	  land	  revenue	  department	  equivalent	  officers,	  known	  locally	  as	  patwaris,	  are	  sometimes	  re-­‐hired	  informally	  after	  retirement	  for	  routine	  technical	  work.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  main	  source	  of	  informal	  earnings	  requires	  the	  signature	  of	  the	  incumbent	  official,	  for	  example,	  on	  documents	  transferring	  property,	  and	  so	  informal	  hiring	  of	  retirees	  does	  not	  threaten	  informal	  incomes.	  (Source:	  Discussions	  with	  District	  Revenue	  officers	  and	  my	  own	  experience	  as	  one.)	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attributes, assessment, collection, arrears, appeals, remissions etc. are required under 
property tax rules to be collated at the district level and reported to higher levels. 
However, this practice has long been discontinued.194 Currently the only monthly 
reports generated pertain to aggregated collections. This problem is compounded by the 
fact that the provincial Accountant General’s office does not account for current year 
and arrears collections under separate accounting heads. As a result, higher level 
management does not have the information available to cross-check current year and 
arrear collection figures presented by field tax offices. As I will explain in section 5.5, 
this information bottleneck is a significant characteristic of the property tax system.195 
Past attempts to digitalise information about the property tax base and tax collection 
performance, including several supported by aid donors, have come to naught. Senior 
officers in the department claim that the major reason for repeated failure to digitalise is 
that the lower level staff members feel threatened, and resist.196  
• Fourth, property tax law and the collection mechanisms in place allow tax 
collectors ample opportunities to exercise discretion with little fear of being detected. 
Circle staff are literally ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 2010), exercising a 
considerable amount of discretion. For example, valuation tables categorise blocks of 
adjacent properties according to estimated rent values, not individual premises. All 
properties in a block are assigned to a category between A and G and assessed 
according to their approximate rental value, which is based largely on the extent of 
infrastructure and service provision in the area.197 The taxes payable on any individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  Until	  the	  1970s,	  the	  Director	  General’s	  office	  produced	  an	  annual	  report	  on	  property	  tax	  (and	  other	  taxes)	  reporting	  all	  these	  changes	  aggregated	  for	  the	  whole	  province.	  The	  report	  included	  about	  sixteen	  different	  tables	  recording	  various	  variables	  affecting	  collection.	  	  	  195	  Khan	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  point	  out	  that	  initially	  the	  tax	  incentive	  scheme	  in	  the	  Punjab	  ETD	  differentiated	  between	  current	  year	  and	  arrear	  collection	  by	  tax	  staff.	  However,	  this	  was	  discontinued	  due	  to	  non-­‐reliability	  of	  the	  reported	  figures	  from	  field	  staff,	  since	  these	  could	  not	  be	  effectively	  crosschecked.	  The	  incentive	  scheme	  only	  used	  aggregate	  collection	  data,	  which	  are	  verifiable	  from	  the	  Accountant	  General’s	  database.	  196	  Recently,	  in	  2012,	  another	  attempt	  was	  made	  to	  digitalise	  data,	  starting	  with	  a	  pilot	  medium-­‐sized	  city,	  Sialkot,	  and	  later	  expanded	  to	  five	  other	  cities.	  The	  ETD	  and	  another	  provincial	  agency	  (the	  Urban	  Unit)	  undertaking	  this	  digitalisation	  claim	  that	  it	  has	  been	  relatively	  successful.	  However,	  a	  recent	  assessment	  of	  the	  project	  commissioned	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  (Khan	  and	  Inam,	  2014)	  points	  to	  serious	  flaws	  in	  the	  visioning	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  project.	  It	  also	  finds	  that	  lower	  level	  response	  to	  digitalising	  is	  not	  unusually	  negative	  for	  such	  projects	  as	  made	  out	  by	  senior	  officers.	  197	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  up	  till	  2014	  the	  property	  valuation	  tables	  drawn	  up	  in	  1999	  were	  in	  use.	  Revaluation	  is	  mandatory	  after	  every	  five	  years	  under	  the	  property	  tax	  law.	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property within a block are then dependent on its size,198 whether or not it is deemed to 
be used for commercial or residential purposes, whether it is owner-occupied or rented 
out, or whether the owners or occupants merit reductions because they are, for example, 
widows or retired public servants.199 The assessing authority (ETO/AETO) can change 
the basic rating value of a block of properties by reassigning it from category A to B, C 
to D etc.  
 
Given the incompleteness of property registration systems and records, the complexities 
of joint family property rights and mostly informal rental arrangements,200 the Circle 
staff enjoy enormous discretion in making assessments. Since there is a large difference 
in a property being assessed as commercial or residential, and again within those 
categories of owner-occupied or rented; most collusion is concentrated in exploiting 
these shortcomings of tax policy.  
Circle staff prepare and deliver the bills, and visit taxpayers repeatedly to follow up on 
payment until they receive or are shown the bank receipt as evidence that payment has 
been made.201 The billing process is itself complex. Bills are initially prepared on the 
assumption that they will be paid within the first three202 months of the financial year, 
and will therefore be eligible for a 5% rebate. Should they not be paid in this time, new 
bills are prepared. Duplicate bills are anyway delivered regularly as reminders. All these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  Tax	  liability	  for	  individual	  properties	  is	  calculated	  using	  a	  complex	  formula	  using	  different	  rates	  for	  size	  of	  the	  plot	  and	  built-­‐up	  area	  of	  a	  property.	  However,	  empty	  land	  with	  no	  improvements	  is	  not	  taxed.	  199	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  assess	  similar	  properties	  or	  parts	  of	  the	  same	  property	  under	  different	  bands	  when	  being	  used	  for	  residential	  and	  commercial	  purposes.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  highly	  commercialized	  ‘hot’	  area,	  as	  the	  staff	  call	  it,	  a	  commercial	  property	  would	  be	  assessed	  in	  say,	  band	  A	  while	  its	  residential	  part	  may	  be	  assessed	  in	  band	  C.	  200	  In	  the	  case	  of	  commercial	  properties	  in	  Pakistan,	  there	  is	  a	  tradition	  of	  giving	  a	  large	  lump-­‐sum	  payment	  up-­‐front,	  called	  ‘pugree’,	  followed	  by	  much	  smaller	  monthly	  ‘rent’	  payments.	  Such	  practices,	  when	  routine	  and	  widespread,	  can	  influence	  rental	  value	  estimates	  even	  if	  surveys	  are	  carried	  out	  regularly.	  201	  Property	  tax	  bills	  are	  issued	  is	  in	  a	  three-­‐foil	  format	  that	  has	  to	  be	  deposited	  in	  branches	  of	  the	  National	  Bank	  of	  Pakistan	  (or	  State	  Bank	  of	  Pakistan	  –	  Pakistan’s	  central	  bank)	  under	  a	  designated	  treasury	  account.	  One	  foil	  is	  returned	  to	  the	  taxpayer,	  stamped	  by	  the	  bank	  as	  a	  receipt.	  Two	  are	  sent	  to	  the	  District	  Accounts	  Office.	  One	  of	  the	  foils	  is	  collected	  by	  the	  ETD,	  which	  makes	  an	  entry	  of	  payment	  in	  the	  District/	  Region’s	  Central	  Daily	  Cash	  Register.	  The	  foil	  is	  then	  sent	  down	  through	  the	  office	  of	  the	  ETO	  to	  the	  concerned	  Inspector.	  The	  Inspector	  attaches	  the	  receipt	  to	  the	  page	  in	  his	  register	  (PT-­‐8)	  that	  has	  details	  of	  the	  property.	  	  202	  Prior	  to	  2012,	  the	  rebate	  was	  valid	  if	  paid	  within	  the	  first	  two	  months	  of	  the	  financial	  year.	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bills are prepared by hand.203 This intensive personal interaction between tax collector 
and taxpayer provides the classic breeding ground for collusion between them, to the 
detriment of the public treasury, as well as scope for coercion on the part of the 
collector.  
Field staff members do not generally use their discretion in ways that generate 
widespread resentment. Indeed, as the case above illustrates, they tend to make an effort 
to keep their taxpayers content in order to ensure payment, even at the cost of foregoing 
some revenue.204 This reflects the interaction of several features of the property tax 
system examined elsewhere in this chapter: the ability of field level staff to fend off 
pressures from above to increase collection; the danger of providing opportunities for 
local politicians to intervene on the side of taxpayers; and the potential costs of 
disrupting a set of arrangements that provide collectors with reliable revenue streams 
and most taxpayers with very low property tax bills. 
Collusion between tax collectors and property owners to reduce assessments is not the 
statistical norm. Because rented and commercial properties are assessed relatively 
highly, it is here that collusive activities are concentrated. Some of the rented shops in a 
large shopping plaza may be recorded and assessed as owner-occupied. In a multi-
storeyed plaza, a whole floor might not be assessed at all. Since there are different tax 
rates for properties on main roads and off main roads, a corner property may be shown 
wholly off the main road and charged a lower tax rate. A property being used as an 
office with no signboards outside may be recorded as residential and charged 
accordingly. For instance, an official explaining the selective nature of collusion once 
remarked to me with a smile, “I do not know why all the petrol stations in my area are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  When	  the	  property	  tax	  bill	  is	  generated,	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  reflect	  the	  tax	  assessment	  shown	  in	  Property	  Tax	  Register-­‐8.	  However,	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  actual	  bill	  issued	  is	  not	  retained	  in	  office	  records.	  Neither	  do	  the	  bills	  have	  any	  universal	  identification	  number	  nor	  are	  they	  on	  officially	  supplied	  stationary.	  Circle	  staff	  members	  normally	  have	  to	  procure	  office	  stationary	  and	  various	  forms	  privately.	  They	  sometimes	  issue	  inflated	  bills	  and	  then	  offer	  to	  ‘reduce’	  taxpayers’	  liability	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  bribe,	  subsequently	  issuing	  the	  correct	  bill.	  I	  was	  told	  that	  this	  and	  similar	  practices	  of	  extortion	  are	  not	  encouraged	  within	  the	  informal	  setting	  of	  the	  department	  as	  they	  are	  considered	  risky.	  The	  probability	  of	  a	  complaint	  to	  higher	  authorities	  is	  greater	  in	  such	  cases	  compared	  to	  collusive	  practices	  where	  the	  taxpayer	  also	  gains	  financially.	  The	  assessing	  authority	  has	  powers	  to	  assess	  properties	  on	  a	  six-­‐monthly	  basis,	  which	  would	  require	  bi-­‐annual	  billing.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  usually	  done	  unless	  there	  is	  a	  large	  change	  in	  tax	  liability	  of	  a	  property.	  204	  For	  example,	  tax	  staff	  has	  the	  legal	  authority	  to	  fine	  a	  taxpayer	  for	  non-­‐payment,	  up	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  outstanding	  tax	  liability.	  However,	  this	  is	  almost	  never	  done.	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owner-operated!” He obviously meant that they were not. Since rented commercial 
properties are taxed five times more, this was where his team was making at least part 
of its informal earnings.  
Blatant misrepresentations run the risk of drawing the attention of the department’s 
Monitoring Wing. However, the Monitoring Wing is small, with staff based only at the 
provincial level and none at the regional level. If the Monitoring Wing or a senior 
officer on inspection unearths irregularities, the staff responsible can offer plausible 
excuses including that they do not properly understand the rules, they are understaffed 
and too busy to check on everything, or the property was put to a different use only 
recently. If disciplinary action is initiated and charges proven, officers normally emerge 
with minor penalties, which generally do not affect their jobs. While going through 
records of some of these disciplinary proceedings and summary sheets,205 I found that 
often the ‘loss to public exchequer’ was made good through payment ‘from the 
taxpayer’. That restitution was in turn cited as ‘mitigating circumstances’, for lenient 
decisions by inquiry officers. Since inquiry officers are appointed from within the tax 
department, they are usually sympathetic colleagues. No departmental staff, including 
those of the human resources wing in the Director General’s office, could remember 
anyone being dismissed from service because of ‘under-assessment’.  
• Fifth, as mentioned previously, there is a substantial informal economy 
associated with property tax collection. On the basis of conversations with the staff of 
six circles, I estimated that the average circle needed to raise about 35,000 Pakistan 
rupees (350 USD) per month to meet the operational costs not provided for in the 
official budget: notably informal office assistants, office stationery, fuel for motorcycles 
and even official vehicles that staff use, as well as other operating costs.206 This kind of 
‘living off the land’ is not unusual in the Pakistani bureaucracy. Senior officials justify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Performa	  “B”:	  Periodic	  summary	  report	  by	  Excise	  and	  Taxation	  Department	  giving	  details	  of	  finalized	  cases	  under	  various	  disciplinary	  rules	  including,	  Punjab	  Civil	  Servants’	  Efficiency	  and	  Disciplinary	  Rules,	  1975,	  1999,	  PROSO-­‐2000	  and	  PEEDA	  Act,	  2006.	  206	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  in	  2012,	  the	  government	  provided	  all	  Inspectors	  with	  official	  motorbikes.	  However,	  they	  are	  not	  given	  any	  money	  for	  the	  fuel.	  Prior	  to	  that,	  apart	  from	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  Regional	  Director	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  pick-­‐ups	  limited	  to	  Regional	  headquarters,	  provided	  in	  2010-­‐11,	  there	  was	  no	  official	  transport	  available	  for	  field	  operations.	  In	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  recent	  digitalisation	  project	  for	  property	  tax	  in	  Punjab,	  Khan	  and	  Inam	  (2014)	  point	  out	  that	  tax	  inspectors	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  electric	  generator	  fuel	  to	  run	  project	  computers.	  Ironically,	  this	  was	  in	  a	  project	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  substantially	  reduce	  tax	  collector	  discretion!	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providing inadequate operational budgets to tax offices on the grounds that the staff 
make a lot of money anyways. This is less true of the offices dealing with property tax 
than of other offices within the tax department. Positions in offices collecting excise 
duties on liquor and motor vehicle taxes are more lucrative and eagerly sought.  
The property tax field staff certainly supplement their salaries significantly with 
informal earnings. In investigating this, I focused more on the proportional division of 
these informal earnings than on absolute amounts. There were some variations from 
office to office, and cases of individual officers who did not participate at all. But the 
phenomenon is broadly systemic. It is very difficult for individuals to decline 
participating and continue to have satisfactory relationships with their co-workers. It 
would also impinge on their ability to run their Circles effectively. Reportedly, on 
average, about 60-70% of informal earnings are retained at the Circle level, with the 
Inspector taking more than half, and the Constable and the Clerk sharing the remainder. 
Operating costs are also met from this share, while the other 30-40% travels to higher 
levels of the bureaucracy. The bulk of it stays with the ETO and the AETO. I have no 
clear information on how consistently any of the money travels up to the office of the 
Regional Director and beyond. The Regional Director also oversees other offices of the 
ETD that collect the more lucrative excise and motor vehicle taxes. There is a 
perception that it is more appropriate (‘cleaner’, more honest) and less risky for the 
Regional Director to focus his attentions on these other offices than on property tax 
collection. In talking of informal earnings, staff may use the local term for ‘corruption’. 
But they do not see this as unusual or in any major sense wrong. The words of one 
officer summarise the general view: “We are all corrupt. You will not find a single 
officer in the Department who is honest… it is just that some are more corrupt than 
others.” 
Staff members also insist that the ETD officers do not become very wealthy even after a 
lifetime of work. Only a handful of officers have made a lot of money and brought a 
bad name to the department. But these were mostly the ‘blue-eyed’ favourites of their 
superiors who remained for long periods in highly lucrative postings, like one of the 
districts, which is the largest excise earner because of a large brewery located there. The 
fact that property tax collectors collude directly with taxpayers to share in the money 
that formally belongs to the public treasury provides a ready legitimation for their 
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behaviour: “the public saves 90 rupees and gives us only 10 rupees, and then they call 
us corrupt?” The sense of entitlement to informal earnings is strong. 
While there is a great deal of cooperation at the Circle level around informal activities, 
there is neither total trust nor openness, but rather a degree of individual vigilance and 
mutual suspicion. If an Inspector is not particularly active in cross-checking information 
by spending time in the street, the Constable can make additional money for himself by 
not pooling all ‘deals’ with the rest of the Circle staff. For example, he could keep a few 
newly constructed properties off the official record, or continue to record properties that 
have been rented out as owner-occupied. As an informant remarked,  
“The Constable always keeps one or two properties out of a hundred for himself… if the 
Inspector is old or not very vigilant the Constable and Clerk might collude and start 
running a side-show of their own.” 
Lack of external checks and weak monitoring mechanisms have helped a ‘rent-taking’ 
culture develop within the department where property tax collectors have ample 
opportunities for low-risk collusion due to tax policy rife with differential tax rates and 
a manual tax assessment and collection system. The high degree of discretion allowed 
and exercised, coupled with control of cadastral and tax collection information, is key to 
the pervasive informality. It is noteworthy that the lower level staff knows that it is 
necessary that the formal system of tax collection works just well enough that it does 
not jeopardize their pensionable jobs while they also work the system for personal gain. 
A distinct characteristic of their incentive structure is guarding their long-term interest 
of working actively in the Department. 
Though collusion is an important factor for low tax collection, a general lack of 
professionalism and shirking hard work amongst lower staff cannot be discounted. In 
fact such factors are exacerbated by the lack of routine supervision and inspections due 
to the pervasive informality in the Department. During my fieldwork, an ETO had given 
up on his Inspector due to his poor performance, and asked the Director to deal with 
him. The Director called in the delinquent Inspector, and exasperated by his excuses 
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said: “Out of a hundred, it is understandable if you know207 five or ten property owners. 
Why are you not collecting from the rest of them?”  
In the absence of any reliable estimate of the potential property tax revenues in the 
province, higher-level management resorts to setting arbitrary targets and pressuring 
Directors to achieve them. In the following section I demonstrate how this is undertaken 
and how tax collectors respond to these pressures. 
5.5 An office meeting, target-setting and managing information 
The Secretary of the ETD was chairing the regular monthly meeting in which the nine 
Regional Directors report on progress regarding their monthly tax collection targets. 
The Secretary was trying to increase the collection target for the Region for which 
Nikama was Director. Nikama refused to accept the revised target. He said it was 
unrealistic and unachievable. The Secretary then asked another Regional Director, 
Kamu, whether he could do the job if transferred to Nikama’s position. Kamu said that 
he was willing to try if the target was reduced a little. The Secretary turned to Nikama 
and asked him if he could try to achieve the reduced target. Nikama still declined. The 
Secretary had little choice but to replace Nikama with Kamu. He asked Nikama to 
report to headquarters for further orders. 208   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  ‘Know’	  used	  by	  the	  Director	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Inspector	  has	  collusive	  arrangements	  with	  them.	  208	  I	  received	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  this	  meeting	  from	  one	  of	  the	  participants.	  A	  new	  Secretary	  had	  recently	  joined	  to	  head	  the	  department	  and	  was	  keen	  to	  push	  for	  higher	  tax	  collection.	  Senior	  and	  normally	  well	  connected	  departmental	  officers	  are	  known	  to	  ‘test’	  the	  higher	  level	  management,	  confident	  that	  their	  political	  connections	  make	  them	  ‘untouchable’.	  Stories	  of	  such	  interactions	  spread	  rapidly	  in	  the	  Department	  after	  a	  new	  Secretary	  or	  Director	  General	  is	  posted.	  They	  reflect	  how	  ‘strong’	  (able	  to	  resist	  political	  pressure)	  the	  officer	  is.	  The	  staff	  usually	  molds	  themselves	  accordingly.	  In	  this	  particular	  case,	  a	  legal	  and	  political	  battle	  ensued	  between	  the	  Secretary	  and	  the	  displaced	  Director,	  which	  I	  witnessed	  in	  one	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  sites.	  The	  displaced	  Director	  was	  asked	  to	  report	  to	  head	  office	  and	  an	  inquiry	  was	  initiated	  against	  him.	  However,	  he	  filed	  a	  petition	  in	  a	  civil	  court	  against	  the	  order	  of	  the	  Secretary	  and	  obtained	  a	  ‘stay	  order’	  which,	  as	  he	  interpreted	  it,	  allowed	  him	  to	  continue	  working	  as	  Director.	  Apart	  from	  applying	  political	  pressure	  on	  the	  Secretary	  to	  restore	  him,	  he	  regularly	  showed	  up	  at	  the	  Director’s	  office	  claiming	  that	  he	  was	  still	  the	  Director.	  This	  caused	  considerable	  anguish	  to	  the	  new	  Director	  since	  it	  was	  eroding	  his	  authority	  over	  the	  staff.	  Eventually,	  the	  departmental	  Secretary	  approached	  the	  local	  district	  administration	  for	  support	  and	  police	  officers	  were	  deployed	  to	  the	  Director’s	  office.	  The	  displaced	  Director	  was	  warned	  of	  arrest	  if	  he	  showed	  up	  again.	  After	  exhausting	  all	  his	  options,	  he	  eventually	  reported	  to	  provincial	  headquarters	  to	  face	  the	  departmental	  inquiries	  initiated	  against	  him.	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The outcome of this meeting was quite consequential for the individuals involved. For 
Nikama, it represented a career setback. He had fallen out of favour with the Secretary, 
and could not expect to get a decent posting as long as this Secretary was in position – 
unless he could get a politician to intervene on his behalf. For Kamu this was a great 
opportunity. He was being transferred to a region that was more urbanized, and 
accordingly had more revenue potential, formally and informally. If he did well there, 
his next posting could be one of the three most desirable regional directorships in 
Lahore, the provincial capital. 
Aside from the consequences for individual careers, the meeting described above 
provides insight into some of the higher-level organisational processes around property 
taxation. I use it as an entry point complemented with additional insights from my 
fieldwork to further analyse the working of the department. Below I make five broad 
points. 
• Firstly, although in broad historical perspective the provincial government does 
not give priority to property tax collection and fails to exploit its potential, the goals of 
achieving annual revenue targets – and steadily increasing those targets (in cash terms) 
– do shape the behaviour of the senior and middle level public servants who oversee the 
property tax collection apparatus. As in the case of many ‘basic’ taxes levied on a large 
number of taxpaying entities in low income environments, the objectives set for tax 
collectors by their superiors are very simple: meet the collection target (Moore, 2013b). 
Achieving the target is virtually the only performance criterion. As long as revenue 
collection does not generate political unrest, the senior levels of the bureaucracy are 
unconcerned about how targets are met, or whether the means used to meet them might 
have adverse effects on future revenue raising capacity. 
The strategy for setting property tax collection targets is ‘incrementalist’. Targets are set 
in cash terms, initially much higher than the previous year’s collection (see figure 5.2). 
They are eventually revised down towards the end of the fiscal year.209 Senior officers 
believe that this is the best way to maintain pressure on subordinates to perform better 
than the previous year. Incremental target setting by higher level is largely a response to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209	  In	  order	  to	  balance	  the	  provincial	  budget,	  the	  Finance	  Department	  at	  times	  sets	  the	  tax	  collection	  estimates	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  previous	  year’s	  collection;	  note	  the	  variance	  in	  targets	  and	  actual	  collection	  for	  financial	  years	  2008-­‐09	  and	  2009-­‐10,	  in	  figure	  5.2.	  However,	  the	  ETD	  has	  its	  own	  internal	  collection	  targets	  which	  are	  incrementally	  higher	  than	  the	  previous	  year’s	  collection.	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absence of information on the total property tax potential in the province, as well as a 
credible figure on total outstanding arrears. In essence it really is a shot in the dark.  
Figure 5.2: Property tax collection target and actual210 
 
Source: Finance Department, Punjab 
Target setting alone does not suffice to pressure tax staff. It has to be followed up 
vigorously by the Secretary and the Director General. They tour districts throughout the 
province, conduct spot checks, and initiate disciplinary action against lower staff. 
Disciplinary action takes the form of posting some tax staff to remote districts or 
initiating inquiries if there is evidence to do so. Clearly, the outcome depends upon how 
aggressive the higher level is and how effectively it can use its authority. Meanwhile, 
the middle and lower levels may resort to dragging their feet, protecting each other, or 
using political influence to neutralize disciplinary action. At one point during my 
fieldwork, the Director General remarked out of sheer frustration, “We [Secretary and 
Director General]211 are fighting the whole department… it is not an easy task.” 
• Secondly, the higher level is not only handicapped in terms of accurate 
information but may at times be severely constrained in taking decisions for effective 
tax collection due to political interference. This interference usually takes the form of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  The	  sharp	  decline	  in	  financial	  year	  2007-­‐08	  is	  attributed	  to	  this	  being	  an	  election	  year,	  and	  a	  spate	  of	  terrorism	  and	  political	  violence	  including	  the	  assassination	  of	  Benazir	  Bhutto,	  a	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  head	  of	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  political	  parties.	  211	  Added	  by	  the	  author	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political pressure for transfers and posting of tax collectors at various levels and 
jurisdictions, as well as when enforcing tax collection – which I discuss in Chapter 6. 
The political patronage of lower government functionaries is common knowledge in 
Pakistan. It is not uncommon for lower-level departmental staff to be recruited into 
government jobs through political connections.212 These patronage-based relationships 
continue through their careers, protecting tax collectors from disciplinary action and 
helping them in getting ‘better’ (more lucrative) postings. Such relationships between 
political patrons and tax collectors are largely based on reciprocity, including regular 
payments and financial support during election campaigns.213  
One day during my fieldwork, the Director General and I were discussing management 
issues that impact property taxation when a ruling party politician walked into his 
office. After an exchange of pleasantries, he presented a list of three tax officers that he 
wanted posted to his constituency District claiming there were ‘complaints’ about the 
incumbents. The Director General promised to accommodate him the best he could. 
Reportedly, such requests from politicians are routine. Two former departmental 
Secretaries informed me that they had never been under so much pressure from 
politicians to post specific people as they experienced in the Punjab ETD. Other 
informants during the course of my fieldwork also emphasised the factor of political 
‘backing’ for tax staff that could be based on arrangements ranging from patronage to 
kinship. The Secretary and Director General normally do not have strong incentives to 
disrupt these relationships because they do not want to upset too many politicians and 
jeopardize their standing with the ruling party. When discussing postings in various 
offices throughout my fieldwork, tax staff members were quite open about naming 
officers who managed better postings, as well as politician who were ‘at their back’. 
• Thirdly, there is a clear disjuncture, in respect to time horizons, between field-
level tax staff and higher-level management. Supervisory staff members, including 
Regional Directors and ETOs, are usually rotated after two or three years. But the circle 
staff members are rarely moved out of their circles or districts, except as punishment in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  212	  Gazetted	  officers	  (grade	  17	  and	  above)	  are	  recruited	  through	  a	  competitive	  process	  by	  an	  autonomous	  provincial	  Public	  Services	  Commission.	  Lower	  ranks	  like	  Inspectors,	  Clerks	  and	  Constables	  can	  be	  recruited	  directly	  by	  the	  Department.	  Because	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure	  from	  politicians	  pushing	  their	  candidates	  for	  these	  jobs,	  at	  times	  the	  government	  requests	  the	  Commission	  to	  recruit	  Inspector	  level	  positions	  as	  well.	  213	  These	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  lower	  rungs	  of	  the	  civil	  service.	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instances of serious or repeated complaints.214 They are concerned about how their 
behaviour today might affect their capacity to work and earn informally in the future. 
By contrast, the higher level is strongly present-oriented, as they are in positions that 
they are unlikely to be occupying in more than a years’ time. From their perspective, it 
is this year’s target that matters, hence their focus on monthly and quarterly targets. 
During the course of my doctorate, from 2010 to 2014, the average tenure of the 
Secretary and Director General was about a year. 
• Fourthly, the disjuncture of time scales between higher and lower levels of the 
ETD is mirrored in the high level of information inequality between the two levels. 
Field level staff has rich and detailed information in their heads and in their private 
records on the actual or potential property tax base. The fraction of the relevant 
information that is in the official records exists in hand-written ledgers in the Circle 
offices, as explained in section 5.3. It is not routinely aggregated for transmission 
upward to higher levels. If higher-level officers want to access that information – or 
indeed find out almost anything else about the process beyond aggregate collection 
figures – they have to resort to physical inspections of lower level offices and records. 
Inspections can be intimidating for those on the receiving end, but they are very 
inefficient and largely ineffective ways of accessing information that might be useful in 
gauging the real performance or tax revenue potential of jurisdictions. 
 
The asymmetry of information on property tax arrears is in many respects at the heart of 
information asymmetry. It is one of the most important instruments used by lower level 
staff to deal with the performance targets that descend on them from above with much 
apparent hierarchical force. It would be hard to grasp the informality of property tax 
collection without understanding what can reasonably be termed as ‘the arrears system’. 
Property tax arrears are large relative to annual collections. The ETD has no aggregate 
figures, but knowledgeable people estimate arrears to be upwards of 30% of annual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  Tax	  staff	  turnover	  in	  smaller	  districts	  is	  lower	  compared	  to	  larger	  ones.	  Since	  smaller	  districts	  do	  not	  have	  much	  potential	  for	  informal	  earnings;	  there	  is	  little	  political	  pressure	  for	  postings	  to	  these	  districts.	  It	  is	  usually	  officers	  that	  belong	  to	  these	  districts	  who	  prefer	  to	  stay	  there.	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collections.215 Accurate figures are available only locally, and to Circle level staff. A 
Regional Director described to me how he once summoned a Circle Inspector to ask 
about the extent of his arrears. The Inspector reported that they amounted to about 20 
million rupees (200,000 USD). When asked to bring all his registers to the Regional 
office for inspection, the Inspector revised that figure to 40 million rupees. By the time 
he arrived with the registers, his estimate was 50 million. The Director guessed that, had 
he taken the time to go through the registers, the real figure might have been double that 
amount, but he did not have the time to check. Written information on arrears exists 
only in the registers, where it should be recorded property by property. Inspectors 
should have separate registers that list out all properties in arrears along with sums 
outstanding. However, supervisors rarely crosscheck these. Similarly, as mentioned 
earlier, collections of current dues and of arrears are not accounted for separately either 
by the banks that actually collect the property tax or by the provincial Accountant 
General. Thus, senior officers only receive aggregate tabulated figures for monthly and 
annual property tax collection from the Accountant General. They are presented with 
figures on monthly and annual ‘collections’ disaggregated to ‘arrears’ and ‘current’ by 
the field staff. Senior officers do not know the quantity of accumulated arrears, nor can 
they independently verify the disaggregated figures provided to them.  
Accumulated arrears are not simply the result of the inability or unwillingness of the 
Circle staff to persuade property owners to pay on time. They also reflect the fact that 
Circle staff sometimes actively encourages property owners to accumulate arrears. Why 
would they do such a thing? There seem to be several interacting reasons. One is that it 
gives field staff some leverage over the taxpayer concerned. The law gives revenue staff 
considerable authority to deal with property taxpayers in arrears. Under the provincial 
revenue collection laws, they can institute legal proceedings for the recovery of 
‘outstanding government dues’ and, without court permission, impound moveable 
property (like vehicles), ‘seal’ (lock up) immoveable property to prevent access by the 
owner, ‘attach’ the rent of the property, or even arrest the owner. These powers are 
rarely used, but field staff members seem to find it useful to have some of their clients 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	  Arrears	  are	  highly	  variable	  and	  are	  reportedly	  much	  higher	  in	  certain	  regions/	  districts	  compared	  to	  others.	  In	  my	  fieldwork	  sites,	  officers	  estimated	  these	  to	  be	  between	  30%	  and	  400%	  of	  the	  current	  annual	  demand.	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in a position where, in principle, such actions may be taken. 216 Enforcement and its 
impact on tax collection are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Second, and perhaps more significant, is the scope for staff and property owners to 
collude to accumulate large arrears on a rented property. After a few years, staff can 
orchestrate an appeal by the owner on the grounds that the property had been self-
occupied the whole time and that he was, for example, living abroad. The appellant 
authority in such cases is the Regional Director. He is reliant on his local Inspector’s 
field report to decide the case. During my fieldwork I observed a number of such cases 
presented to the Regional Directors. Most cases were decided in favour of the taxpayers, 
reducing their liability or arrears. It is hard to say whether the Directors were colluding 
in such cases but they did not seem to have much evidence apart from the Inspector’s 
report to make their decision. 
Third, there is a collective incentive for lower level staff to encourage the accumulation 
of arrears because it helps them buffer demands from above. This takes us back to the 
meeting described in the beginning of this section. Revenue targets for property tax do 
not reflect any sophisticated, informed analysis of changes in underlying revenue bases. 
They are set by variable combinations of pure incrementalism (last year’s figure plus a 
standard percentage increase) and the kind of strategic games played at that meeting by 
the Secretary to find out how he could best squeeze out a little more given all the 
constraints. He may have been assuming that middle level officers (Directors) would 
have more information than he had available on the real revenue potential of each 
regional office. In that case, the small bidding war for the Director’s post might serve to 
unearth that information. Alternatively, or equally, he might have been banking on 
Kamu to be more aggressive than Nikama in badgering and bullying his staff, notably 
by a blitz of inspections, to suck out a little more money. This makes no difference to 
the tax officer or staff of the Circle level. They know that these kinds of higher level 
manoeuvring can at any moment subject them to demands for more money that would 
be painful if they had to either sacrifice their own informal earnings or upset their 
taxpayers by reneging on some collusive assessment deals. The arrears system – and it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  The	  head	  of	  the	  tax	  department’s	  monitoring	  unit	  informed	  me	  that	  during	  one	  of	  his	  spot	  record	  inspections,	  he	  discovered	  that	  an	  inspector	  had	  failed	  to	  carry	  forward	  the	  record	  of	  arrears	  to	  the	  new	  registers	  that	  he	  had	  prepared,	  virtually	  (officially)	  wiping	  off	  all	  arrears	  in	  his	  circle.	  He	  had	  moved	  all	  arrears	  in	  his	  jurisdiction	  into	  the	  informal	  zone,	  thus	  increasing	  his	  personal	  discretion	  regarding	  when	  and	  how	  to	  use	  them.	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does make sense to term it a ‘system’ – helps them deal with these unpredictable 
pressures in two ways. First, they can press for payments of arrears when in real need of 
money, and allow arrears to accumulate again once the pressure is relaxed. Second, the 
absence of any separate aggregated figures for collections of arrears and of current dues 
makes it impossible for senior staff to prevent this kind of response.    
• Lastly, in order to circumvent information asymmetry, higher-level management 
creates incentives for the middle level to collaborate to achieve revenue targets. The 
middle level comprises senior departmental officers who are either close to retirement, 
having started in relatively junior positions, or relatively younger who were direct 
recruits as Inspectors or ETOs. During my fieldwork year, higher-level management 
decided to sideline some of the older officers who were considered ‘incorrigible’ and 
posted younger ones, who would usually have had to wait longer before occupying 
important Regional Director positions. Not senior enough to be posted as Directors, 
some of these officers were granted postings on ‘acting charge’, a tactic normally used 
to keep the officer on his toes and compliant to his superiors. Officers falling short of 
expectations can then be returned to positions of their actual seniority. I observed such 
officers to be quite active and aggressive in pursuing revenue targets by accompanying 
Circle staff in the field for enforcement and conducting inspections (see Chapter 6).  
5.6  Conclusion 
The informality of tax collection is systematic and provides tax collectors stable rents 
through selective collusive arrangements. It is largely non-extortionist, and rents 
extracted are at the expense of government revenue. These rents are mostly generated 
from properties that have relatively larger tax liabilities. Current arrangements are the 
product of repeated interactions, both within the formal boundaries of the property tax 
system and across them. 
In a regime of weak supervision, irregular inspections, almost non-existent external and 
internal auditing, and manual record keeping, coupled with high level of discretion that 
Circle staff exercises, rent-taking is an expected outcome. Though it can be considered 
‘petty’ corruption at the local level, the systemic nature of the informality has 
substantial impact on property tax revenues. Although it is selective, mostly exploiting 
rate differentials and, at times, exemptions allowed under existing tax policy, it has a 
deep negative impact on the working of the Department. The informal working of the 
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ETD encroaches on formal roles and responsibilities of the A/ETOs and the Regional 
Directors who, as part of the ‘system’, are then constrained in exercising their respective 
roles effectively. They are mostly content with office-bound management while the 
lower level staff ‘runs’ the department. Even when there is pressure to collect more 
taxes and middle level staff is pushed into action, then, as I discuss in Chapter 6, they 
focus primarily on enforcing collection of outstanding bills and not re-assessing 
properties. 
The informality of tax collection centres on information asymmetries that exist between 
the higher and lower levels of the tax department. Lower level staff monopolizes 
information on tax assessment, collection, and arrears to their benefit over the medium 
to long term to achieve two primary objectives: Firstly, to earn adequate informal 
income which is shared throughout the hierarchy of the tax office and to finance the tax 
functions at the Circle and office levels. Secondly, to maintain an adequate buffer to 
manage year-on-year incremental increases in tax collection that ensures their continuity 
in their jobs. 
In the absence of accurate information about the tax base, the higher level manipulates 
and pressures the middle level tax staff to increase tax collection. The incentive 
mechanism to elicit cooperation from the middle level is based on posting and transfers 
to what are considered better jurisdictions, and being given charge of ‘acting’ positions 
in higher positions to relatively junior tax officers. Given that they have a better sense 
of the tax potential as well as the informal working of the Department, they are better 
placed to squeeze more work and tax revenue from the lower level. This is not 
necessarily at the cost of collusive arrangements. Accumulated arrears and un-assessed 
pockets of properties provide buffers to resist exactly this sort of pressure. However, the 
middle level tax officers are also part of the system and know that the following year 
will have similar pressures from the top. I discuss some of these issues in more detail in 
the next chapter, which explains departmental functioning during an unusual 
enforcement drive. 
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6 Enforcement: The mirage of change 
6.1 Introduction 
Pervasive informality within the Excise and Taxation Department (ETD), discussed in 
the previous chapter, creates a range of obstacles to increasing revenue from property 
tax. One is that tax collectors create a buffer, in the form of tax arrears, which they can 
use when they come under particularly strong pressure to deliver more revenues. These 
pressures normally intensify in the last quarter of the financial year, from April to June. 
Fortunately for me, my fieldwork coincided with an exceptionally intensive drive to 
raise revenues, in the last quarter of financial year 2011-12. The senior management of 
the ETD was particularly keen to be seen to be performing well. According to the 
departmental staff, the level of enforcement activity was significantly greater than 
normal.   
In this chapter, I discuss the working of the ETD under extraordinary pressure to 
increase tax collection. Most of this pressure was channelled into the collection of 
arrears, following up on and taking legal action against tax defaulters. Despite a veneer 
of increased formal working, I find that even during a period of strict enforcement the 
fundamental working of the department did not change. Pressure for increased tax 
collection was created by the departmental leadership with support from the political 
executive. Strict enforcement implies that outstanding dues and arrears are pursued 
vigorously and collected. The strategies used to enforce follow mostly formal legal 
procedures that protect tax staff from litigation and complaints. Despite a relatively high 
level of political support from the top, multiple underlying factors that impact tax 
collection did not change. These factors are embedded and long-term, including 
personal and social affiliations that tax staff might have with local politicians. The 
knowledge that strictness in the Department is only temporary and things can revert to 
normal rapidly after the end of the financial year or when senior management is 
changed deter tax collectors from pursuing tax collection aggressively. Tax collectors 
have instituted a practice of ‘part-payment’, as a way of affecting partial recovery while 
at the same time responding to ground realities, like political connections, pressures, 
protecting collusive arrangements or simply taxpayers’ ability to pay. Though strictly 
not allowed under the property tax rules, part-payment implies payment by the tax 
defaulter of a portion of his/her outstanding dues or arrears. The exact amount is usually 
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negotiated between the defaulter and the tax collectors; this adds to the discretion 
exercised by tax collectors. As discussed in detail in this chapter and the previous one, 
there are reasons why tax staff might want arrears to remain uncollected.  
In section 6.2, I briefly explain why enforcement was exceptionally intense during 2012 
when I was doing my doctoral fieldwork and how it changed the way tax staff work. In 
section 6.3 I highlight the tactics used during enforcement by the supervisory staff. In 
section 6.4, I show how civil courts can impede tax collection and influence the 
behaviour of tax collectors. In section 6.5, I show that tax collectors continue to use 
discretion even during periods of formally strict enforcement. In section 6.6, I explain 
why despite this unusual episode of enforcement, there was no long-term change in tax 
collection or the ways in which local level relationships are configured. The last section 
concludes. 
6.2 Enforcement in the last quarter 
Part of my fieldwork,217 the period from April to June, coincided with the last quarter of 
the fiscal year. Under pressure from the Finance Department to meet annual collection 
targets, the ETD usually enforces tax collection in the last quarter. Senior officers of the 
ETD pressure middle and lower level tax staff to meet targets set for each Region/ 
District. There was a noticeable increase in the activity of tax staff compared to the 
previous quarters. Tax staff told me that enforcement activity in this particular year was 
greater than usual.  
The driving force behind this unusually aggressive enforcement was the new Secretary, 
who had been posted to head the ETD earlier that year. He is known for his aggressive 
and demanding professional nature as well as close personal links to the provincial 
Chief Minister. 218 Over the course of the year, strong support from the Chief Minister 
helped the Secretary to protect the ETD from political interference in the department’s 
administrative matters. The Secretary ensured that postings and transfers of tax staff 
were not decided on recommendations of politicians but were instead largely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	  From	  September	  2011	  to	  September	  2012	  218	  The	  Secretary	  is	  quite	  ambitious	  and	  has	  a	  reputation	  for	  being	  tough	  on	  his	  subordinates.	  He	  was	  prematurely	  posted	  out	  of	  two	  departments	  he	  headed	  earlier	  because	  his	  harsh	  attitude	  resulted	  in	  departmental	  staff	  to	  go	  on	  strike.	  He	  probably	  took	  his	  ETD	  posting	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  his	  ability	  to	  deliver	  on	  targets.	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performance-based. Both the departmental Secretary and the Director General were 
strict in disciplining staff and conducted random field inspections throughout the 
province, selectively replacing some of the Regional Directors. To ensure better 
compliance,219 some relatively less senior officers were offered Director level positions 
in an acting capacity.220 Gradually, the senior management built pressure for higher 
revenue collection by signalling to tax staff that they would face sanctions for non-
performance. Disciplinary action was initiated against errant staff. 221 More importantly, 
some on-going disciplinary cases were finalized and harsh punishments were delivered 
to tax officials found guilty, including dismissal from service. Such stiff penalties 
unsettled tax staff considerably since, as mentioned in Chapter 5, disciplinary cases in 
the department usually concluded with minor penalties for errant officials. Lighter 
penalties scarcely impact on careers or posting prospects, and thus provide no incentive 
for errant officials to alter their behaviour. In addition, senior officers signalled to lower 
level staff that they would be protected from any political repercussions that might 
result from enforcing tax collection. Normally, tax staff avoid enforcing collection from 
influential taxpayers, including ruling party politicians and their supporters, for fear of 
punitive action, such as being posted to remote districts.  
During this period of strict enforcement, some chronic cases of tax default and some 
politically sensitive cases were vigorously pursued by tax officials. Tax Inspectors and 
Constables wore their uniforms to work regularly. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this is 
not the usual practice. Enforcement involved a number of sanctions on taxpayers in 
arrears, including sealing properties that have outstanding property tax dues – which I 
discuss in detail in section 6.3. Public visits to the tax office and generally the level of 
activity in the tax offices increased significantly compared to previous quarters. Tax 
defaulters eager to avoid enforcement would present their payment receipts, apply for 
remission or appeal against assessment. Sometimes tax defaulters came in groups: for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219	  Officers	  are	  normally	  rotated	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  new	  fiscal	  year	  (in	  July),	  so	  as	  to	  have	  continuity	  of	  management	  through	  the	  fiscal	  year.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  hard	  and	  fast	  rule.	  For	  example,	  in	  one	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  regions	  the	  Director	  was	  posted	  just	  before	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  the	  financial	  year	  (consequent	  to	  the	  episode	  I	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  220	  ‘Acting	  charge’	  is	  the	  term	  commonly	  used	  when	  an	  officer	  is	  posted	  to	  a	  position	  which	  is	  above	  his	  seniority	  level	  in	  the	  civil	  service.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  such	  postings	  are	  coveted	  and	  fear	  of	  reversion	  makes	  officers	  extra	  compliant	  to	  higher	  management.	  	  221	  According	  to	  official	  data	  from	  the	  Director	  General’s	  office	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  of	  100%	  in	  new	  disciplinary	  cases	  initiated	  against	  tax	  staff	  by	  the	  senior	  management	  in	  FY	  2011-­‐12	  compared	  to	  FY	  2010-­‐11.	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example, shopkeepers from a market where most shops had been sealed. Local 
politicians often accompanied them. Defaulters pleaded their cases and requested 
remissions or more time for payment. Directors and tax officers were inundated with 
phone calls from ministers, politicians, other civil servants or relatives interceding on 
behalf of defaulters. The last quarter was hectic for tax staff, who juggled their time 
between issuing final notices to tax defaulters, following up on individual cases, 
pursuing cases in civil courts – where taxpayers sometimes file cases against 
enforcement – and sealing and de-sealing properties. 
Sometimes when a defaulter paid up a large overdue tax bill, there was a sense of 
achievement and pride among tax staff. Expressions such as “we are the Government… 
this is our job” could be heard in staff conversations. As one experienced tax collector 
remarked, “we are always ready to do this [enforcement]222 … it is the seniors [higher 
management] who don’t want to face the [political] pressures.”223 Notwithstanding 
these sporadic outbursts of enthusiasm, generally enforcement was a challenging task 
for supervisory officers.  
6.3 How supervisors ensure enforcement 
Enforcing tax collection requires the constant support of the political executive. 
However, that alone is not enough; the senior management has to constantly ensure that 
tax staff follow rules and procedures stipulated in the tax laws. For much of the year the 
departmental Secretary attempted to bring the ways in which tax staff conducted their 
job in line with formal rules. His efforts culminated in the last quarter of the financial 
year. Regional Directors, motivated by the Secretary to push for greater tax collection 
(as I showed in Chapter 5), followed the Secretary’s lead. Regional Directors are crucial 
to tax collection both in their supervisory capacity and as appellate authority on tax 
assessments.224 As remarked by one Tax Inspector, an information technology expert 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222	  Added	  by	  author	  223	  Although	  I	  don’t	  have	  any	  direct	  evidence	  to	  support	  this	  but	  it	  is	  generally	  known	  that	  ‘strictness’	  on	  part	  of	  the	  government	  or	  higher	  management	  increases	  the	  negotiating	  power	  of	  government	  officials	  within	  collusive	  arrangements	  	  –	  that	  might	  partly	  explain	  this	  exuberance.	  224	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  Regional	  Director	  is	  mostly	  limited	  to	  the	  Regional	  headquarter	  district	  that	  he	  is	  located	  in,	  which	  is	  usually	  the	  largest	  city	  in	  the	  Region.	  The	  Director’s	  role	  requires	  his	  physical	  presence	  and	  daily	  monitoring	  of	  staff	  activities.	  This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  replicated	  in	  other	  districts	  within	  his	  jurisdiction,	  partly	  because	  it	  is	  physically	  not	  possible	  without	  neglecting	  his	  headquarter	  city.	  Large	  urban	  centres	  are	  an	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with a masters’ degree in management sciences: “the culture of the tax office is 
determined by the Regional Director. He sets our pace of work, through example.”   
Regional Directors have sufficient experience of working at junior levels in the ETD to 
know the nuances of the tax collection business. Even when posted to Regions in which 
they have not worked previously, Regional Directors can effectively push staff for 
higher tax collections. Regional Directors cultivate a couple of ETOs and Inspectors in 
the Regional office. One would see them having tea with the Director once or twice 
during the course of the day. These collaborators from the local staff are important to 
the success of the Director.  They share vital information about the Region, for example, 
identifying the tax Circles to which the Director needs to give more attention, or telling 
on an unusually corrupt Inspector. Some tax staff tend to step forward with such 
information because they might have been side-lined during the tenure of a previous 
Director and/or want to earn favour with their present Director.  
Generally tax staff are reluctant to change their pace or ways of working. The majority 
of them require close supervision. The attitude of lower tax staff is similar to Scott’s 
(1985; pp.29-35) depiction of relatively ‘powerless’ groups whose weapons of resisting 
authority are, 
“… foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, ….they require little or no 
coordination or planning… and they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation 
with authority… Seen in the light of a supportive subculture and the knowledge that the 
risk to any single resister is generally reduced to the extent that the whole community is 
involved….”  
Regional Directors constantly pressure lower level tax staff to enforce collection. 
Below, I enumerate some of the tactics used by Directors that mainly involve 
emphasising formal roles, following rules and increased supervision. 
• First, Inspectors and Constables are obliged to wear their uniforms when on 
official duty, during the last quarter. No one wore uniforms in previous quarters; this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  obvious	  priority	  because	  of	  the	  large	  property	  tax	  base.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  absence	  of	  enforcement	  in	  smaller	  cities	  and	  towns.	  But	  I	  did	  not	  find	  the	  Directors	  show	  too	  much	  interest	  in	  smaller	  cities/	  districts	  apart	  from	  making	  a	  phone	  call	  to	  the	  ETOs	  daily	  to	  inquire	  about	  progress,	  and	  occasional	  short	  visits.	  
 
 
164 
changed in two out of the three Regions where I witnessed aggressive enforcement.225 
The Directors told me that wearing uniforms has a psychological effect on the officials 
as well as the taxpayers, sending out a clear signal that it is not business-as-usual. The 
uniform of the Tax Inspectors and Constables is very similar to that of the police. Only 
the shoulder straps and caps signify that they belong to the ETD. This subtle difference 
is not generally evident to the public. The idea is to create a deterrent against attacks by 
tax defaulters; sealing operations especially can easily get out of hand and people are 
usually reluctant to assault officials who appear to be the police. 
  
• Second, when enforcing tax collection, teams of tax staff comprising two or 
three Inspectors and five to six Constables are sent out to a Circle. This is in contrast to 
earlier quarters where only the Circle field staff – the Inspector and the Constable – 
collect taxes. Sending out teams is an effective cross-check on the Circle staff, as larger 
numbers ensure that fewer things stay secret. At times, Inspectors themselves request 
team visits to their Circles. They use these team visits as an excuse – ‘pressure from 
above’ and ‘inspection visits by higher officials’ – to pursue tax collection in their 
Circles more aggressively. Team visits also provide them some face-saving in case they 
have to renege on some of their collusive agreements. In one instance, prior to the 
enforcement visit to his Circle, the Circle Inspector requested the Director to instruct the 
‘visiting’ Inspector to “act as his boss”. Enforcement teams are sent out in one or two 
vans painted in police colours. An officer pointed out that these vans have a tremendous 
impact on defaulters, especially in affluent areas. Tax defaulters promise to pay up and 
request Inspectors to not come to their houses ‘with police’ as it “dishonours them in 
the eyes of their neighbours.” 
 
• Third, at times the Director accompanies enforcement teams, especially to areas 
considered relatively troublesome. Some markets and congested inner city 
neighbourhoods are notorious for roughing up and chasing away tax collectors. A 
Director told me that a certain area was being portrayed by the Circle staff as 
particularly dangerous and, according to the staff, whenever they go there “people are 
ready to bite them!” The Director made a point to accompany the enforcement team to 
this area, sealed fifty properties and then gathered the shopkeepers in the bazaar to warn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  I	  observed	  enforcement	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  in	  three	  different	  Regions.	  Later	  I	  point	  out	  why	  one	  Region	  out	  of	  these	  three	  had	  relatively	  weak	  enforcement.	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them to clear their tax dues. He then challenged them, at the same time taunting his own 
staff and asked, “so which one of you here bites?” Another Director (that I 
accompanied to the field during enforcement) sent out teams every morning and then 
randomly checked on them in the field personally throughout the day. This prevented 
staff from going home early as they did not know when he would call their cell phones 
to locate and meet them. 
 
• Fourth, for effective enforcement, Directors have to convince their staff that they 
will be protected from any political fall-out of strict enforcement. The following 
incident is an excellent example of such protection. As I walked into the Director’s 
office one morning I found a number of ETOs having tea with him. They were 
discussing a sealing operation from the previous evening that had made headline news 
in local television. A Tax Inspector had sealed the main city office of a large opposition 
political party, a move dubbed by media as ‘political victimization’ by the ruling party. 
Annoyed at this unwanted negative publicity, the ruling party’s leadership asked the 
departmental Secretary to identify and punish the tax staff responsible for this mischief. 
The Secretary in turn asked the Director for names of the staff so that he could suspend 
them from duty. The Director explained to the Secretary that all legal formalities had 
been followed in the operation. He added that the property owner refused to clear his 
considerable arrears because he thought the ETD would not enforce collection (by 
sealing) because such a move would be politically sensitive. However, the Secretary 
insisted on getting the names of the tax officials involved. The Director, wanting to 
protect his staff, replied that he had sealed the property personally and was not 
accompanied by any of his staff. Realising the Director’s firm position, the Secretary 
assured him that he would deal with the political bosses and that the Director should 
issue a press release stating the case facts. The incident greatly increased the Director’s 
standing and reputation with his staff. He had risked his own job to protect the 
Inspector. Normally, when taking a stand for his subordinates an officer expects them to 
reciprocate, by working for him sincerely. He expects them to deliver on targets set by 
superiors and not compromise him professionally. 
 
• Fifth, every morning the Director holds a progress meeting with all tax officers 
and Inspectors to discuss the recovery of current dues as well as arrears, for each Circle. 
He asks Inspectors if they need his support for a particularly tough case and if anyone 
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wants him to come along to a difficult site for sealing properties. Updates on 
problematic default cases are shared and recovery strategies discussed. According to 
their performance, tax staff are appreciated, cajoled and at times threatened by the 
Director. The threat of disciplinary action is used constantly by Directors to keep 
Inspectors alert. At one of these meetings, the Director, upset with slow progress, 
warned that if staff did not improve he would “withdraw his promise of immunity 
against Tax Inspectors’ past actions.” He warned that he would start scrutinising their 
assessments and records more closely and initiate inquires. 
 
• Sixth, tax collectors find sealing properties to be the most convenient way of 
enforcing collection. In the case of continued non-payment of government dues, the 
outstanding amount is declared as arrears under the Land Revenue Act.226 The land 
revenue laws from the colonial period are particularly harsh on tax defaulters. They give 
a wide choice of coercive measures to tax collectors including arrest of defaulter, 
distress and sale of moveable property, attachment and sale of immoveable property, 
etc. Any of these actions can be taken once legally prescribed processes of issuing 
multiple notices are completed. Sealing a property signifies that the government has 
taken possession227 of it with the intention of auctioning it in the event that outstanding 
government dues are not cleared within a certain time period. Previously, the tax staff 
usually arrested defaulters but that added to administrative costs, amongst other 
complications, partly because the ETD does not have its own detention facility.228 For 
some years now, tax staff have found sealing properties to be a very effective and 
administratively convenient means of enforcing collection. However, non-observance of 
prior legal formalities can have repercussions for tax staff and may disrupt the 
collection process, if defaulters challenge the process or its legality in the civil courts.  
Sealing commercial properties can be difficult especially when these are a cluster of 
shops or a whole market. There is always a risk of physical resistance from defaulters. It 
is generally easier to avoid this by undertaking sealing operations early in the morning, 
before shops open. Enforcement action against well-organised groups of defaulters 
located in the same area, like shopkeepers, often elicits political pressure as well. 
However, once businesses are sealed the negotiating position of defaulters diminishes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  Under	  Sections	  74-­‐81	  of	  West	  Pakistan	  Land	  Revenue	  Act,	  1967	  227	  The	  legal	  term	  normally	  used	  is	  ‘attaching’	  the	  property.	  228	  The	  department	  maintains	  one	  small	  lock-­‐up	  in	  Lahore.	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considerably because their business losses accumulate with each day of closure. 
Residential properties are relatively easier to seal but, after some instances of being 
taken to court by residents for being ‘illegally confined’, tax collectors are now very 
careful when it comes to sealing residential properties. The principle they follow is 
simple: seal residential property in a way that does not obstruct residents’ movement in 
or out of the property. The objective is to inconvenience residents and burden them with 
the social stigma of having their house sealed. Sealing residential properties normally 
implies locking the main gate so that vehicles cannot be taken out, while leaving a side 
entrance open. If there is only one entrance to the house then they use a chain and a lock 
so that the gate opens just enough to let a person through. Once properties are sealed, 
defaulters usually do not tamper with the locks. Breaking the lock and official seal 
creates legal complications for the defaulter as the tax staff may register a police case 
under a criminal act. Though there are exceptions, defaulters are generally aware of this 
and avoid getting involved in a criminal offence due to the possibility of arrest and 
extortion by the police. 
6.4 Civil courts impede enforcement229  
Despite being legally barred230 from interfering in tax collection, civil courts231 often 
halt or reverse enforcement action on applications filed by defaulters. Partly due to the 
recent wave of judicial activism in Pakistan, civil courts normally entertain cases 
against enforcement and issue a ‘stay order’ – a judicial order maintaining the status 
quo, which stops the government from taking any further action to recover tax revenues. 
Stay is granted despite the fact that it is normally used only where an action by the 
government is expected to harm the interest of the plaintiff irreversibly, for example, 
demolishing a building. This is clearly not so in the case of tax recovery since money 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229	  See	  Leiven	  (2011),	  Chapter	  3	  generally	  and	  especially	  pp.107-­‐118,	  for	  an	  illuminating	  account	  of	  how	  the	  court	  system	  works	  in	  Pakistan.	  230	  Under	  various	  laws	  civil	  (lower)	  courts	  have	  no	  legal	  authority	  to	  entertain	  cases	  involving	  recovery	  of	  government	  dues.	  For	  example	  under,	  Section	  22	  of	  Punjab	  Urban	  Immoveable	  Property	  Tax	  Law,	  1958;	  and	  Land	  Revenue	  Act,	  1967.	  231	  Lower	  courts	  have	  no	  legal	  role	  under	  property	  tax	  law.	  Higher	  courts	  have	  appellate	  jurisdiction	  in	  cases	  where	  assessment	  is	  challenged	  by	  taxpayers.	  Provincial	  High	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  third	  and	  fourth	  appellate	  authorities	  respectively	  for	  assessment	  cases;	  the	  first	  and	  second	  being	  the	  Regional	  Director	  and	  Executive	  District	  Officer	  (Finance)	  of	  the	  district	  government.	  Thus	  for	  a	  case	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  a	  High	  court	  the	  taxpayer	  should	  already	  have	  appealed	  (and	  been	  rejected)	  at	  the	  first	  two	  levels.	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can be refunded if at any stage assessment is found to be excessive. Moreover, a stay is 
normally granted when a case of appeal against assessment, for example, is underway in 
a court. The logic of such stay orders is that the government should not take any action 
until the court decides the case. Violation of a stay order can lead to contempt of court 
proceedings against government functionaries. Normally, tax collectors do not flout 
court orders.  
The tax staff informed me that civil courts entertain cases against tax enforcement on 
the basis of infringement of human rights. Issuance of stay orders, once these 
complaints have been accepted for hearing, is routine and an impediment to 
enforcement. Although the phenomenon is not widespread – one tax officer estimated 
that it comprises no more than one percent of property tax default for Lahore – it can 
affect tax collection in a number of ways. First, although the cases are not large in 
number they usually involve large amounts of outstanding dues, making it more feasible 
for defaulters to pursue litigation.232 Second, tax collectors allege that, in a corrupt 
judicial system, defaulters can bribe court clerks to obtain a stay order. In addition, 
bribes are made to ensure that once the stay order is granted, the case does not come up 
for hearing for several months. Stay orders are issued without hearing the tax 
department’s representative. If tax collectors are not given an opportunity to present 
their case, the stay order can be prolonged indefinitely. Third, in the absence of legal 
support from the department, tax staff have to pursue court cases themselves, which 
costs them time and money – an Inspector usually pays out of his own pocket to get 
legal help in drafting replies to the petition etc. Daily court-case lists are long and 
reportedly getting a case higher up on the list requires bribing court clerks. A single 
hearing in court can tie up an Inspector for a whole day. At the end of the day, he 
usually finds that the hearing has been postponed and is given another date.  
For reasons mentioned above, tax collectors try not to encourage defaulters to go to 
courts, and have low incentives to pursue cases if they do. Only a few high-profile cases 
are pursued by a small legal team in the Secretary’s office.233 Cases of property tax 
arrears that are not recoverable due to on-going cases in courts are estimated to account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	  For	  example,	  semi-­‐autonomous	  government	  organisations	  like	  power	  companies	  and	  the	  Pakistan	  Cricket	  Board.	  233	  This	  team	  normally	  deals	  with	  routine	  cases	  against	  the	  ETD	  in	  the	  higher	  courts.	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for less than one percent of the total number of defaults.234 So what about the other 
ninety nine percent? In the section below I show that continued use of discretion on the 
part of tax collectors, even during episodes of strict enforcement, may partly explain 
overall low level of tax collection despite periods when pressure to collect is high. 
6.5 Persistent informality 
In this section, I show that the tax collectors, including the middle and lower level of the 
ETD hierarchy, continue using their discretion during periods of strict enforcement, as I 
witnessed during my fieldwork. Despite the appearance of relatively more formal 
working practices that I described in section 6.2, in essence there is very little change in 
the working of the field offices. This is largely because the primary objective of the 
Regional Directors during these periods of enhanced enforcement is to increase tax 
collection, and not principally to change the ways through which taxes are collected. 
My field observations indicated four types of informality that persist even during 
episodes of strict enforcement. 
• First, in order to achieve their objective of increased tax collection, Directors 
generally allow lower level staff considerable discretion when choosing cases for 
enforcement. Time and resource constraints during the short enforcement period require 
that cases for enforcement be prioritised, implying that tax defaulters are pursued 
selectively. There are good reasons to believe that cases where tax collectors have 
colluded are lowest on the recovery list, as the following example demonstrates. In one 
of the morning meetings, the Director, dissatisfied with the progress in the recovery of 
arrears by one of the Inspectors, asked him to bring his arrears’ register, that should 
contained a full record of all outstanding liabilities in his Circle. It turned out the 
register in question was a private notebook. The Director showed me the long list of 
arrears, spread over many pages, and then mentioned that this particular Inspector had 
won the highest cash award in the province for the last quarter under the on-going tax 
collectors’ incentive scheme.235 He turned to the Inspector and said, “you don’t deserve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  This	  is	  an	  educated	  guess	  based	  on	  discussions	  with	  some	  senior	  ETD	  officers,	  and	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  stay	  cases	  are	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  the	  total	  default	  cases	  in	  Lahore,	  which	  is	  the	  highest	  ratio	  for	  a	  district	  in	  Punjab.	  	  235	  Initiated	  in	  the	  department	  as	  part	  of	  a	  study	  in	  2009/10,	  the	  scheme	  was	  designed	  and	  led	  by	  a	  team	  of	  economists,	  Asim	  Khawaja	  (Kennedy	  School	  of	  Government,	  Harvard	  University),	  Ben	  Olken	  (Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology)	  and	  Adnan	  Qadir	  Khan	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a bonus that big, just look at your arrears. I should confiscate your award and buy 
office furniture with it…”  He then went on to mark some of the larger amounts with a 
highlighter and numbered them, giving the Inspector a week to show progress on the 
highlighted cases or else he would be posted to a part of Punjab where he would almost 
certainly not be able to earn a bonus.236 Essentially, the Director was not interested in 
lists of arrears as long as the Inspectors were showing good progress. 
  
• Second, while Directors threaten lower level staff with disciplinary action and 
use any available evidence of malpractice to pressure them to increase collection, they 
rarely initiate disciplinary cases. In one instance, the Director asked an Inspector with a 
particularly low record of collection to bring and present his assessment registers.237 
Examining the records, the Director was surprised and somewhat amused by the blatant 
manner in which the Inspector had colluded with taxpayers in his Circle. Literally every 
third taxpayer had been declared a widow and granted an exemption. Passing the 
registers for me to see, the Director quipped that the Inspector had “liberated a third of 
women in the city from their husbands.” Even during field visits with the Director in the 
last quarter, numerous inconsistencies were discovered between official records and 
actual situation of various properties. The Director made a note of these cases, 
mentioning them to the Inspector concerned, but did not initiate any disciplinary action. 
 
• Third, in keeping with the current age of news media proliferation in Pakistan, a 
recent development has been the use of news channels by the Directors. The Directors 
enlist local newsmen to cover enforcement operations and entertain them in their offices 
in return for positive press coverage. At times, this might involve extending personal 
favours to newsmen, like reducing tax assessments for properties of their relatives or 
friends. This has a two-fold impact: it gets the official version of the story publicised, 
helping tax collectors avoid risks similar to the incident narrated in section 6.3 – when 
an Inspector almost got sacked for sealing a political party’s office – and publishing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (International	  Growth	  Centre,	  London	  School	  of	  Economics).	  	  Draft	  paper	  analysing	  results	  at:	  http://economics.mit.edu/files/9646	  	  236	  Larger	  cities	  have	  relatively	  greater	  property	  tax	  potential	  –	  because	  of	  large	  tax	  base	  and	  more	  commercialization	  –	  with	  greater	  cushion	  for	  manipulating	  current	  and	  arrear	  collections	  to	  show	  overall	  improvements.	  237	  Property	  tax	  register	  No.	  8	  (PT-­‐8)	  is	  the	  property-­‐wise	  record	  of	  tax	  assessments,	  collections	  and	  arrears.	  One	  register	  covers	  a	  period	  of	  five	  years	  after	  which	  the	  record	  has	  to	  be	  carried	  on	  to	  a	  new	  register.	  
 
 
171 
stories about strict enforcement that is expected to encourage taxpayer compliance. I 
also witnessed some Directors threatening local politicians (who are mostly themselves 
defaulters) that they would leak names of tax defaulters and their outstanding liabilities 
to the press. This can lead to embarrassing local newspaper headlines for the politicians 
and influential people who are named. The threat is used effectively by the Directors to 
deflect undue pressures, especially from local politicians and public figures that 
pressure the Directors to ease enforced tax collection. 
 
• Fourth, in certain cases, Directors use discretion with the objective of collecting 
some tax revenue rather than have a taxpayer not pay at all, by approaching the court for 
a stay order, for example. During strict enforcement, since the Directors become more 
directly involved in decisions about individual cases, their own use of discretion 
becomes more obvious. Either the Regional Directors use discretion themselves or 
allow lower tax staff to do so. There is a usual practice of allowing part-payment of tax 
arrears whereby a property is de-sealed after a mutually-agreed partial payment of 
outstanding property tax dues. Such cases of de-sealing properties always require the 
approval of the Director. Under tax recovery laws, once a property is sealed, either the 
defaulter has to pay the outstanding amount in full or the property is auctioned in order 
to recover the government dues. The part-payment arrangement is convenient – though 
in contravention of tax recovery laws and rules – to reach a compromise in cases where 
tax officers face difficulty in collecting full payment. This difficulty can arise mainly 
because of three reasons: Firstly, the absence of enforcement for a number of years 
leads to large arrears that make it difficult for tax defaulters to pay in a lump sum. 
Secondly, the amount of arrears compared to the approximate market value of 
properties is too disproportionate, and the legal and administrative complexities make 
auctions impractical.238 Thirdly, political pressure and the unwillingness of local staff to 
upset local arrangements and relationships favour a compromise. 
In most cases, the use of discretion reduces total tax (arrears) collected. But at the same 
time ensures at least some collection if the alternative is to collect nothing. I found the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  Auctioning	  a	  private	  property	  to	  recover	  government	  dues	  can	  be	  a	  long	  and	  tedious	  process.	  It	  is	  even	  less	  attractive	  to	  tax	  collectors	  because	  arrears,	  even	  if	  relatively	  large,	  are	  usually	  disproportionately	  small	  compared	  to	  the	  market	  value	  of	  properties.	  This	  makes	  auctioning	  properties	  to	  recover	  property	  tax	  dues	  a	  bit	  of	  an	  ‘over-­‐kill’.	  During	  my	  fieldwork	  no	  tax	  collector	  could	  remember	  a	  property	  being	  auctioned	  during	  his	  service	  career.	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logic of collecting at least a part of the outstanding dues to be the main motivation 
behind how tax collectors dealt with various types of tax defaulters. 
6.6 Dealing with various types of tax defaulters 
During the last quarter of the financial year, I found that tax collectors face, broadly, 
three types of property tax defaulters. The first are those individuals who do not have 
the ability to pay. The second are those who do not want to pay because they believe 
they have been over-assessed. When pushed for payment, they tend to appeal against 
assessment. The third are politically influential taxpayers, often organised into groups, 
who simply resist payment and challenge assessment on various grounds in order to 
reduce their liability. The latter two types impede enforcement either by lodging appeals 
against assessment with the tax authorities (Regional Directors),239 applying to civil 
courts for stay orders, or through involving politicians to mediate with the tax 
collectors. Below, I cite some examples of each of these three categories of tax 
defaulters, and show that tax collectors use their discretion when dealing with them. As 
mentioned earlier, tax collectors do this mainly to recover some tax revenues from 
defaulters. The amount collected is usually below the originally assessed or potential tax 
liability.240 
• First, throughout my fieldwork I found that tax collectors in all of the three 
Regions that I studied used their discretion to accommodate cases where they found a 
genuine inability to pay. While in normal times these arrears would simply be ignored 
and the liabilities kept pending in the registers, during times of strict enforcement such 
arrears are either collected or written off the registers. Normally, Tax Inspectors do not 
want to write off arrears on their own, and prefer ETOs or Directors to make such 
decisions. Directors and ETOs are satisfied when making remissions in what they 
perceive to be deserving cases based on information provided mostly by the Circle staff. 
As elaborated in Chapter 5, Circle staff have excellent on-the-ground information and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  Although,	  legally	  there	  is	  a	  fixed	  time	  period	  after	  service	  of	  the	  first	  tax	  bill	  to	  lodge	  an	  appeal	  regarding	  assessment,	  the	  Regional	  Directors	  usually	  admit	  appeals	  for	  hearing	  after	  lapse	  of	  the	  prescribed	  time-­‐limit	  as	  well.	  Also,	  under	  the	  rules	  appeals	  are	  only	  to	  be	  accepted	  for	  hearing	  by	  the	  Director	  once	  the	  taxpayer	  deposits	  the	  outstanding	  liability.	  But	  this	  rule	  is	  almost	  never	  followed.	  240	  This	  is	  a	  broad	  generalization	  and	  I	  am	  not	  discounting	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  reassessment	  is	  a	  genuine	  requirement.	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usually vouch for the weak financial circumstances of a particular household, such as 
those with an absence of male earners. 
On one particular occasion, a woman and her younger brother were shown into the 
Director’s office, accompanied by the Circle Inspector. The Inspector had gone to seal a 
shop that belonged to their father who had recently passed away, leaving behind eleven 
children. Over the preceding decade, arrears of almost Rs. 100,000 (1000 USD) had 
been accumulated by the now deceased father. There was no surviving bread winner in 
the family and the paltry rent from the shop was their only source of income. The 
woman, in her early twenties, was the eldest in the family. The Inspector did not want to 
seal their shop and asked the Director for guidance. The Director went through the case 
and eventually asked the woman to file an appeal. The Director assured her that he 
would take care of it. I experienced a number of similar cases brought to the notice of 
the ETOs or Directors by lower level staff.  There seemed to be a consensus amongst 
tax collectors to use discretion in such cases by either foregoing collections or, 
preferably, to award a remission. The Circle staff felt safer bringing such cases to the 
ETOs or the Directors, but, at times, took the decision on their own. An Inspector 
revealed to me that he had decided to forgo arrears’ collection from an old woman who 
was extremely grateful to him and promised to pray for him. He said soon afterwards 
his collection rate improved!  
However, for obvious reasons, tax collectors are not keen to give such discretionary 
remissions and are careful when granting them. They do not confuse a person’s ability 
to pay with a person’s status. For example, simply being a widow does not mean not 
having to pay any property tax if tax collectors know she can afford to do so. Such a 
case came up in the Director’s office where an old widow was pleading inability to pay 
arrears. The Director went through her case. She had already been granted widow’s 
exemption for her residential property, but her commercial property was well-situated 
and the Director believed she had reasonable earnings. She had been addressing the 
Director as “brother,” so he asked her if she would like her “brother” to be 
“dishonoured” by his superiors for bad performance. She said no. He told her to pay her 
dues as he had favoured her as much as he could. 
• The second type of tax defaulters are those who are not fully aware of tax laws 
and current policies related to their liabilities. They normally resist payment because 
they think they have been over assessed. This lack of taxpayer awareness (genuine or 
 
 
174 
feigned) reduces compliance generally and hinders collection during enforcement. Lack 
of awareness of changed tax policies is often compounded by confusion between 
exemptions granted for property taxes and those given for other taxes, such as income 
tax, as I show in the example below. In such cases, tax collectors have a broad scope to 
exercise discretion. 
 
Exemptions granted by the government for other taxes liabilities, such as, by the Federal 
Government in the case of the federal income tax, can create ambiguities and are 
usually exploited by property taxpayers. One of these is the income tax exemption 
granted to organisations registered as charitable trusts with the Federal Board of 
Revenue. Managers of these organisations claimed that the exemption covered all sorts 
of taxes, including property tax. The confusion partly emanates from the fact that 
property tax law also exempts charitable trusts. There is however a proviso that the 
income from trust properties is spent solely on charitable purposes and that has to be 
proven to the satisfaction of the assessing authority. As most large charitable trusts have 
prominent and influential people on their boards, most trust properties were never 
assessed or pursued for property tax payment prior to this episode of strict enforcement 
in 2012. Pressures for increased tax collection led the Director in one region to 
scrutinise some of the exemption cases, and summon board members/ managers of these 
organisations to provide satisfactory evidence of trust expenditures. In one case, the 
Director met the finance manager representing a charitable trust run by a scion of an 
established family of Lahore, famous for his philanthropy and his role in advancing 
education in the country. The trust had more than a dozen residential houses located in 
an affluent neighbourhood and mostly rented to foreigners. According to the manager, 
all rental income was used to fund the charitable activities of the trust. The Director said 
he would be satisfied with that explanation if evidence of the recipients and audited 
accounts of charitable expenditures were presented. The manager said the accounts were 
secret, and could not be divulged. He then listed the great things his boss had done for 
the country, including the fact that his family had donated millions of rupees to the 
newly established Government of Pakistan in 1947 when it faced a serious financial 
crisis. The Director listened patiently and then advised the manager that he had a week 
to present detailed accounts of the beneficiaries of the trust charity, or be prepared to 
pay property tax. In another, similar case, the members of the board of a charitable trust 
that ran a large private university could not present their accounts of charitable 
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expenditures that would satisfy the Director. The Director had looked up the tuition fees 
on the university’s website, and reminded the board members that their annual property 
tax bill was less than the annual fees for two students. Irrespective of the trust’s status as 
a non-profit, the board would have to pay property tax. Cases like the two above often 
end up in higher courts of law. Relatively rich taxpayers can afford to do this, and the 
amount of money at stake makes it worthwhile.  
Confusion, which is not always genuine, over exemptions reduces tax collection and 
consumes a considerable amount of the tax collectors’ time. A large number of property 
tax defaulters are owners of properties of 125 square yards or less, which, as pointed out 
in Chapter 2, were exempted from property tax in 2006. At that time, the provincial 
political leadership verbally directed the ETD not to collect any arrears from the 
exempted properties. However, for some properties these liabilities lingered in the 
registers while the owners thought these had been remitted when the exemption was 
announced. The enforcement drive in 2011-12 brought these outstanding dues to the 
surface again. Such cases were particularly challenging for tax collectors since some of 
these small property owners did not have the ability to clear their arrears in full. When 
some of them came to the tax office to have their final notices withdrawn or properties 
de-sealed, they maintained that they were exempt. They were told by the tax staff that 
the exemption did not cover arrears. One of the ETOs would sometimes respond to such 
tax defaulters that, after 25 years of working for the government, he did not even own 
an inch of land in Lahore, so they should not expect him to be sympathetic. 
Nonetheless, in most of these cases, property owners were let off after an agreement 
over amount of part-payment. 
It is noteworthy that, in the instances narrated above, the Director could have exercised 
his discretion to allow the de facto exemptions to continue, possibly motivated either by 
some personal reward or political pressure. He would have faced little personal risk, but 
would have lost significant revenues. He chose to do the right thing.   
• The third type is defaulters who can mobilize local political pressure. Even 
during strict enforcement, tax collectors try not to upset their relationships with local 
politicians and other powerful groups. Almost irrespective of the degree of support for 
greater tax collection given by the political executive and the senior management of the 
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ETD, local politicians generally can neutralise these efforts. They can do this in a 
number of ways:  
First, politicians can combine with organised groups of defaulters like trade associations 
to resist taxation and physically prevent tax collectors from enforcement activities like 
sealing properties. This happens rarely, as creating a law and order situation can get the 
politician in trouble with the police. However, in one instance, a local politician asked 
the Director to have shops in a market de-sealed and promised to make the defaulters 
pay up. But, once the shops were de-sealed he did not deliver his promise. 
Secondly, powerful politicians, especially those belonging to the ruling party, use their 
influence within provincial government to soften enforcement in their constituencies. 
This happened in one of the three tax Regions I studied where a senior ruling party 
politician forbade the ETD to enforce tax collection in his constituency.241 The level of 
enforcement in this region was starkly different to the other two that I studied. This was 
mostly because the politician in question was politically as powerful within the party as 
the provincial Chief Minister. The two were also close friends. Therefore, in this 
Region, the departmental Secretary could not use his influence over the Chief Minister 
in the same way as he did to isolate the influence of other politicians in his department. 
Arrears in this District are four times its annual tax collection, which is exceptionally 
high compared to other Districts.  
Thirdly, local politicians fall back on their long-term relationships with tax collectors 
and make requests at a personal level to show leniency in certain cases. The standing 
and level of influence that a politician wields both locally and at the provincial level is 
important, and the tax collectors treat them accordingly. While a local government 
politician or an elected member of provincial or national parliament whose party is in 
opposition might not carry much weight in local administrative departments, ruling 
party politicians can have considerable influence. In addition, some of the tax collectors 
posted to certain positions on the recommendations of politicians are afraid to refuse 
them favours.  
Irrespective of assurances of protection from political victimisation, local tax staff try 
not to offend local politicians. Working in a complex socio-political environment, tax 
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collectors, who are relatively junior officers in the civil service, run a huge risk of 
annoying a politician and, potentially, being transferred to remote Districts. During my 
fieldwork, I was informed by colleagues serving in the field as District or Divisional 
Commissioners that, every month the Chief Minister holds a meeting that includes party 
politicians and heads of civil and police administration from each District and Regional 
government. Among other matters, an important point discussed in these meetings is the 
level of cooperation and compliance of the civil administration with recommendations 
of party politicians in various local administrative issues. In an environment where 
politics is mostly patronage-based, incumbent parties consider it their right to have a say 
in all kinds of administrative decisions. In these meetings, officers who are pointed out 
by party politicians to be uncooperative are reprimanded by the Chief Minister and, if 
complaints persist, are posted out. 
I observed the interaction between politicians and tax collectors in two Regions with 
strict enforcement on a number of occasions. This was mostly in the offices of the 
Directors where political representatives would come to ask favours for certain 
taxpayers. They would often come with large groups, for example with market or 
traders unions. Directors felt uncomfortable in publicly declining requests made by 
politicians and, if they did refuse, were very apologetic and blamed pressure from the 
top to increase collection. 
Despite increased support from higher management and the Chief Minister, tax 
collectors do not fully enforce recovery of arrears. More importantly, tax collectors are 
mindful of the fact that such enforcement drives and political support from the higher 
level is transitory. They do not want to upset local politicians too much. Some tax 
collectors might even want to score personal points by accommodating their requests, 
especially during strict enforcement. 
As mentioned earlier, it is noteworthy that the use of discretion during times of strict 
enforcement is widespread. A prime example is the withdrawal of enforcement notices 
and de-sealing properties on part-payment of property tax arrears. Though not legal 
under the property tax or land revenue recovery laws, this provides relief to the 
defaulter while the tax collectors can show that they have recovered at least part of the 
outstanding amount. This arrangement suits all parties concerned, since the outstanding 
amount is not waived but is instead held in the books and can be liquidated when 
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another enforcement drive is instituted. In the last quarter of the fiscal year 2011-12 
property tax collection crossed the Rs. 1 billion mark, which was unprecedented and has 
not been surpassed since (see fig. 6.1).  
Figure 6.1: Property tax collection in fourth quarter 
 
Source: Office of the Director General, Excise and Taxation, Punjab 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this was a result of exceptional 
pressures on tax staff to increase tax collection. However, as I show in the preceding 
sections, there was neither any change in real terms in the way the department works, 
nor in the usual pattern of year-on-year nominal increase in tax collection, shown in 
figure 6.1.  
Strict enforcement drives, like the one I witnessed during the last quarter, do not 
compensate for low tax collection efforts over the previous three quarters and other 
general shortcomings of property tax administration. A senior tax officer told me that, 
as an Inspector, he had once managed to double his collection by making a point of 
visiting defaulters regularly from the second quarter onwards. Every evening, when the 
probability of finding the head of the household is highest, he showed up at the 
defaulter’s house, reminding him about the property tax bill and asked when it would be 
paid. The Inspector noted the meeting down in his diary and made sure to return and 
enquire about payment on the said date, persisting until payment was made. According 
to the Inspector, property tax collection is a matter of sheer perseverance and hard work 
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on the part of the Circle team, and matters only come to enforcement if the team is not 
sufficiently diligent earlier in the year. Another Inspector estimated that in certain cases 
he makes at least ten visits to a property before they finally pay up. Given the average 
number of properties per tax Circle staff (more than a thousand)242 a lot of persistence 
and follow up is required throughout the year rather than relying on strict enforcement 
drives in the last quarter. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the working of the tax department under extraordinary 
pressure to increase tax collection. Despite appearances of increased formal working, I 
found that even during a period of strict enforcement the basic ways in which tax staff 
work did not alter much. The tax collectors both at the lower as well as middle levels 
exercise discretion. Although the objective of the middle level management is to 
increase tax collection, their efforts are mostly limited to collection of arrears and not of 
improving tax assessment. In the following chapter I conclude my thesis and based on 
my findings discuss some implications of my research apart from some other issues. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of the arguments 
The central question that I have tried to answer in this thesis is why property taxes are 
exceptionally low in Punjab, Pakistan. Many of the points that I have made will be 
familiar to experts in the field. These include, for example: the unpopularity of such a 
small tax with taxpayers because it is so visible or salient; the relative ease with which 
taxpayers with properties in the same locality can organise to oppose payment; the fact 
that property valuations are not updated at anything like the desirable frequency; the 
complexities of the procedures for valuing individual properties, which in turn gives 
considerable discretion to the field level tax collectors; generally weak enforcement; the 
fact that responsibilities for assessing and collecting property tax – along  with the 
enjoyment of the consequent revenues – are divided among levels of subnational 
government, reducing the overall incentive for government organisations to focus on 
this potential source of revenue. My discovery that the property tax system in Pakistan 
is in many ways very similar to that of other countries has been of great value to me in 
completing this research. It has enabled me to better understand the Pakistan system. 
However, the question around which this thesis is focused directs my attention away 
from the similarities between Pakistan and other countries in respect of property taxes. I 
have concentrated rather on explaining differences: in particular, the fact that property 
tax revenues in Pakistan are significantly less than in so many other comparable 
countries. In this thesis my focus has been the recurrent (annual) tax on properties.  
Because I focused very much on obtaining a deeper understanding of how the property 
tax system works in Pakistan, including considerable fieldwork, I was not able to 
undertake any rigorous comparisons between Pakistan and any other countries. The 
answers that I give here to my central question have not been thoroughly tested using 
comparative data. They must remain tentative. That said, I believe that I have identified 
three broad explanations for exceptionally low property tax collections in Pakistan. 
First, revenues are low because governments are not willing to do the things needed to 
increase them. Pakistan inherited a property tax system from the colonial era. While 
governments have made many changes to it, they have overall permitted it to decline in 
efficacy. There are various dimensions to this story. The most tangible is the factor 
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discussed in Chapter 2: the fact that roles and responsibilities in the property tax system 
have been divided in a complex and rather arcane fashion between the three levels of 
subnational government. To oversimplify: the provincial government bears most of the 
burden – both organisational and political – in raising property tax revenues, while most 
of the revenue raised is allocated to the town level governments two tiers below it. 
While I have no direct evidence about the options that were considered when the current 
property tax system was introduced – or about the motivations for the policy choices 
made – it is very hard to avoid the conclusion that a significant motivating factor was 
the desire to devolve provincial departments to the local governments, especially the 
Excise and Taxation Department, since part of its job was to collect property tax, which 
in any case, belonged to the local government. This resulted in a system where property 
taxes could not be increased without engaging in complex cooperation across three 
different tiers of territorial government. The possibility of cooperation was further 
reduced because of resistance to decentralisation at the provincial government level. 
Senior civil servants who resented reporting to elected local politicians found a common 
cause against the decentralisation reforms with the elected provincial government 
officials who have historically opposed elected local governments.  
My second explanation is more tentative; it is based partly on speculation and 
deduction, and partly my own experience of working in the government. The sub-
national governments in the Punjab appear to be in a state of low equilibrium, of low 
income and low expenditures, where they seem largely to be comfortable in a political 
sense. They can manage to sustain themselves with the available resources in the 
absence of any strong political pressures to increase expenditures on public service 
delivery. One indicator that the sub-national governments in Punjab are not under any 
immediate pressure to raise additional resources is their relatively comfortable financial 
liquidity position over the last decade. On the one hand, experience from elsewhere 
leads us to expect that sub-national governments face disincentives to raise own source 
taxes. These disincentives are expected to arise particularly when own source taxes 
become a small source of sub-national governments’ total income, and they have easy 
access to transfers from higher levels of government and loans. As I show in Chapter 3, 
this is the case in the Punjab. For the Punjab Provincial Government the cost of raising 
property taxes substantially is relatively high both politically, and financially – as this 
requires substantial investment in its capacity to collect property taxes. On the other 
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hand, as I argue in Chapter 4, there are particularly no strong political pressures to 
expand public service delivery which would require more financial resources and hence 
possibly more taxation. Political demands for expanded service delivery are relatively 
weak, despite appallingly low levels of provision, because of the prevalence of 
patronage politics, and the domination over electoral politics which is exercised by 
relatively well-off people who are largely not reliant on publicly provided services. In 
the absence of effective political and social accountability of the ways in which public 
money is spent, the political executive and the bureaucrats can largely satisfy their own 
narrow interests – development projects, and salaries and perks, respectively – with the 
available financial resources. Thus there is no strong internal political pressure on the 
government to raise more taxes. Moreover, although aid donors routinely attach 
conditions to their loans that relate to increases in public spending on service delivery, 
the provincial government can in practice ignore these conditions without impairing its 
long-term relationships with the aid donors.  
Third, I have provided more detailed and tangible evidence for another set of factors 
that appeared to interact iteratively with the first set listed above. In sum, the staff 
occupying the lower levels of the property tax collection system have to a large degree 
taken control of it. The degree of effective monitoring of the system from above has 
declined over time. In Chapter 5, I show that the basic control technology – hand 
written records – has not been updated. The financial resources provided by government 
for meeting basic operational needs to have become less adequate. The field level staff 
have increasingly been financing their own operational costs – to the extent of actually 
employing informal assistants.  The formal disciplinary procedures of the tax 
department are still in place and are sometimes used. But they are relatively mild and 
not imposed with sufficient frequency or severity that they represent a serious 
disincentive to the misuse of public position. Long-established procedures designed to 
enable senior staff to control field staff through examination of written records as to a 
significant degree been neglected. The field level staff maintain a large corpus of 
information, some unwritten and some located on private records, that is not accessible 
to their superiors. In particular, field staff are able to both nurture and manipulate a 
large volume of property tax arrears. To some extent, these arrears are deliberately 
created. As I show in Chapter 6, during the periods when the senior staff of the tax 
department try to push and encourage their employees into raising more revenue than 
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usual – typically in the final quarter of the financial year – two  different ways of 
working coexist within the Department, and within the work routines of many 
individual officers. On the one hand, the more formal, hierarchical, or Weberian 
working practices are visibly followed. Uniforms are worn. Senior staff give orders; 
these orders are obeyed. There is significant visible cooperation between different levels 
of the hierarchy in trying to achieve the dominant formal goal of the organisation: to 
collect taxes. However, the senior staff have not penetrated or taken control of the 
organisation to the extent that one might believe from this kind of evidence. The normal 
system of operational control by field level staff continues to operate. The field level 
staff do not disclose the private information they have on collection potential and actual 
collections. It is at this point that they can make use of the arrears that they have 
allowed to accumulate. It is much easier for them to deal with collection pressure from 
above by putting pressure on taxpayers who are in arrears, rather than to take any of the 
many steps that could be taken to increase collections on a routine basis (e.g. reduce 
‘illicit’ exemptions). There is some significant enforcement of formal procedures and 
tax payers’ obligations at this point, but also much ritualistic enforcement procedure.  It 
is my understanding that this is not just a matter of the senior staff being deluded. To 
some extent at least, they know what is going on beneath them in the system and are 
complicit in it. Enforcement rituals do not significantly change the conditions that allow 
the field level staff to control the property tax system on a day-to-day basis.  
7.2 Observations on the tax experiment in Punjab 
During my doctoral research, a panel of researchers was conducting an experiment by 
providing monetary rewards for tax collectors to increase property tax collection. The 
experiment was conducted in collaboration with the Punjab government.243 The findings 
of the tax experiment are published as Khan et al. (2016b).244 During the course of this 
experiment and my doctoral research, I had a number of mutually beneficial meetings 
with the tax experiment team since both the studies were investigating the behaviour of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243	  The	  researchers	  leading	  the	  randomized	  controlled	  trial	  (RCT)	  were	  Adnan	  Qadir	  Khan	  (London	  School	  of	  Economics),	  Asim	  Khawaja	  (Harvard	  Kennedy	  School	  of	  Government)	  and	  Ben	  Olken	  (Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology).	  In	  my	  earlier	  job	  as	  Program	  Director,	  Punjab	  Resource	  Management	  Program,	  these	  researchers	  approached	  me	  with	  the	  proposal	  in	  2009/10,	  and	  I	  initiated	  the	  concept	  note	  for	  this	  research	  collaboration	  for	  approval	  of	  the	  Chief	  Minister,	  Punjab.	  244	  There	  are	  various	  versions	  of	  the	  paper	  cited	  as	  Khawaja	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  in	  Condition	  1.	  I	  use	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  paper	  published	  in	  the	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  in	  2016.	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government officials in the same department using different methodologies. Khan et al. 
conducted econometric analysis of a randomized controlled trial that offered varied 
incentives to property tax collectors as a group at the circle level, while my work on the 
property tax collection in Punjab is qualitative, partly based on observations of working 
of the tax offices. I used qualitative methods single-handedly for about six months’ of 
fieldwork, compared to more than three years’ of experimentation undertaken by a 
panel of researchers with field assistants and the government of Punjab funding the 
incentive scheme. My research generally complements the findings of Khan et al. 
(2016b) and goes much further in showing the internal workings of tax office. However, 
based on my research, I am of the opinion that certain factors like the limited/fixed 
timeframe of the experiment and the wider social setting in which tax collectors work 
may have blunted the effectiveness of the incentive scheme, as I discuss later in this 
section.  
Under the tax experiment three incentive schemes were offered to tax staff, in 218 
randomly selected property tax circles. The rest of the 264 out of a total of 482 property 
tax circles in the province were the control group. The first incentive scheme was purely 
revenue based, where circle staff received a percentage of any increase beyond a 
historical benchmark level of tax revenue collected. In the second incentive scheme the 
circle staff were given a reward that was dependent on additional revenue, like in the 
first scheme, but adjusted for non-revenue outcomes like taxpayer satisfaction and the 
accuracy of tax assessments, both checked independently through third party surveys of 
taxpayers. In the third scheme all the circle staff received a bonus based on the circle’s 
performance ranking determined by a performance evaluation committee of the Excise 
and Taxation Department. The last scheme was based purely on subjective criteria like 
peer reviews. The experiment results show that on average incentives are effective in 
increasing revenue and taxpayer satisfaction does not change significantly. The most 
effective treatment is the pure revenue incentive, while the second one is less effective 
and the third has no effect. The additional revenues come largely from re-assessment of 
properties. 
Khan et al. report a number of findings, some of which are consistent with my research. 
I give two examples here. First, most of the revenue increases reported in the 
experiment are from high-value properties, suggesting that the tax collectors mostly 
focus their efforts on relatively few properties, reassessing them to increase tax 
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revenues (Khan et al., 2016b, p.252). These might well be the kind of properties that I 
highlight in Chapter 5: I report that, to obtain their own informal earnings, tax collectors 
focus on a small number of properties with high potential for making lucrative deals 
with taxpayers through using discretion in making assessments. The large difference in 
assessments between ‘rented’ and ‘self-occupied properties’ provides many such 
opportunities.  
Second, Khan et al. (2016b, p. 262) report that, “…properties newly added to the tax 
rolls are being systematically targeted, something that would not be feasible unless the 
tax collector had prior (private) information that is now being revealed.” This echoes 
one of my key findings about the lower (circle) level tax staff, which is that they have 
almost perfect information about properties in their circle (see Chapter 5). In addition to 
the two examples above, Khan et al (2016b; section II.B) borrow from (and cite) my 
work, and use it to explain some of their findings in their conclusion. 
Despite a number of common findings and complementarities, I question the 
effectiveness of the tax experiment in terms of achieving its stated objective of finding 
the right ‘incentive’ for tax collectors in order to increase overall tax collection. Based 
on my research, I point out some factors below that possibly diluted the effectiveness of 
the incentive scheme, and affect the validity of the policy conclusions drawn from the 
research.  
The first is the limited timeframe, of two years, for which the incentive scheme was 
executed. Based on my research, I contend that any incentive scheme that has a limited 
timeframe of x number of years will not be as effective as, say, an on-going incentive 
scheme. There are two interconnected but separate reasons for this:  
(a) The tax collectors are permanent government employees and expect to hold their 
jobs for most of their working lives; thus they have a much longer time horizon in their 
minds when making strategic decisions about how much tax collection to aim for in one 
particular year. In Chapters 5 and 6, I showed that tax collectors are under constant 
pressure from their superiors to collect more tax revenues compared to the preceding 
year. Thus, holding everything else (including taxable areas, tax rates and property 
valuations) constant and given the pressure to increase tax collection every year, I 
would expect the tax collectors to respond to temporary incentives in a very controlled 
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fashion.  
(b) I would not expect tax collectors to bring to the table all (or even most of) the under 
assessed and non-assessed properties in their circles in response to a temporary 
incentive scheme. The reason is that for the tax collectors the trade-off is not directly 
between bribes and incentive scheme money only. There is a third category: that of 
properties not on the tax cadastre and from which no rents are being taken by the tax 
collectors. These unregistered properties are added to the cadastre systematically to 
partly increase tax collection every successive year. As I explain in Chapter 5, this is 
one of the ways in which tax collectors deliver annual increases in tax collection and 
manage to retain their jobs. During my study I found that such properties were 
important buffers, since taxable urban areas, property valuations and tax rates did not 
change from 2000 to 2013. In such a context, tax collectors’ response to any temporary 
incentive scheme would be muted and to a large extent, controlled.  
Second, the model of collusion that the experiment is based on is that, with the 
monetary incentive in place, tax collectors can choose to opt out of some of the 
collusive arrangements, or demand a higher bribe to maintain the arrangements (Khan et 
al., 2016b; p.229). This model presumes that the tax collectors’ decisions to assess the 
taxpayer correctly or collude with her and under-assess are based on monetary 
incentives alone. While this might hold true in some of the cases, my study shows that 
the tax collectors work under a number of political and social constraints and are not 
totally free to take independent decisions about tax collection solely based on 
considerations of short-term monetary rewards. As I show in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
dynamics of the tax office and the local politics of tax collection are complex matters. 
In the conclusion of their article, Khan et al. allude to this complexity, and find it 
surprising that no local political resistance accompanied higher tax revenues resulting 
from their incentive schemes. They expect political opposition to this sort of a drive to 
collect taxes if it were to carry on for a longer time period. Mascagni (2015) also makes 
a similar observation about this experiment. In my view, absence of any political fallout 
and no change in taxpayer satisfaction point towards the fact that the impact of 
incentives was somewhat blunted, because of the broader social context as well as the 
limited timeframe of the incentive discussed earlier. 
 
 
187 
It is noteworthy that the experiment team has recently e-published another study based 
on an extension to the tax experiment, discussed above. The study is a follow up 
experiment based on the use of transfers and postings of tax collectors as incentives to 
increase collection in place of direct monetary incentives. This follow-up study 
corroborates my findings about how the higher-level management of the Excise and 
Taxation Department uses postings and transfers as an incentive to get tax collectors to 
perform better (Chapter 5). Khan et al. (2016a) find transfers and postings to be almost 
an equally effective way of increasing tax collection as the monetary incentive scheme. 
This finding in itself also indicates the relative ineffectiveness of the monetary incentive 
scheme, and might partly explain why the Punjab Excise and Taxation Department did 
not take it up after the experiment concluded. 
7.3 Policy implications for tax reforms in Pakistan 
Based on the findings of this thesis, I discuss six broad implications for long-term tax 
revenue raising in Pakistan. Most of these policy implications are stand-alone but also 
complement each other, except the third, which is an alternative to the first one. 
1. Whenever a level of government collects a tax but does not receive all the 
revenue collected, then it likely will not make every effort possible to collect the tax. 
Similarly tax policy tends to be neglected if the government that bears the political cost 
associated with the tax does not receive a share of the revenues that make the costs 
bearable. In Chapter 2, I showed such outcomes in the case of annual property taxation 
in Punjab. The responsibilities for policy-making and collecting property tax and 
distribution of its revenues are divided between three levels of sub-national government 
in relatively complex ways. The level of subnational (provincial) government that 
shoulders the most responsibilities for tax collection receives a relatively small share 
(15%) of the tax while the district governments receive none, and town governments 
that receive most of the share (85%) have very few responsibilities. In Pakistan this 
particular problem is not unique in the case of property taxes. Currently I am working in 
a provincial tax-collecting agency, the Punjab Revenue Authority that was formed 
recently to address a similar problem, in the case of sales tax on services. 
The Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA) was established in 2012 to collect the sales tax 
on services, a tax assigned to the provincial governments but collected by the Federal 
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Board of Revenue up till 2012. In the last year before handing over tax collection to the 
provinces, the Federal Board of Revenue collected Rs. 22 billion in sales tax on services 
from 12 taxable services, on behalf of Punjab province. Over the last four years that this 
tax is being imposed and collected by the Punjab government (through the PRA), tax 
revenues have gone up to Rs. 60 billion and are being collected from almost 60 services. 
During the financial year, 2015-16, the tax base increased from 10,000 to almost 22,000 
registered sales taxpayers. An obvious reason for this increase in tax revenues is that the 
tax is being imposed and collected by the level of government (provincial) that also gets 
to keep all the revenues. 
Based on the above example, and on the findings of my thesis, a case can be made for 
handing over property tax collection to the town governments in Punjab. However, 
there are a number of counter arguments forwarded by property tax experts and 
practitioners in Pakistan whenever this proposition is fielded. They make three main 
arguments. First is the low capacity of local governments to collect all kinds of taxes 
and fees. Second is the proximity of local level politicians to local businesses and 
residents that supposedly makes local politicians more susceptible to interest group 
influences. Third, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, if local governments continue to 
receive transfers from above as at present, they will anyway not take advantage of the 
opportunities provided to raise their own revenues. In view of this obvious disincentive 
it is clear that a transfer of property tax functions to the town governments is only viable 
if accompanied by two measures: (a) building the capacity of town governments to 
assess and collect property tax, and (b) changing the way money is transferred to local 
governments in Pakistan. 
2. The point ‘b’ above – the way money is transferred to local, and generally 
subnational governments – is in its own right the second important implication of my 
thesis for tax revenue raising in Pakistan. Currently subnational taxation (provincial and 
local governments) is about 0.8% of Pakistan’s tax to GDP ratio. If this is to be raised 
anywhere close to the levels in comparable countries, the nature and the ways in which 
transfers from higher level governments to lower levels are made in Pakistan has to be 
revised substantially. I have discussed the relevant institutions and practices in detail in 
Chapter 3. Briefly, in the case of Pakistan, intergovernmental transfers – both, from 
federal to provincial and from provincial to local governments – are governed by formal 
National and Provincial Finance Commission awards. Unlike India, these finance 
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awards are made by constitutional bodies led by politicians, rather than technocrats. As 
a result, the whole award system is politicized and fails to effectively take into account 
tax efforts made by the recipient governments. Moreover, additional grants from higher 
level governments, especially in the form of constituency funds and special grants are 
also forthcoming, which weakens the resolve of the recipient governments to make 
efforts to raise their own taxes. 
According to some experts, subnational governments need to be presented with a ‘hard 
budget’ constraint, like in the case of local councils in the United Kingdom. The central 
government in the UK transfers a fixed amount of money to the councils who then have 
to raise their own resources locally in order to provide an expected level of services. 
Political pressures for delivering services force local politicians to weigh the relative 
political costs of increasing taxes or various service charges against the risk to their 
popularity of providing poor services. (The arrangement is a little more complicated and 
caps are imposed by the central government on annual increases to the Council Tax, but 
I use this example to make my point about fixed transfers.) In principle, something 
similar needs to be implemented in the case of subnational governments in Pakistan. 
The higher-level governments will have to enforce a ‘hard budget constraint’ on lower 
level governments, so that the provincial and local governments exert to collect their 
own taxes. Token incentives in the current scheme of awards that are supposed to 
incentivize tax collection by subnational governments should also be expanded and 
implemented more effectively. 
3. If the primary objective is to increase property tax revenues in Pakistan and 
bring them close to developing country averages, then the following suggestion may be 
considered as an alternative to the first one presented above. Due to longstanding and 
deep political rivalry between the provincial and local governments in Pakistan (see 
Chapter 2), it might not be practical to devolve property tax to local governments 
completely. In that case an alternative could be to have the provincial government 
appropriate all the revenues from annual property taxation. I propose this because the 
provincial government makes most of the policies and collects property tax but gets 
negligible share of the revenues. There are basically two sets of transfers: (a) Local 
governments are provided money by the provincial governments based on a multiple 
indicator award designed to fulfil their expenditure requirements, and (b) Revenues 
from property tax that are over and above this basic transfer. As I show in Chapter 2, 
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town governments are not reliant on property tax revenue transfers since these are 
neither regular nor to the full amount due. Reassigning property tax revenues to the 
provincial government might lead it to invest more in improving tax administration and 
interventions that are expected to enhance tax collection, including digitization and 
incentives for tax collectors, as discussed in Chapter 2. The findings of my study imply 
this to be a practical way of increasing property tax revenues in Punjab, where the 
potential of annual urban immoveable property tax has been estimated at about Rs. 25 
billion annually, only about a fourth of which is being collected.  
In case both the options of wholly handing over tax functions and revenues to either the 
town governments or the provincial government are not acceptable, then it would be in 
order to at least reconsider the provincial share of the property tax revenue. The 
provincial share should be commensurate with the potential political and financial cost 
the provincial government is expected to incur in order to improve property tax policy 
and administration. 
4. This implication of my thesis for long-term tax reform in the country concerns 
tax administration, especially the low capacity of the tax departments and motivations 
of the tax collectors. Civil servants, including tax collectors, are not only paid salaries 
that are considerably lower than a ‘living-wage’, but are also not commensurate with the 
high levels of discretion that they exercise. This creates the need and the opportunity for 
them to take bribes. Additionally, tax collectors are often not provided the operational 
costs of tax collection and are expected to ‘live off the land’ while they do their jobs. In 
the case of property taxes most property circles lack staff, especially tax clerks, that are 
hired privately by the inspectors. Similarly, costs of stationery, mobility and other tax 
collection functions are not provided by the state. Land revenue and agriculture income 
tax collectors face similar conditions. The concept of living off the land often proves to 
be a slippery slope and reportedly most newly inducted tax collectors soon enough fall 
in line with the prevailing culture in the tax collecting departments. In my view the 
tradition of living off the land and low wages perpetually reinforce a culture of 
corruption in the tax departments, as well as other government departments. 
Any meaningful tax administration reform in Pakistan needs to take into account often 
overlooked factors of low capacity and the low wages of tax collectors. While recent 
experiments of incentivizing tax collectors in Pakistan have reportedly delivered 
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encouraging results (see discussion on Khan et al., 2016a/b in section 7.2), previous 
government experiences (at the Federal Board of Revenue) of doubling wages across 
the board have not been effective. Based on my study, I suggest that, (a) the case for 
giving tax collectors ‘living wages’ has to be considered irrespective of any incentive 
schemes; (b) the tax collectors should be provided full operational costs of collecting 
taxes, (c) capacity development of tax departments should be an on-going government 
activity, and (d) incentive schemes should be initiated on an on-going basis in all tax 
collection departments, and not for a limited timeframe. 
5. In order to reform tax administration in Pakistan, it is important to prevent tax 
collectors from exercising their discretion that results in lower tax collection. This can 
be done in a number of ways, including:  
(a) Limiting the opportunities provided in tax laws and policies that allow 
exercise of individual discretion. For example, in the case of property tax, rented 
residential properties are taxed ten times more than the ones occupied by the owners. 
This gives tax collectors, who also assess the tax liability, an opportunity to collude 
with the taxpayer at the cost of state revenues. Thus reduction in differential rates of 
property taxes where property use is unchanged can bring down use of discretion by tax 
collectors substantially. Using this logic, the Punjab Excise and Taxation Department 
has recently reduced the differential between self-occupied and rented properties from 
ten to five times. Similarly simplification of the tax assessment formula can help further 
reduce discretion exercised during tax liability assessment.  
(b) Tax departments in Pakistan need to develop strong audit function that 
regularly detects cases involving unequal treatment of taxpayers during tax liability 
assessment or enforcement. Disciplinary procedures against tax staff allegedly involved 
in corruption need to be revamped. Based on my research, if anti-corruption efforts need 
to be made effective it is important that prosecution of cases against tax collectors be 
conducted by a third party and not by the officers of the same department, as practiced 
currently. Experts are of the view that certainty of punishment if discovered is a more 
effective deterrent compared to the severity of punishment. 
(c) Digitalization and automation of the tax cadastres and notice management 
systems are helpful in making tax administration relatively transparent and reducing 
exercise of discretion by lower tax staff. Technology is increasingly being used by tax 
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departments to minimize physical contact between taxpayers and the assessors/ tax 
collectors. This is expected to reduce collusion. There has been an uneven progress in 
this area, among various tax departments in Pakistan. Clearly more needs to be done. 
6. The last implication of this thesis is at a much wider political level and is 
immensely important for tax raising in Pakistan. It has to do with elite taxation and 
equal application of law. Although not the primary focus of this thesis, in Chapters 1 
and 4, I briefly mention the reluctance of the Pakistani elite to pay taxes, for various 
reasons. Complicity of political and economic elites in Pakistan seems to be of an acute 
nature, which, does not only affect tax collection directly but also reduces the level of 
voluntary tax compliance generally. The economic elites in Pakistan, representing both 
landed or commercial interests, are often themselves political entrepreneurs and leaders 
with direct control over policy-making. This is true for the leadership of almost all the 
political parties. The recent Panama Leaks’ scandal has exposed ruling party leaders and 
their families/ supporters of illegally transferring money abroad over the last three 
decades and evading taxes in Pakistan. There is a lot of public debate on television and 
newspapers about the elites evading taxes, and the burden of taxes falling on the middle 
and lower classes, largely through growing indirect taxation.  
Part of this debate on tax evasion and avoidance by the elites has been spurred by the 
public availability of information about taxes paid by elected public representatives. 
Recently the Election Commission of Pakistan has been making the annual asset returns 
of elected representatives public. Leaks in the media have also made tax returns of some 
of the leaders public. This has led to public scrutiny and criticism of tax 
avoidance/evasion by the political elites. On similar lines, if it is made possible for 
property taxpayers to access information about what their neighbours and owners of 
similar properties in their neighbourhood pay in annual property tax, this may lead to 
pressure for equal treatment, and hence reduced incidence of collusion. 
7.4 Some broader implications 
In early August 2016 national newspapers ran headlines about Pakistan ‘bidding 
farewell’ to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as another of its loan programmes 
to Pakistan came to an end. The Finance Minister tried to gain political mileage out of 
this news, claiming that the government would not need the IMF funding any more. 
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Various political and economic commentators were, for good reasons, sceptical. 
Pakistan has been through numerous IMF loan programmes, by many different names – 
structural adjustment, enhanced growth facility, and the like – but mostly for the same 
purpose, of filling the fiscal and external account deficits that plague the country. 
Pakistan experts believe that despite, these programmes and their stringent conditions, 
over the last more than two decades little has changed in the way the economy is 
structured and the way the government functions, especially in matters related to tax 
collection (McCartney, 2012, Zaidi, 2005).  
Why, despite almost thirty years of efforts to broaden tax bases, reduce tax rates, 
improve incentives for tax collectors, increase penalties for taxpayers and improve the 
technology of tax collection, do tax collections remain so stubbornly low in Pakistan? 
Why, despite decreases in regulation and quotas, privatization and reductions in tax 
rates, has corruption seemingly not declined? Why is the level of public service delivery 
so low? These are complex questions that cannot be explored in depth here. However, a 
common thread broadly links these questions: weak state capacity and persistent 
informality in the functioning of the state – important themes of this thesis.  
Rooted in Keynesianism and socialist models of development, the role of the state in 
guiding the economy from the ‘commanding heights’ gained ascendency in the 1930s. It 
was consolidated during the post Second World War reconstruction period and 
remained the dominant development paradigm through the 1970s. Especially 
highlighted for its relative success in East Asian countries, the ‘developmental state’, 
with a strong bureaucracy, was expected to lead poor countries toward equitable growth 
and development. The late 1970s onwards saw a movement towards globalization, 
market economics and against state intervention in affairs of the economy. Led by 
Thatcherism and Reaganomics, the developed world generally championed the agenda 
of ‘rolling back the state’. Also known as the Washington Consensus, the ‘panacea’ for 
economic problems facing poor countries comprised ten prescriptions including, 
lowering trade taxes and other barriers to free trade, deregulating economies – for 
example, loosening capital market and foreign exchange controls, privatizing state-
owned enterprises, and cutting fiscal deficits including phasing out state subsidies 
(Stiglitz, 2002, Williamson, 2009). 
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Economic liberalization is based on the belief that markets tend to be self-correcting and 
need only limited state regulation and intervention. Lowering taxes, including income 
and corporate taxes, was expected to lead to higher capital accumulation and investment 
in the economy and in turn rapid economic growth. Benefits of growth, primarily 
through employment generation, were expected to ‘trickle down’ to the poor and hence 
everyone was expected to be better off. With lower tax rates, individuals and small 
businesses were expected to register and become part of the formal economy. It was 
also expected that the rapid growth of the economy would more than offset the decrease 
in tax rates, resulting in a net increase in tax revenues. These ‘neo-liberal’ policies were 
implemented in poor countries globally, pushed by the multilateral financial institutions 
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund through lending programmes, 
like the Structural Adjustment Loans. The changing role of the state and implementation 
of liberal economic policies in poor countries have largely been a result of the influence 
of external actors, both intellectually and due to the financial dependence of poor 
countries on international aid (Lal, 2000, Leftwich, 1995). 
At the end of almost three decades of pursuing economic liberalizing policies, some of 
which are mentioned above, the benefits are not very visible. Amongst other things, 
there is increasing evidence that inequality has increased globally – both between and 
within countries – and that ‘trickle down’ does not really work (Piketty, 2014, Stiglitz, 
2002). In most poor countries, like Pakistan, a large number of people live below the 
poverty line and do not have access to basic public services.245 As pointed out earlier in 
this thesis, although Pakistan is categorized as a low-middle income country, it ranks 
146 out of 187 countries on the human development index (UNDP, 2013). A disease 
like polio, which has been eradicated in almost the whole world, still occurs 
sporadically in Pakistan. Absence of universal access to state education has provided 
space for religious seminaries to operate all over the country. Lack of quality public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  According	  to	  a	  recent	  government	  report	  nearly	  39%	  of	  Pakistanis	  live	  in	  multidimensional	  poverty,	  with	  the	  highest	  rates	  of	  poverty	  in	  the	  Federally	  Administered	  Tribal	  Areas	  (adjacent	  to	  Afghanistan)	  and	  Baluchistan.	  Although	  the	  multidimensional	  poverty	  index	  showed	  a	  strong	  decline,	  with	  national	  poverty	  rates	  falling	  from	  55%	  to	  39%	  from	  2004	  to	  2015,	  progress	  across	  different	  regions	  of	  Pakistan	  is	  uneven.	  Poverty	  in	  urban	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  is	  9.3	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  54.6	  percent	  in	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  Disparities	  also	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  across	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  (Report	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  Multidimensional	  Poverty,	  Ministry	  of	  Planning,	  Development	  and	  Reform	  2016).	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education and employment opportunities are considered to be important factors for the 
rise of religious extremism and militancy in the country (Raja, 2011). The writ of the 
state in Pakistan is often challenged not only in remote and inaccessible regions, like 
Baluchistan and the bordering areas with war-torn Afghanistan, but in places like Swat 
valley, which is just a few hours drive from the national capital, Islamabad. There is 
also evidence of informal taxation by powerful political groups in the large commercial 
urban centres, like Karachi. There is an absence of the rule of law and equal treatment 
for all citizens. On the one hand, all the institutions of the state, including the judiciary 
are steeped in corruption (Lieven, 2011) – which makes access to justice and to the state 
generally more difficult for those who cannot afford to pay bribes. On the other hand, as 
I elaborated in Chapter 4, the rich lead privatized lives and do not demand expanded 
public services from the state. This puts the poor in a difficult position; they cannot 
afford private services and, for various reasons like patronage politics, they are not in a 
position to effectively demand public services from the state.  
All of the above does not imply that the Pakistani state was very effective and strong 
prior to implementation of liberal economic polices or that the present state of affairs is 
solely because of liberal economic policies. There is no one clear indicator of state 
capacity, but if the tax to GDP ratio is anything to go by, the capacity of the state in 
Pakistan has certainly shrunk, clearly in financial terms, over the last couple of decades. 
The low tax to GDP ratio does not only reflect the diminished capability of the state to 
tax its citizens but also the size of the state relative to the economy, to which it has to 
provide multiple public services. From a high point of more than 13% in 1980s, 
Pakistan’s tax to GDP ratio has gradually declined to less than 10% (Marinez-Vazquez 
and Cyan, 2015; p.10). After fifteen different loan agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund worth billion of dollars, since 1995, to fix its fiscal deficits and external 
account deficits, Pakistan has little to show for these loans (McCartney, 2012).  
Due to persistent fiscal deficits, running as high as 8% of the annual Federal 
Government budget in recent years, the Federal Government has been borrowing 
heavily both from abroad and domestically. According to the Annual Reports of the 
State Bank of Pakistan, public debt has increased to unsustainable levels. The debt to 
GDP ratio was 69% in FY15 compared to 65.5% in FY10. Domestic debt increased 
from 31.4% in FY10 to 44.5% in FY15, while the external debt increased 12%, from 
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USD 54 billion to 61 billion, during these five years. As a result, interest payments are a 
large portion of the public expenditure. The domestic interest payments as a percentage 
of GDP have increased over the years, with 4.3% in FY14 compared to 3.4% in FY11, 
while interest on foreign loans has been stable at 0.4% since FY11. As a rough estimate, 
about 9.5% of Pakistan’s GDP is collected in tax revenues, out of which 4.7% is spent 
on debt servicing and about 3.6% is spent on defence – Pakistan Army is one of the 
largest standing armies in the world.246 It is not surprising then that Pakistan’s public 
social sector expenditure, as a percentage of GDP is 1.5% compared to the average of 
4.7% for countries in South Asia (also see Table 4.1).  
Despite the rising debt, the government has very little money available to provide 
expanded public services and build its own capacity. One of the reasons why people do 
not pay taxes is the absence of public services: they do not feel the state is reciprocating 
adequately. They might also feel that they should not be paying twice if they access all 
sorts of private services despite paying taxes. The perception of a dysfunctional and 
corrupt government at the community level can ease the sense of guilt about not paying 
taxes and can lead to people readily bribing tax collectors to avoid or totally evade 
taxes. Narrow tax bases – resulting from non-registration of professionals, businesses, 
traders and service providers – are probably the biggest challenge for the tax 
departments in Pakistan. For example, there are only one million registered individual 
income taxpayers in Pakistan, mostly salaried professionals. Out of this small number, 
in a country of about 180 million people, only about a fourth usually file their income 
tax return in a given year. The federal government has launched numerous amnesty 
schemes for non-income taxpayers to register but has had little success. Those not 
registered with the tax authorities find it easier to stay out of the reach of a system that 
is corrupt and wastes their time and money. Thus irrespective of the tax rates, the 
income taxpayer base might not grow and a large informal sector may persist. Various 
studies estimate the informal sector in Pakistan between 30% to 50% of the GDP 
(Gulzar et al., 2010).  
But tax collectors (and other public servants) do not have to be corrupt. Irrespective of 
what people feel about taxes, they can be assessed and made to pay. Obviously, this is 
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not the case in Pakistan. Corruption amongst public servants in Pakistan is almost a 
necessity partly because the state runs its core functions, like tax collection, on a 
shoestring budget. As I have discussed earlier in this thesis, tax collectors, like all other 
public servants, are not only given salaries much below the living wage, they are also 
not provided with anything close to adequate funds to bear the operational costs of tax 
collection. They are basically expected to ‘live off the land’ – bestowed with authority, 
they are required to fend for themselves, and also in the process collect taxes for the 
state. In fact, they are modern day versions of ‘tax farmers’. Tax farming is an 
exploitative way of collecting taxes, which might not make much money for the state, 
but has ample incentives for tax farmers to be corrupt and usually creates resentment 
against the state.  
Whenever informal sources of income spring up, it also gives rise to a whole political 
economy of the division of this income. In the context of tax collection in Pakistan, this 
implies not only sharing informal earnings within the food chain of the tax departments 
but also with politicians who have the power to affect transfers and postings within the 
tax departments, or those with power to impact the working of the tax collectors in the 
field. There often develops an alliance between lower level public servants and tax 
collectors and local public representatives. Public servants share their informal income 
with ruling party politicians on a regular basis and fund their election campaigns in 
return for political patronage, like getting more lucrative postings, and protection 
against possible disciplinary action by the department. Hurdles to reform that emanate 
from such complicated and deeply embedded informal relationships are not 
insurmountable, but will not be easy to overcome even if the ‘political will’ to reform 
the system develops. Any meaningful reform will have to be a long-term affair and will 
need to start simultaneously from the top as well as the bottom of the governance 
structures. 
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Annexure A 
  
Selection of local (town) governments for fiscal data 
Population-wise seven largest and most urbanised districts in the Punjab province were 
selected. Each district jurisdiction has 6 to 13 town governments which receive 80% of 
the property tax collected from their respective jurisdictions. These towns included most 
of the sites where I observed tax collectors and interviewed tax staff and others. 
Figure A.1: Map of Punjab showing districts (circled) from where fiscal data of the 
town governments was collected 
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Annexure B 
 
For selection of districts for observing tax collectors I had two criteria: 
• The first, was to have a sample of the four largest districts, one from each of the 
four distinct socio-economic zones of the province, including Lahore: 
According to the UNICEF led periodic Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, Punjab can 
be divided into four zones in terms of ‘quality of life index’ on the basis of selected 
socio-economic indicators: north, central and south and west (Andrabi et al., 2008a). I 
decided not to pick a site from the western zone since the area was recovering from 
widespread flooding in 2010, and none of the five City Districts of Punjab are located 
there.  
Punjab has a population of about 90 million. Administratively it is divided in 36 
districts out of which five are most populous and highly urbanised ‘City Districts’. In 
descending order of population size, these are Lahore, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, 
Rawalpindi and Multan. Three large cities, Lahore, Faisalabad and Gujranwala are in 
central Punjab, while Rawalpindi and Multan are in north and south Punjab 
respectively.   
• The second criterion was to select observation sites (property tax jurisdictions) 
with highest property tax collection in their respective zones, and which were farthest 
from the provincial capital, Lahore: 
Lahore is divided in two property tax Regions. As shown in figure B.1, Lahore- Region 
B is the highest property tax collector. Faisalabad and Gujranwala were not selected 
because they are located in central Punjab. Multan and Rawalpindi meet the criterion of 
being highest property taxers in north and south Punjab respectively, and also happen to 
be farthest (see figure B.2) from Lahore. The distance from the provincial capital was an 
important criterion, because greater distance implies less direct supervision by the 
higher level officers of the ETD including the Secretary and the Director General, who 
are based in Lahore.  
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Additional sites for Interviews 
In addition to interviews at my observation sites, I interviewed tax collectors and 
other public servants at Sialkot, Sahiwal, Khanewal and Murree. This was primarily 
a convenience sample but each site had unique characteristics in terms of level of 
local supervision. Sahiwal is a small regional headquarter; Khanewal is a small 
district headquarter reporting to Multan region; Murree is a small sub-district 
jurisdiction reporting to Rawalpindi; Sialkot is a medium-sized district headquarter 
where a digitalisation pilot project was being implemented by the ETD during my 
fieldwork. The main reason for choosing a variety of jurisdictions was to investigate 
whether there was any fundamental difference in the way the lower level staff 
functions in remoter districts, with reduced direct supervision of middle and higher 
level superiors. 
Figure B.1: District-wise property tax collection in Punjab (average for 5 years: 
FY2006-7 to FY2010-11) 
 
Source: Director General’s office, Excise and Taxation Department, Punjab 
Legend: Interview sites: × + ü   ;   Observation sites: ü   
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Figure B.2: Map showing cities where I observed tax collectors and conducted 
interviews 
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